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FOREWORD 
We are pleased to introduce this volume, which summarizes the 
proceedings of an important and timely conference on the key policy 
challenge of reinvigorating credit growth in Central, Eastern, and Southern 
European Economies (CESEE).1 The need to act decisively and remove 
structural barriers to a high and sustainable credit expansion has been a 
core preoccupation of policymakers in the region and the IMF since the 
onset of the Global Financial Crisis, and is widely recognized as a critical 
prerequisite to establishing a new growth momentum. 
Indeed, even seven years after the onset of the crisis, and after experiencing 
a sharp contraction in both credit and economic activity, much of the 
CESEE region still suffers from low credit and economic growth. And the 
worry is that, without a reinvigoration of the reform momentum, this “low 
growth” performance could become the “new normal.”  
The fact that this conference was able to attract such an impressive group 
of senior European policymakers—including 15 governors and  
vice-governors of central banks—provides both a testament to the 
commitment of policymakers to engaging on these issues and recognition 
of the importance of continued efforts. The two-day event provided an 
encouraging degree of consensus on where these efforts need to be 
concentrated.  
It is our sincere hope that this event, and the summary of the discussions 
that have been compiled here, will provide a useful springboard for moving 
forward with bolder actions and reforms that will help put the region on a 
solid growth path.   
José Viñals 
Financial Counsellor 
Director of the Monetary and Capital 
Markets Department 
International Monetary Fund 
Boštjan Jazbec 
Governor 
Bank of Slovenia 
 
                                                 
1 The conference was held in Portorož, Slovenia on September 25–26, 2014. 
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I.   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
__________________________________________________ 
Marco Piñón, Advisor, Monetary and Capital Markets 
Department, IMF 
The IMF-Bank of Slovenia high-level conference2 on 
“Reinvigorating Credit Growth in Central, Eastern, and Southern 
European Economies (CESEE)” attracted prominent 
policymakers in the CESEE region, as well as from the rest of 
Europe and elsewhere. This participation testified to the 
importance that was attached to the opportunity to come together 
and discuss the issues weighing on the region’s recovery.  
Indeed, reactivating credit in the CESEE represents one of the 
most important challenges to improving the economic prospects 
of the region in the years ahead. Recoveries without the support 
of healthy levels of credit, so called “creditless recoveries,” tend 
to be subpar and less sustainable. In the case of the CESEE, 
seven years after the onset of the global financial crisis, and the 
ensuing collapse in credit, lending and broader economic growth 
remain anemic in most countries. 
Although policymakers have placed an appropriate emphasis on 
the need to jump-start credit, the design of effective policy 
responses has been elusive. What is often required are difficult 
institutional changes and deep reforms that can threaten deeply 
rooted practices or vested interests, or have costs that are 
difficult to bear given the difficult fiscal situation in most 
CESEE countries. Instead, the focus has often been on easier 
measures to boost credit that may have only a temporary or 
                                                 
2 Held in Portorož, Slovenia on September 25–26, 2014. 
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palliative effect, or unintended and undesirable macroeconomic 
consequences.  
Background 
The 2008 global financial crisis was markedly different from 
several previous crises. In contrast with other episodes, when 
weak credit growth was associated with emerging and 
developing economies, this time the epicenter of the crisis was 
the advanced countries of the world. And, while many of these 
countries still suffer from the after-effects of the crisis, emerging 
market economies have been generally resilient.  
However, the experience of the CESEE region differs markedly 
from that of other emerging markets. Not only did the CESEE 
region experience a more abrupt and severe drop in credit levels 
during 2008–09 (albeit following an equally striking rally in the 
preceding years) but, with very few exceptions, CESEE 
countries continue to face depressed credit levels and uncertain 
credit growth prospects.  
Recent studies and surveys point to a range of factors as likely 
drivers of credit developments in the CESEE region. 
Econometric estimates indicate that global factors, domestic 
macroeconomic conditions, and domestic and parent bank 
fundamentals all played a role. Interestingly, the results suggest 
that while macroeconomic factors were important, particularly in 
the early phases of the crisis, bank fundamentals gained 
relevance over time. In particular, depressed credit levels appear 
to be related to an important extent to domestic banks’ asset 
quality, liquidity constraints, and capital reserves, as well as to 
parent banks’ funding costs and capitalization. 
A survey conducted by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 
the context of the Vienna Initiative 2 confirms the key 
econometric findings. The survey, which was completed by a 
large sample of bankers operating in the CESEE area, points to 
local nonperforming loans (NPLs) as well as group NPL figures 
as the most important factors explaining weak credit 
performance in the CESEE region. It also finds that the local and 
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global market outlook and the local and global funding outlook 
have become less binding constraints and, in some instances, are 
already helping to reactivate credit growth.  Beyond the factors 
identified by the econometric studies, the survey indicates that, 
to a lesser but still important extent, changes in local and global 
regulations have also affected credit growth negatively.  
A survey conducted by the IMF on measures to promote credit 
growth adopted around the world, including in the CESEE 
region, offers further insights. The survey was applied to 
42 countries, covering 50 policy categories. The results were 
then used to identify policy gaps with significant potential 
impact for the CESEE region, by comparing the measures 
adopted (or not) with the factors identified as driving credit 
conditions in the same countries. 
A key finding is that the CESEE region lags behind considerably 
in terms of bank restructuring efforts with respect to other parts 
of the world, including the advanced economies. This is a 
meaningful finding considering that NPLs and, more generally, 
bank fundamentals, both domestic and foreign, appear to be the 
key drivers of slow credit growth. It also finds that there is 
significant room for further corporate and household debt 
restructuring efforts, although in this case lagging efforts appear 
to be widespread also outside the CESEE region. The survey 
also finds that virtually no capital market measures have been 
adopted in the region, suggesting that this could also be a fertile 
ground to activate nonbank credit.  
Against this background, the conference’s discussions were 
centered on four high-level panels covering a wide range of 
relevant issues. 
Panel 1—Repairing balance sheets and other challenges  
During the discussions, there was broad consensus that 
strengthening banks’ weak balance sheets should be at the core 
of any efforts to reactivate credit growth on a sustainable basis, 
and that more decisive efforts in this regard are needed in most 
CESEE countries. Capital injections had often not been 
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sufficient or timely, and efforts to address high NPLs had not 
gone far enough in most cases. At the same time, the general 
view was that improvements are not only needed for banks’ 
balance sheets, but also for corporations and households, where 
efforts are lagging even further. 
Panelists generally expressed the view that efforts on multiple 
fronts were needed, involving a coordinated approach that calls 
for actions that go well beyond the purview of the central bank 
and supervisory authorities. Going forward, the primary focus 
should be on forceful measures to improve the quality of 
institutions, legislation, and regulations. The priority should be 
on removing barriers that hinder NPL resolution, such as 
inappropriate and inefficient insolvency and tax legislation. But 
efforts are also needed on other fronts, including to improve and 
reinforce risk management strategies and corporate governance. 
Some panelists called for more coordinated macroeconomic 
policies, where fiscal policies are more supportive of monetary 
and structural policies. Others, however, emphasized the limited 
fiscal space in many CESEE countries, and that an unintended 
consequence of monetary easing could be further delays in 
identifying and correcting the underlying imbalances.  
Panel 2—Prospects for credit growth and for foreign bank 
engagement in the region 
The discussions focused on the role played by foreign banks in 
explaining credit developments in CESEE countries, particularly 
in the context of the global crisis and the subsequent regulatory 
reforms. Several panelists pointed out that a more appropriate 
distinction between banks would be in terms of management 
practices instead of ownership. In their view, many foreign 
banks had displayed lower levels of NPLs and managed to 
maintain higher levels of credit. Furthermore, foreign banks had 
brought considerable benefits to the CESEE before the crisis, 
including more efficient intermediation and improved access to 
credit by the corporate sector. Nevertheless, participants agreed 
that foreign banks have an ongoing role to play and that it will be 
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important to ensure their long-term commitment to their host 
country. 
Regarding the causes of foreign banks’ weak credit growth, the 
diversity of experiences within the CESEE region illustrated 
that, while deleveraging was an important driver of credit 
developments, this was a needed correction to earlier credit 
excesses; and that macroeconomic fundamentals were an 
important determinant of credit developments in specific 
countries. With respect to regulatory reforms, at both the 
European Union (EU) and international levels, there was 
agreement that stricter capital and liquidity requirements may 
have dampened credit, but also that in the long run this would be 
offset by the benefits of a more stable financial system, 
improved confidence, and lower costs of bank financing.  
Panel 3—Measures to revive credit markets: best practices and 
pitfalls 
The panel acknowledged that the continued weakness in credit is 
partly a correction that still needs to run its course. Several 
panelists mentioned that confidence needs to be restored before 
credit growth can be expected and saw the recent asset quality 
review and stress tests as helping to restore confidence and credit 
growth in the medium run. Still, credit growth may continue to 
be weak in the short run, especially in banks that are short of 
capital. Moreover, panelists stressed that structural reforms have 
stalled and need to be reinvigorated if sustained credit and 
economic growth are to return anytime soon. 
The panel discussed alternatives to bank funding, especially for 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The consensus 
view was that alternatives to bank financing should be 
developed, and that financial markets should play a greater role. 
Securitization and further development of ABS markets were 
seen as plausible alternatives to bank lending. Other alternatives 
included venture capital funds, joint venture funds, and 
development of mini-bond markets. 
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Regarding central bank schemes, panelists observed that these 
have a role to play in creating the necessary conditions for 
liquidity to be channeled to the real economy, but cautioned that 
in the past they have not always been successful. In particular, 
they stressed that central banks’ direct credit or subsidies to 
SMEs pose risks, such as political interference. To minimize 
political interference, some panelists suggested that multilateral 
institutions could play a greater role as intermediaries. 
Panel 4—Risks of a new financial crisis affecting the CESEE 
region 
The panel discussed the vulnerability of the CESEE region to a 
new financial crisis. Encouragingly, most felt that the near-term 
risks were relatively modest, especially since many countries had 
reduced their reliance on parent or wholesale funding, and 
dollarization/euroization had diminished. However, they also 
warned that medium-term risks remained, which called for 
sustained reform efforts.  
Panelists discussed vulnerabilities resulting from market 
rigidities in Europe, debt overhangs, and weak balance sheets in 
the CESEE region and more broadly in Europe. While these 
factors were not seen as posing near-term risks, they tended to 
depress demand and growth, and therefore prevented institutions 
from rebuilding their capital and other buffers, leaving them 
exposed to future shocks.  
The panel also discussed risks resulting from geopolitical 
developments outside the CESEE region, protracted low growth 
in Europe, and the normalization of global monetary conditions. 
It was acknowledged that the region was already feeling the 
impact of economic developments in Russia, and panelists 
warned that a slowdown in emerging markets could have a 
significant impact on Europe and, in particular, on the CESEE 
area, given that its exports have been one of the most dynamic 
sectors. The prospective tightening of U.S. (and U.K.) monetary 
policy could potentially lead to a large re-pricing of assets and a 
return to higher risk premiums, which could also put strains on 
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the region given the aforementioned lack of buffers and the lack 
of progress in balance sheet repair. 
Panelists agreed that the current period of relative calm 
represents a window of opportunity to reduce the risk of a 
renewed crisis by tackling the underlying vulnerabilities. With 
high and rising NPLs, action is needed to address the issue of 
debt overhang, including at the level of corporates and 
sovereigns. Buffers need to be rebuilt, and this will require steps 
to promote orderly balance sheet restructuring and the restoration 
of sustained bank profitability. But addressing underlying 
weaknesses—especially the low long-term trend growth rate—
will require structural measures that go beyond the financial 
system and encompass labor markets, education systems, and 
new and innovative European financing vehicles.  
Conclusions 
While weak credit reflects a natural response to the 
overleveraging that occurred prior to the crisis, and will need to 
run its course, in much of the CESEE region this process still 
needs to be supported by decisive structural and other reforms to 
avoid more permanent damage to the credit channel and output 
growth. What appears to be weighing on the region is a legacy of 
inadequate or incomplete efforts to address the weak balance 
sheets not only of banks, but also of corporations and 
households.  
The role of foreign banks in this recovery process also needs 
careful thought. Deleveraging by foreign banks has dampened 
credit in the region, but at the same time foreign banks have 
contributed to significant efficiency gains in most countries and 
have had a positive impact on credit growth in countries with 
stronger macroeconomic policies and market outlook. While 
regulatory reforms at both national and global levels have 
weighed on credit, such measures offer the eventual promise of a 
more stable financial system.  
A further lesson for the region from the crisis is the importance 
of developing more diversified sources of investment financing, 
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especially for SMEs, including through securitization and further 
development of ABS markets, venture capital funds, and the 
development of mini-bond markets. While direct credit by 
central banks or credit subsidies to SMEs can help jump-start the 
credit channel, such schemes are not always effective, can distort 
credit allocation in ways that are not growth friendly, and are 
prone to political interference. But, more generally, the panels 
agreed that there could be a role for multilateral institutions in 
assisting in the development of credit diversification. 
The core conclusion of the event was the importance of injecting 
a new momentum to the implementation of structural reforms. 
These measures need to go beyond merely reactivating credit, 
and should be geared toward addressing the weak balance sheets 
of financial institutions, the corporate sector, and households. 
They also need to extend beyond financial issues and address the 
more fundamental impediments to strong and sustained growth, 
especially those in the labor markets and education systems. 
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II.   OPENING REMARKS 
 
A.   Boštjan Jazbec, Governor, Bank of Slovenia 
It is a great pleasure to welcome you all to the high-level seminar 
on reinvigorating credit growth in Central, Eastern, and Southern 
European Economies (CESEE), organized jointly by the Bank of 
Slovenia and International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is indeed a 
great honor to have a very distinguished gathering of central 
bank governors and vice governors, senior officials of other 
international financial institutions, former public officials and 
leading academics to discuss a very critical issue that occupies 
the minds of policymakers in the region and elsewhere.  
The objectives of the seminar are to learn about the diverse 
experiences of different countries in the region and to exchange 
views on the policy challenges and possible responses. The 
appropriate policy responses necessarily are country-specific and 
must take into account the heterogeneity within the various 
sectors of the economy and the role of idiosyncratic and 
institutional factors. Still, important lessons can be drawn from 
cross-country comparisons.  
The presentations and discussion in the seminar will focus on 
four main themes: (1) repairing balance sheets in the financial 
system and the corporate and household sectors; (2) the role of 
foreign banks in fostering credit growth; (3) best practices for 
reviving credit markets and the pitfalls; and (4) risks of a new 
financial crisis. I will now briefly touch on these themes in 
general terms.  
How the situation has changed! Not that long ago, policymakers 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were concerned about the 
issue of rapid credit growth. A key question then was whether 
rapid credit growth should be seen as an endless boom or as an 
early warning.  
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As we all know very well, the boom turned to bust abruptly in 
2008. The turmoil in international financial markets and the 
consequent collapse in output in major developed economies 
also adversely impacted the countries in Central, Eastern and 
Southern Europe in varying degrees through a combination of 
the trade, financial and domestic demand channels.  
A fallout of the global financial crisis was balance sheet 
recession in the region. The rapid credit growth during the pre-
crisis boom period was grounded in excessive borrowing and 
risk-taking by banks and enterprises. Banks relied heavily on 
external wholesale funding, and the rapid credit expansion took 
place against very limited equity capital in the corporate sector. 
The global financial crisis exposed these balance sheet 
vulnerabilities. The onset of the crisis caused a sudden stop in 
external financing, and countries in the region were caught in a 
vicious cycle of reduced credit availability, deleveraging, rising 
NPLs, and a cutback in corporate investment and output. 
Much of the region is still suffering from the fallout of the global 
crisis. In a large number of countries, economic recovery 
remains feeble and bank credit is still contracting. For these 
countries, reviving credit growth is considered essential to 
achieving a strong and durable output expansion. However, the 
task is complex.  
Boosting credit growth, without addressing the large sectoral and 
aggregate imbalances in the economy that had built up during the 
credit boom years, can be risky. Matters may become worse if 
additional credit availability enables enterprises to postpone 
balance sheet adjustment. In the wake of a balance sheet 
recession, the allocation of credit matters more than its aggregate 
amount. It is important that good borrowers rather than the bad 
ones are the main beneficiaries of credit growth.  
It is not surprising that much of the CESEE region is 
experiencing a slow so-called creditless recovery. Balance sheet 
recessions are typically not very responsive to traditional 
demand management measures. This is because the monetary 
policy transmission channel is impaired by the weak balance 
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sheets of banks and the corporate sector. As long as asset quality 
is poor and capital is inadequate, banks will tend to restrict 
overall credit supply. Liquidity may not be a binding constraint 
in such a situation. As has been argued by some analysts in the 
context of an unexpectedly low take-up in the recent first auction 
of liquidity under the European Central Bank's (ECB) targeted 
longer-term refinancing operation (TLTRO) program, the 
profitability of borrowing very cheaply from the central bank to 
lend to the private sector (especially (SMEs)) is not guaranteed if 
NPLs are high and banks need to allow for high expected default 
rates, and if lending to SMEs implies high risk weights and, 
consequently, capital charges.  
Credit demand also is weak in a balance sheet recession. Bank 
lending surveys in the region indicate that credit demand has 
decreased since the onset of the global crisis. An important 
factor weighing down credit demand is the corporate debt 
overhang. The easing of monetary conditions will not necessarily 
induce higher borrowing while highly indebted companies are 
focused on deleveraging.  
Thus, repairing the balance sheets of both the banking sector and 
corporate sector is a priority for unlocking credit growth. A 
complicating factor here is that the maximum possible speed for 
completing bank restructuring is typically faster than that for 
corporate restructuring, even if all the enabling legislative and 
institutional frameworks for the latter are in place. So, the 
resumption of credit growth may take a while. There also is a 
worrisome aspect of the different restructuring speeds of the two 
sectors. Experience shows that, when enterprise restructuring is 
lagging, NPLs continue to accumulate and erode the capital 
buffer of banks created by their recapitalization, creating a likely 
need for another round of capital injection.  
Revival of credit growth is also difficult because of the tensions 
between monetary policy considerations and financial stability 
considerations. The global crisis has demonstrated very clearly 
the importance of having adequate safeguards in place to prevent 
unhealthy risk taking and the creation of credit bubbles. All 
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central banks in the region are now in the process of putting in 
place frameworks to strengthen bank supervision, enhance risk 
management and governance standards, and increase 
transparency and statistical disclosure. National authorities also 
are establishing the institutional framework for macroprudential 
oversight of the financial system. These prudential aspects of the 
financial policy framework are meant to reduce the amplitude of 
financial cycles. However, they also are likely to dampen the 
pace of credit growth.  
It also should be recognized that it will not be possible to achieve 
durable economic growth underpinned by abundant credit in the 
same manner as that pursued during the pre-crisis boom period. 
It will be necessary to limit the reliance on debt-financing and 
shift towards more equity financing. Given the need to ensure 
fiscal sustainability, recourse to more state funding for 
restructuring the economy and increasing investment is not a 
feasible option. An appropriate business environment has to be 
created for attracting new non-debt capital flows. This will 
require addressing the institutional and regulatory bottlenecks 
that currently inhibit investment. In this context, increasing the 
efficiency of the legislative and judiciary systems will be 
extremely important.  
Not all CESEE countries have been equally hit by the crisis. 
Indeed, a few countries in the region managed to escape the 
worst effects of the financial crisis, highlighting the role of 
country-specific factors. Economic growth and strong credit 
expansion in these countries have resumed after a brief pause. 
For them, an important question is whether the momentum can 
be sustained. Based on the lessons from the crisis, a key priority 
for these countries should be to prevent a build-up of imbalances 
that could threaten financial and macroeconomic stability. The 
main tasks are to identify and implement on a timely basis 
measures to curb the boom and to build the capacity to cope with 
a possible bust. An advantage here is that, because of the 
differences in cyclical position, policy conflict between 
monetary policy and prudential policy is absent, unlike in the 
case of countries suffering from balance sheet recession.  
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Given the integration of CESEE countries in the world financial 
markets, credit growth in these countries has acquired an 
international dimension. There is a significant presence of 
foreign-owned banks, and external funding is an important 
source of bank liquidity. While external bank funding for the 
region has been on a declining trend since the onset of the global 
crisis and sizeable deleveraging has already occurred, parent 
bank funding still represents a large share of bank funding in 
several CESEE countries. Thus, countries in the region are 
highly vulnerable to changes in the external environment. If 
parent banks come under pressure to deleverage and build up 
capital in the period ahead on account of the results of the just 
concluded euro area asset quality review and stress tests or 
because of tighter global financial conditions, the liquidity 
support for credit growth in the daughter banks may not be 
forthcoming.  
I would like to conclude by pointing out that central banks alone 
cannot succeed in reviving credit growth and economic growth. 
Putting the economies in the region back on track will require an 
integrated national policy strategy to restore the health of the 
financial sector, restructure the corporate sector, reinforce the 
sustainability of the public finances, improve the flexibility of 
product and labor markets, and reform the business environment. 
Because of the complementarity of the measures, coordination 
between government agencies and other stakeholders is essential 
in policy implementation. Successful and timely policy 
implementation will require political resolve and social 
consensus. If there is no determined follow-through on policies, 
the fragile recovery that is underway will come to an end and 
economic problems will intensify. 
B.   Christopher Towe, Deputy Director, Monetary and 
Capital Markets Department, IMF 
Thank you very much Governor Jazbec for these very helpful 
opening remarks. Let me just add a few additional thoughts 
before we begin with the first session.  
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At the outset, I would like to underscore the importance of the 
topics that we will be debating today and tomorrow.  
Like the Governor, I too find it ironic that we are meeting here 
today to discuss how to reinvigorate credit when only 10 years 
ago the worry was excess credit growth. Indeed, almost exactly 
10 years ago, the IMF co-hosted a conference in this region 
whose proceedings were published in a book entitled—Rapid 
Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe: Endless Boom or 
Early Warning?  
Unfortunately, for all of us, the answer to that question was that 
rapid credit growth, especially cross-border credit, was an early 
warning for crisis.  
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that lending in foreign 
currency was excessive, there was inadequate risk management 
by foreign banks, macroprudential oversight was too weak, and 
home-host relations were not robust enough. 
And while it is encouraging that considerable progress has been 
made in addressing these shortcomings, the region is still 
struggling with twin hangovers from the global financial crisis 
and home-grown credit busts. These have undermined the credit 
channel, left balance sheets still fragile, and dampened growth. 
And, as the IMF has recently reported to the G20, the economic 
environment is likely to become more challenging in the period 
ahead. 
Yes, we expect the global recovery to regain strength in the 
coming year, on the back of exceptionally supportive financial 
conditions and moderating fiscal consolidation. And 
strengthening balance sheets also should support the recovery in 
the remainder of 2014 and into 2015.  
However, downside risks have increased, including those related 
to geopolitical tensions, continued signs of deflation pressures in 
some regions, and the possibility of a disorderly renormalization 
of the United States’ (U.S.) monetary policy. A more 
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fundamental concern is that the new normal post-crisis will be 
much lower potential growth. Moreover, there is growing 
concern that easy monetary policies globally are leading to 
financial excesses and asset price overvaluations in some 
markets, which could increase the chances of a disorderly 
unwinding when monetary accommodation is unwound. 
So I would leave you with three thoughts as we begin our 
discussions today and tomorrow. 
First, the issues we are to address are vitally important for the 
economic well-being and financial stability of the region. 
Second, with increasing risks globally, there is an even greater 
urgency now to tackle the impediments to sound and  
growth-enhancing credit. 
Third, the fact that we have been fortunate enough to assemble 
here such an impressive number of key policymakers from the 
region provides a unique opportunity to engage in a frank and 
candid dialogue on these issues. I am confident that this 
opportunity will be seized by all of you and look forward to 
lively, policy relevant, and fruitful discussions. 
With these remarks, let me close by thanking Governor Jazbec 
and his team for having organized this event, especially in such a 
lovely venue.  
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III.   WHAT IS DRIVING CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS? 
CAN SOMETHING BE DONE? 
 
A.   Lead: Marco Piñón, Advisor, Monetary and Capital 
Markets Department, IMF3 
It is a pleasure to be here before such a distinguished audience. 
The topic that brings us here is an important one for the CESEE 
economies. Indeed, reinvigorating credit growth on a sustainable 
basis will be important because it relates directly to the  
well-being of the people of the region. The idea of this seminar 
is to benefit from the collective experience of high-level policy 
practitioners, from within and outside the region. Key questions 
that we will try to answer together in this event include: what 
works or at least has better prospects of working, and what are 
the costs and benefits of different alternatives?  
In this session, the idea is to offer background information for 
each of the key questions that have been posed to the four panel 
discussions that follow. It is organized in four parts. First, it 
gives a quick assessment of credit growth performance in the 
region; second, it aims to shed light on the factors that are likely 
to be driving credit growth; third, it discusses the measures that 
have been taken to revitalize credit, both in the region and in 
other parts of the world; and fourth, it suggests possible ways 
forward by comparing part two (what drives credit) and part 
three (what has and has not been done). 
                                                 
3 Mr. Piñón’s presentation was co-authored by Johannes Ehrentraud and Benjamin Huston, 
Economist and Research Assistant, respectively; from the Monetary and Capital Markets 
Department, IMF. 
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CESEE credit growth performance 
Starting with the first part: how is credit performing in the 
CESEE region? The red line in Figure 1 depicts credit growth in 
annual terms for (a selection of) advanced economies. It shows 
that after the drop resulting from the global crisis in 2008–09, 
credit has remained fairly stagnant in real terms, even further 
contracting throughout the crisis. In the case of (selected) 
emerging market economies (green line), the drop in credit 
following the global crisis was less severe, and it has since 
recovered. In some sense, this crisis is different from what we 
have seen in the past, and the old saying “when developed 
countries catch a cold, emerging economies get pneumonia” did 
not generally apply. Except in Europe! In the case of the CEESE 
region (blue line), excluding Russia and Turkey, having 
experienced a substantial boom before the crisis, credit collapsed 
and thereafter credit growth has remained, on average, negative. 
While these are arithmetic averages of growth rates and there is a 
lot of heterogeneity across countries, credit for the region as a 
whole is not performing well.  
Before turning to the next part, let us look at Russia and Turkey, 
which were excluded from the previous analysis, where the story 
is different. 
In these cases (dotted line), credit collapsed initially but, much 
like the emerging economies in other parts of the world, it 
bounced right back soon after. This raises a different question: is 
this sustainable, or is it a repeat of what we saw before the crisis? 
And if it’s a repeat, what can be done to prevent another large 
correction? 
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Figure 1. Real Bank Credit Growth, by Region 
(In percent, year over year) 
 
Source: EBRD, BIS, IMF staff estimates 
Note: vertical black line denotes onset of global financial crisis. 
 
To take another look at the same issue, Figure 2 classifies 
countries by their rate of credit growth (quarterly average over a 
one-year period). The first column shows that credit in most 
advanced economies is still contracting in real terms or 
expanding only moderately. In contrast, the second column 
shows that (a selection of) non-European emerging economies 
are already exhibiting clear signs of credit expansion, sometimes 
vigorously. In the case of the CESEE region as a whole (third 
column), credit is still generally contracting, six years after the 
onset of the global crisis. As previously presented, this chart 
confirms that for a few cases, notably Russia and Turkey, credit 
growth is vigorous, behaving similarly to that observed in non-
European emerging economies.  
To summarize, while credit growth has already resumed for most 
of the emerging markets outside Europe, the majority of CESEE 
countries continue to experience negative credit growth, much 
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Figure 2. Average Credit Growth, by Region 
 Advanced Economies Other Emerging Market Economics 
Central, Eastern, 
and Southeastern 
Europe 
Contracting 
Austria  Albania 
Denmark  Croatia 
France  Czech Republic 
Germany  Hungary 
Greece  Latvia 
Ireland  Lithuania 
Italy  Romania 
Portugal  Slovenia 
Spain   
United Kingdom   
Moderate 
Belgium  Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Finland  Bulgaria 
Korea  Estonia 
Norway  FYR Macedonia  
Sweden  Poland 
United States  Slovak Republic 
Expanding 
Japan Brazil Montenegro 
Luxembourg India  
Netherlands Malaysia  
Singapore Mexico  
Switzerland South Africa  
Rapidly 
Expanding 
 Argentina Moldova 
 China Russia 
 Indonesia Turkey 
 Thailand  
 
Source: EBRD, BIS, IMF staff estimates 
Note: bank credit is measured as the average of real FX-adjusted quarterly bank credit growth over the 
period of 2013Q-2013Q4. 
Average credit growth levels are:  “Contracting” is  between -10 percent and 0 percent, “Moderate”  is 
between 0 percent and 3 percent, “Expanding” is greater than 3 percent and less than 10 percent, “Rapidly 
Expanding” is greater than 10 percent. 
 
like many of the developed economies, including in Europe. 
Moreover, with some exceptions, recent developments do not 
point to a clear trend toward an improvement. 
Factors explaining credit growth 
Let me move to the second part of this section. To shed light on 
what may be behind credit developments in CESEE countries, 
we have used a number of complementary approaches 
(Figure 3). Borrowing from recent econometric research at the 
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Figure 3. Approaches to Identify Credit Constraints 
 
 
Figure 4. Bank-Level Panel Analysis 
 
*Analysis done by Gregorio Impavido, Jerome Vandenbussche, and Li Zeng (IMF-EUR). 
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remain
Main Results
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IMF’s European Department, one approach that we have used is 
panel regressions, that is, the estimation of pooled time series 
cross-country regressions (with fixed effects), with generally 
encouraging results. Another one is disequilibrium (between 
supply and demand) models, which are time series models for 
individual countries. Although typically less robust than panel 
models, the results of disequilibrium models tend to offer similar 
intuition. To complement this, we have also taken advantage of 
two leading bank lending surveys for the region: the first one is 
the CESEE Bank Lending Survey and the other is the Institute 
for International Finance (IIF) Emerging Market Bank Lending 
Survey. 
So, we are trying to use different or alternative approaches that, 
as a group, will give us a broad view of the likely “suspects,” 
that is, factors that we should focus on as possible drivers of 
credit growth (or lack thereof) in the CESEE region. For the 
purposes of this presentation, we would like to concentrate now 
on the first econometric approach, which is the panel analysis, 
and the CESEE Bank Lending Survey. 
The results of the bank-panel model estimated by staff of the 
European Department of the IMF were initially published last 
year, but were updated for this conference last June. So they are 
fairly recent and are available online. This model uses individual 
bank-level data for 2005–12 and it covers 75 banks, both 
domestic and external, in nine countries. It uses three sets of 
explanatory variables to ascertain which ones may be driving 
credit growth: macroeconomic factors, domestic bank 
fundamentals, and parent bank conditions. 
The results are not surprising and show that both bank 
fundamentals (domestic and foreign) and macroeconomic 
conditions matter. What we have found interesting is that the 
relative importance of these two factors appears to be shifting. In 
the early part of the global crisis, their importance was more or 
less evenly distributed but, as the crisis evolved, bank 
fundamentals appear to have gained importance.  
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Let’s look at some details of the estimated panel analysis 
equation. In the equation, higher asset quality, liquidity, and 
capital reserves, and are found to be associated with higher credit 
growth. For parent bank characteristics, we find that lower 
funding cost and capitalization of the parent increases credit 
growth. Again, the results are not surprising. 
Another way to look at this, using the same equation, is in the 
two charts below (Figure 5). The top chart shows the variance 
decomposition of credit growth for domestic banks. The drop in 
credit growth now and the average rate observed during 2002–08 
can be explained by two bars: the one in blue shows how much 
of the drop is explained by bank fundamentals; and the one in 
red shows how much of it is explained by macroeconomic 
conditions. As you can see, in the early years of the crisis, the 
model tells you that, roughly half was explained by bank 
fundamentals and half by macroeconomic conditions. But as the 
crisis evolved, the breakdown seems to have changed, with bank 
fundamentals becoming more important. A similar story is told 
by the lower chart for foreign banks. The only difference is that 
we have included one more variable, which is parent conditions, 
i.e., bank fundamentals for foreign banks. We found generally 
the same conclusion, that is, that bank fundamentals and parent 
bank conditions appear to be driving the poor performance of 
credit growth in the region. 
Before moving to the results of the surveys, let me digress 
slightly and briefly discuss the issue of how external or domestic 
factors are driving credit. The original version of the panel 
regression estimated by the IMF’s European Department 
included global factors as one of the retained explanatory 
variables. The conclusion at that time was that global factors 
were important drivers of the drop in credit at the beginning of 
the crisis, but also that they were becoming less important as 
domestic conditions became more relevant. This was an intuitive 
result consistent with our priors. Thus, it comes as no surprise 
that, in the re-estimated model with more recent data, this 
 variable dropped out (i.e., was not statistically significant). 
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Figure 5. Credit Growth Decomposition, 2001–2007 
(In percent of total credit growth) 
Domestic Banks 
 
Foreign Banks 
 
 
Source: IMF staff calculations; analysis done by Gregorio Impavido, Jerome Vandenbussche and Li Zeng. 
Note: credit growth decomposition was estimated relative to average credit growth over 2001-2007 pre-crisis 
period. 
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To shed more light on this, the charts below show the emerging 
markets bond index (EMBI) spread for Europe (Figure 6) and a 
comparison of the evolution of NPLs in the CESEE region, 
advanced economies, and (selected) emerging markets 
(Figure 7). The EMBI jumped to very high levels at the 
beginning of the global crisis, and while there have been 
subsequent spikes, these have been smaller. At present, while 
still above pre-crisis levels, the EMBI is substantially below the 
levels observed during the crisis. I think we can say, with some 
confidence that this suggests that global factors, while important, 
are unlikely to be a critical determinant factor for credit growth. 
In contrast, if we look at the comparison of NPLs between the 
developed, developing economies and then Europe, we can see 
that the economies where credit recovered quickly in emerging 
markets have lower and declining NPLs, after a little spike at the 
time of the crisis. Yes, there is an identification issue here, 
although it is partially addressed in the previous econometric 
work presented above. However, it is interesting to note that in 
the developed economies, which are also facing a credit growth 
problem, NPLs have continued to increase. Now, what is 
happening in the CESEE countries? They also see an increase, 
but at a much more rapid pace. While these are only arithmetic 
averages, they not only show a dramatic increase, but also just as 
worrisome, no clear downward trend. 
Now, let us move away from the econometric results and turn to 
what the industry’s surveys tell us, i.e., what the banks’ views 
are regarding the factors that are driving credit growth. In this 
case, we will concentrate on the CESEE Bank Lending Survey 
prepared by the EIB. The survey is conducted twice a year, 
covering over 100 groups, both domestic and international. It 
includes a number of questions aimed at assessing demand and 
supply factors that may be driving credit growth. The results are 
interesting and generally support what the econometric work 
says. It finds that, while numerous factors affect credit growth, 
NPLs are the single most important factor. Second to NPLs, 
bankers believe that regulatory changes are also an important 
constraint.  
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Figure 6. EMBI Spread Europe 
(In basis points) 
 
Source: Bloomberg, IMF staff estimates. 
 
Figure 7. Nonperforming Loan Ratio, by Region 
(In percent) 
 
Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators. 
Nonperforming loan ratio is defined as the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. 
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In Figure 8 below, negative values means that credit conditions 
are getting worse, while positive values means that they are 
improving. As previously mentioned, the single most important 
factor according to banks is NPLs. And this was true for both 
domestic and external factors. Moreover, it is true for the 
previous six months and even more important in terms of 
expectations for the following six months (red versus blue bars). 
The survey also shows that bankers find changes in regulation, 
both local and at the EU level, also important. Somewhat 
surprisingly, they do not see funding, especially local, as a 
particularly important constraint. 
Before I turn to the next topic, let us explore further the results of 
the survey. Figure 9 shows the evolution over time of demand 
and supply factors constraining credit growth. Again, if the 
numbers are negative it means that things are getting worse. 
Conversely, when the numbers are positive, it means that things 
are getting better. According to this, conditions on the demand 
side have stabilized and have even moved from very negative to 
slightly positive. On the supply side, while becoming less 
negative, the results indicate conditions are still deteriorating, 
albeit at a slower pace. The next question here is what bankers 
expected for the future. Will this get better or worse? 
Interestingly, bankers expected both supply and demand to 
improve markedly over the following six months. Before we 
become overly optimistic, however, it is important to note that, 
according to the survey last year, there was also the expectation 
of a recovery, which did not fully materialize. 
Policies put in place to support credit 
Let me now move to the third part of the presentation. We have 
so far looked at how bad the problem seems to be, and 
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Figure 8. Factors Constraining Credit Supply 
(As a net percentage of positive and negative responses) 
Source: CESEE Lending Survey (H1-2014) 
Note: Negative values indicate tightening credit conditions. 
 
Figure 9. Outlook of Credit Supply and Demand Conditions 
(As a net percentage of positive and negative responses) 
Source: CESEE Lending Survey (H1-2014) 
Note: Negative values indicate tightening credit conditions. 
now we want to look at what policies have been put in place in 
the region so far. For that, I want to use the results of an IMF 
survey conducted late last year for 42 countries and questions 
covering over 50 policy categories. The results of this survey 
were published last year in the Global Financial Stability Report 
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(GFSR), although for the case of the CESEE countries, the 
survey was updated just two months ago.  
Figure 10. Taking Stock of Credit Policies Implemented 
Scope 
42 countries, including CESEE 
About 50 policy categories  
 Measures enhancing credit supply 
 Measures supporting credit demand  
Note: detailed table available online at 
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2013/02/pdf/appendix2_1.pdf 
 
Questions that were asked covered a wide array of measures to 
enhance credit adopted in the region and elsewhere. This is not 
to say that these measures are advisable. Clearly, some may not 
be effective or, under certain conditions, may entail higher costs 
than benefits. The purpose is to do a comprehensive survey of 
measures adopted. On the supply side, there were 50 policies in 
5 sub-categories: monetary policy, fiscal programs on credit, 
supportive financial sector regulation, capital market measures, 
and bank restructuring (Figure 11). On the demand side, it 
covered measures related to corporate and household debt 
restructuring, including government-led schemes, legal 
approaches, and workout plans (Figure 12).  
In Figures 13 and 14 below, “Y” denotes measures that have 
been implemented. It does not describe the specific measures 
taken or how deep or successful they have been. So it is a broad 
look into the general areas where countries are moving, a bird’s 
eye perspective of what has been done.  
Let’s take a look at credit supply policies. The left side of the 
table presents the responses for developed economies (both 
European and non-European), while the right side presents the 
results for CESEE economies. One of the first things that stands 
out is that the column on bank restructuring is sparsely populated 
in the case of CESEE, compared to developed economies. This is  
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Figure 11. Policies Enhancing Credit Supply 
Monetary policies 
 Monetary policy operations 
 Purchases of private sector assets 
 Lending facilities to firms and households via banks 
Fiscal programs 
 Direct extension of loans to firms and households 
 Subsidies and tax incentives 
 Credit guarantees  
Financial sector regulations 
 Reduction of RWs for SMEs 
 Forbearance on recognizing NPLs 
Capital market measures 
 Promotion of corporate bond markets and securitization 
Bank restructuring 
 Recapitalization programs 
 Asset purchases, and guarantees for bank assets 
 
Figure 12. Policies Supporting Credit Demand 
Corporate/ Household debt restructuring  
 Government-led scheme with contingent fiscal liabilities  
o Debt restructuring using state-owned banks or asset 
management companies 
o Subsidy and tax incentives 
 Legal approach (without direct fiscal involvement)  
o Moratorium on debt services 
o Amendments to bankruptcy-related rules 
 Coordination to reach orderly workout plan  
an interesting result given our finding from previous sections 
that the problem of high NPLs is more acute in these countries. 
As a first take, it appears to be an area in which much can still be 
done. 
Similarly, perhaps less significant, but still important, is the 
result for capital market measures. In the responses received, not 
a single CESEE country reported that they have adopted capital 
market measures. While some countries may not be large 
enough, it is an interesting result to keep in mind. For example, 
the possibility of a regional approach comes to mind as a 
possibility worth exploring. 
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Figure 13. Credit Demand Policies Implemented Since 2007 
  Monetary Policy Fiscal Programs on Credit 
Supportive 
Financial 
Regulation 
Capital Market 
Measures 
Bank 
Restructuring 
Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe Non-Euro-Area 
Albania Y 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Y 
Bulgaria Y 
Croatia Y Y Y 
Czech Republic 
Hungary Y Y 
Latvia Y 
Lithuania Y 
FYR Macedonia Y Y Y 
Moldova Y 
Montenegro Y 
Poland Y 
Romania Y Y 
Russia Y Y Y Y 
Serbia Y Y Y Y 
Turkey 
Ukraine Y Y     Y 
Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe Euro-Area 
Estonia Y 
Slovak Republic Y 
Slovenia Y Y Y   Y 
Other Euro Area 
Austria Y Y 
Belgium Y Y Y 
Finland Y 
France Y Y Y 
Germany Y Y Y 
Netherlands Y Y   Y Y 
Euro Area (periphery) 
Greece Y Y Y 
Ireland Y Y Y 
Italy Y Y Y Y Y 
Portugal Y Y Y 
Spain Y Y   Y Y 
Other Advanced Europe 
Denmark Y Y Y 
Iceland Y Y 
Norway Y Y 
Sweden Y 
United Kingdom Y Y   Y Y 
Non-European Countries 
Australia 
India Y Y Y Y Y 
Japan Y Y Y Y Y 
Korea Y Y Y Y Y 
South Africa 
United States Y Y Y Y 
Source: IMF staff. 
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Figure 14. Credit Supply Policies Implemented Since 2007 
  Corporate Debt Restructuring Household Debt Resolution 
Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe Non-Euro-Area 
Albania Y Y 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Y Y 
Bulgaria 
Croatia Y 
Czech Republic 
Hungary Y 
Latvia Y Y 
Lithuania Y Y 
FYR Macedonia 
Moldova Y Y 
Montenegro Y 
Poland 
Romania Y Y 
Russia 
Serbia Y 
Turkey 
Ukraine Y   
Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe Euro-Area 
Estonia Y Y 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia Y Y 
Other Euro Area 
Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands     
Euro Area (periphery) 
Greece Y Y 
Ireland Y Y 
Italy Y Y 
Portugal Y Y 
Spain Y Y 
Other Advanced Europe 
Denmark 
Iceland Y Y 
Norway 
Sweden 
United Kingdom   Y 
Non-European Countries 
Australia 
India Y 
Japan Y 
Korea Y Y 
South Africa 
United States Y Y 
Source: IMF staff. 
 
Let’s move to the other side of the equation, that is, the demand 
side. Compared to the supply side, here the picture is more 
mixed. Let’s look at the implementation of corporate and 
household debt restructuring across groups of countries. Starting 
with the first column covering developed economies, while 
implementation is rather mixed, it is interesting to note that all 
the countries that faced the strongest impact of the crisis, the so-
called periphery (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain), have 
implemented both corporate and household debt restructuring 
  42  
schemes. In the case of the CESEE area, the picture is more 
varied. In these countries, while some have implemented debt-
restructuring programs, particularly for corporations, many have 
not. While this is by no means definitive, the latter provides 
some evidence that more could be done in this area. Of course, a 
deeper analysis on a case-by-case basis, and taking into account 
other factors would still be needed.  
Before I conclude, let me qualify the analysis that we have so far 
presented. First, ascertaining causes and effects is difficult. But it 
is also essential to understand the root causes of low credit and 
hence, the potential effectiveness of alternative measures to 
revitalize it. While the econometric work presented above 
incorporated to some extent the latter, there is further work that 
could be carried out in this area. Also importantly, the analysis 
presented above did not elaborate on the costs and benefits of the 
alternatives measures, or on the medium-term financial 
implications, including whether there is fiscal space. Nor did it 
enter into the issue of the monetary framework, which clearly 
has implications for the viability of some measures. 
Nevertheless, despite these important qualifications, it should 
provide a broad but useful framework to see where further 
analysis and policy efforts could concentrate.  
Figure 15. Policy Considerations 
 
Policies are not 
always effective…
• Cause and Effect?
• Important to ascertain root causes
… or, even 
advisable
• medium-term financial stability implications (fiscal space, debt levels, 
monetary framework, etc)
… and may entail 
unintended 
consequences
• Cost-benefit analysis is important 
• Introduce distortions/ inefficiencies and weakened incentives
• for rigorous credit assessments
• for bank or household debt restructuring 
• Potential for significant fiscal implications
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The way forward 
One key conclusion we derive is that the risk of a creditless 
recovery appears significant for several countries in the CESEE 
region and that spurring sustained credit growth requires actions 
in both home and host countries, particularly the former 
(Figure 16). A central issue here is the need to repair banks’ 
balance sheets, and also corporate and household balance sheets. 
An area that appears particularly promising, despite serious 
challenges in its implementation, is that of decisive actions to 
deal with the problem of high NPLs. Other areas that also appear 
to offer promise include corporate and household debt 
restructuring efforts.  
This presentation has focused primarily on the countries that are 
facing low credit growth problems. A few countries, however, 
are already experiencing vigorous growth, and raising different 
policy questions, such as whether credit growth is 
sustainable/excessive, and if so, the appropriate macroeconomic 
policy mix (Figure 17). 
With this let me conclude. This presentation provides a 
justification and background for the four panels of this seminar: 
repairing balance sheets; prospects for credit growth and foreign 
bank engagement; measures to revive credit markets (best 
practices and pitfalls); and risks of a new financial crisis. 
Figure 16. Findings 
 
Risks of a creditless recovery appear significant for several countries
• Spurring “sustained” credit growth requires actions in both home and host countries
• More proactive actions on debt restructuring and NPL resolution, appear particularly important
• Measures to repair corporate and household balance sheets also appear promising
• Other actions could also be considered, such as diversification of financing options, provided that 
benefits are carefully weighted against costs 
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Figure 17. Further Findings 
 
  
Rapid credit expansion in a few countries raises the question of sustainability
• Is credit growth excessive?
• Appropriate macroeconomic policy mix?
• A possible role for appropriate macroprudential policies?
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IV.   PANEL 1: REPAIRING BALANCE SHEETS AND 
OTHER CHALLENGES 
 
A.   Summary 
Panelists discussed the extent to which balance sheets in the 
financial system and the corporate and household sectors 
constrain credit growth in the CESEE region; the key 
impediments to the repair of balance sheets; and how best to 
address high levels of NPLs and high private and household 
indebtedness. The discussion focused on practical considerations 
to make meaningful progress both in the banking system, as well 
as in the private and household sectors, given the experience in 
the CESEE region as well as in the rest of Europe. 
There was acknowledgement that credit is procyclical. On the 
one hand, weak credit growth is to an extent a symptom of 
stabilization from the imbalances that had built up before the 
crisis. On the other hand, the financial crisis is likely to have 
depressed credit levels beyond this correction. In this context, 
several alternative explanations for weak credit growth, both on 
the supply and demand side, were discussed. 
Firstly, banks may not have sufficient funds to lend because of 
weak balance sheets as a direct result of the crisis and the effects 
of a high level of NPLs, toxic assets, and hidden off-balance 
sheet activities. Secondly, credit may be suppressed due to 
perceived underperformance of potential borrowers. The vicious 
circle that emerges out of the banks' risk-aversion during the 
downswing of the business cycle prevents growth, which results 
in underperformance of potential borrowers and may potentially 
further increase NPLs. 
The discussion stressed that, while some advocate natural 
processes for the resolution of weak balance sheets and low 
credit, the process is usually too slow and proactive actions may 
be necessary. Moreover, it pointed out that capital increases have 
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not been sufficient or timely for much of the region. In this 
connection, improvements are needed not only for banks’ 
balance sheets, but also for those of corporations and 
households; this calls for actions that go beyond central bank 
policies.  
Going forward, panelists argued that the primary focus of the 
policymakers in the CESEE region should be on improving the 
quality of institutions and regulation. The argument was that 
unnecessary barriers hindering NPL resolution, such as 
inappropriate and inefficient insolvency and tax legislation that 
causes delays in restructuring and raises confidence issues in 
potential investors, should be removed. There were calls to 
improve and reinforce risk management strategies and corporate 
governance, and also to improve coordination of macroeconomic 
policies. Monetary policy cannot alone provide a further demand 
stimulus, so the fiscal stance and structural reforms should be 
reconsidered, and institutional and legal frameworks should be 
strengthened.  
B.   Presentations by Members of the Panel 
Lead: Jan Švejnar, Columbia University and Vilem Semerak 
(CERGE EI) 
Quite a few issues have already been raised. I will go quickly 
over those that have been covered and deal a little bit more with 
some other ones. 
The first thing to remind ourselves of is that credits are 
procyclical. The literature indicates that credit supply is very 
much procyclical, and that there are three key factors that hinder 
the provision of credit: (i) banks may not have funds to lend; 
(ii) companies may not be fit enough to borrow (collateral 
constraints); and (iii) banks may have funds but cannot lend 
because of regulatory constraints (poor health of banks versus 
capital adequacy rules). In addition, customers may change their 
evaluations of what will be happening in the future and may be 
less willing to indebt themselves than before.  
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Note that cases (ii) and (iii) above are directly related to the 
balance sheets of borrowers (business sector) and banks (and 
possibly other intermediaries), respectively. 
Problems related to the financial crisis and subsequent recessions 
(or slow recoveries): 
 Assets that turned “toxic”  
o Assets related to subprime market-linked derivatives 
(Iceland, Cyprus, and Greek bonds) 
 Domestic NPLs  
 Additional issues 
o Hidden risks (“off-balance sheet” risks, repo 
agreements) 
o Additional pressure: Basel Leverage Rule 
 New threats 
o Threats related to complicated relations with Russia 
When we consider banks’ balance sheets, there are problems 
related to the financial crisis and the subsequent recession(s) 
and/or slow recoveries. There are assets that turn “toxic,” such as 
the bonds of Iceland, Cyprus, and Greece (subprime market 
linked derivatives), and there are domestic NPLs. Additional 
issues are related to hidden risks (off-balance sheet activities, 
repo agreements) and the Basel Leverage Rule. There are also 
new threats related to complicated relations with Russia that 
have emerged recently.  
Let me say a few words about the CESEE region. NPLs in the 
region are a legacy of fast credit growth before the crisis and one 
observes a variety of performances. There are, for example, 
countries with low shares of NPLs––Estonia, Slovakia, Poland, 
and Czech Republic––and there are countries with high shares of 
NPLs––Albania, Serbia, and Romania (see Figure 1). Moreover, 
two issues can be observed in these situations: (i) data 
deficiencies and possible underreporting (highlighted in the 
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Vienna initiative report), and (ii) macroeconomic disequilibria in 
countries with a high share of NPLs. The disequilibria act as 
constraints on policymakers and increase the risk of further 
shocks that may escalate the NPL problems.  
So if you look at Figure 1, you see that on the left there are 
countries that have relatively high shares of NPLs, which are 
growing over time. These are the Baltic countries that have 
reduced the share of NPLs to a low level, and countries such as 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia where the share is 
steady at a relatively low level.  
Figure 1. Bank Nonperforming Loans 
(In percent of total gross loans) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, online database (as of September 2014). 
 
Figure 2 shows current account balances and balances of goods 
and services as a share of GDP in the CESEE countries. It is 
noteworthy that some of the same countries are at the extremes 
as in Figure 1. 
A somewhat similar picture emerges when we look at the 
government budget surplus/deficit figures (Figure 3). It is
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Figure 2. External Disequilibria of CESEE Countries, Current 
Account Balances, and Balances of Goods and Services  
(In percent of GDP) 
 
 
Figure 3. Fiscal Disequilibrium, Cash Surplus/Deficit in 2012 
(In percent of GDP) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, online database (as of September 2014). 
 
interesting that, even with a simple set of indicators, one can 
start getting a sense of what is going on. The in-depth analysis 
done by the IMF is naturally complementary. 
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The process of cleaning up the banks’ balance sheets is affected 
by economic growth and the time span under consideration. With 
enough growth and time, many problems go away. Bankruptcies 
of banks with the biggest problems and mergers and acquisitions 
are also parts of the process. There are obvious problems with 
natural processes. There are losses brought about by the lack of 
trust, asymmetric information, and slow pace of the process. 
There is also the chicken-and-egg problem—economic growth 
will be achieved when the balance sheets are better, but balance 
sheets improve when the economy starts to grow. 
So what assistance can governments and regulators give? First, a 
timely identification of risks is essential. Yet, this is not an easy 
task because of international linkages and hidden risks. Second, 
the government could provide support that would accelerate 
takeovers of these “ill” banks by healthier partners. The question 
that arises here is whether the government ought to provide 
guarantees. Third, one could have swaps of NPLs and toxic 
assets for higher quality bonds or other assets. This is usually 
done by state-controlled asset management corporations. The 
question is how often you can do this––just once when you, for 
instance, establish the market system, or more frequently? 
Fourth, there could be direct recapitalization––the state provides 
additional capital and (temporarily) becomes a shareholder. 
 Efforts to reduce NPLs exist, but the results are weak 
o Share of NPLs has continued to increase in many 
countries 
 Reduction of NPLs is an uphill struggle 
o Weak economic recoveries 
o Negative effects of lower quality institutions on the 
quality of credit allocation and subsequent enforcement 
 Too slow enforcement of collateral 
 Company restructurings underutilized 
 Tax systems that hinder loan write-downs 
o Complications related to developments in Russia 
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When examining NPL resolutions in the CESEE region, one 
observes that there have been major efforts, but the results so far 
have not been particularly impressive, as the share of NPLs has 
continued to rise in many countries. Among the factors 
contributing to this outcome, one notes weak economic 
recoveries and the negative effects of underdeveloped 
institutions on the quality of credit allocation and subsequent 
enforcement. Institutional weakness often results in low reliance 
on company restructuring and excessive reliance on a tax system 
that hinders the write-down of loans. And of course, there are 
complications related to the developments in Russia. 
Examining the five-year (2007–12) change in NPLs in Figure 4, 
one observes that Albania, Romania, Slovenia, Hungary, and 
Bulgaria significantly increased their share of NPLs. The 2012–
13 data in Figure 5 indicate that this growth in NPLs continued 
in spite of the awareness of the problem and the efforts to deal 
with it. 
Let me end with some implications for the CESEE region. The 
primary focus should be on improving the quality of institutions 
and the regulation and coordination of macroeconomic policies. 
An emphasis also ought to be placed on removing unnecessary 
barriers that hinder the resolution of the NPL problems 
(e.g., burdensome insolvency legislation and tax barriers). 
Finally, it is useful to adopt best practices observed in other 
contexts (see e.g., the Vienna initiative report). 
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Figure 4. Change in the Share of NPLs, 2007–12 
(In percentage points) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, online database (as of September 2014). 
 
Figure 5. Change in the Share of NPLs, 2012–13 
(In percentage points) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, online database (as of September 2014). 
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Panelist 1: Josef Bonnici, Governor, Central Bank of Malta 
Thank you. It is a pleasure for me to be here, and thank you, 
Boštjan, for inviting me. I come from a country, which is not 
part of the region we are focusing on, so I have been thinking 
about what I can say that would add some input to this debate.  
First of all, Malta has a relatively large financial sector, probably 
the second largest in Europe after Luxembourg. The second 
place used to be occupied by Cyprus, but things have changed 
since then.  
The banking crisis in Cyprus has focused attention on other 
European countries with developed financial sectors. Malta came 
under the spotlight as being similar to Cyprus as another small 
country with a large banking sector.  
However, the structure of the Maltese banking sector is very 
different from the Cypriot one. In Malta, there is a clear 
separation between international banks and core domestic banks. 
The core domestic banking sector in Malta follows a traditional 
banking model, relying mainly on resident deposits for its 
funding and lending exclusively to the domestic economy. This 
contrasts with the situation in Cyprus, where systemically 
significant banks have taken on a large international role that 
included large holdings of Greek paper and a large volume of 
funds from outside the EU. In addition, unlike Cyprus, Malta’s 
core domestic banks have very low reliance on non-resident 
deposits. Cypriot banks made significant efforts to expand 
overseas, especially in Greece, where banks’ exposure was 
concentrated and which formed the starting point of the Cypriot 
banking crisis. 
Some 12 to 13 years ago, Malta followed the United Kingdom’s 
example of separating supervision from the central bank and 
setting up an independent authority in charge of national 
financial supervisory tasks. According to the legislation in place, 
the central bank was responsible for ensuring financial stability, 
while the supervision was managed by another institution, the 
Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA). At the time, the 
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credit market was booming and the Central Bank of Malta had 
limited ability to supervise and control the situation in an active 
manner.  
More recently, the European Systemic Risk Board, the newly 
established institution to oversee risk in the financial system as a 
whole, came up with a recommendation for a financial stability 
board or authority. I agreed with this proposal since this could 
provide us the opportunity to influence the relationship between 
the banking sector and the economy. In the local context, the 
establishment by the Central Bank of Malta and the MFSA, of 
the Joint Financial Stability Board (JFSB) was an important step 
in the preparation for the Single Supervisory Mechanism.  
Amongst the issues that have been discussed by the JFSB was 
the proposed revision of the Banking Rule BR/09/2008. The rule 
deals with provisioning for NPLs, taking into account their 
duration. It also calls for a specific buffer linked to the gap 
between provisions and NPLs, and takes into account the 
International Financial Reporting Standards’ accounting 
definition of NPLs. There was a lot of resistance concerning the 
NPLs from an accounting point of view. We introduced a 
requirement of extra buffers that banks would be required to hold 
over a period of three years. The reason we did this was also 
because we felt that the banks, since they were profitable, should 
allocate a higher portion of their profits to provisions for NPLs 
rather than distributing them. This was a bone of contention 
because the banks were very keen on distributing profits so that 
their share prices keep going up. I kept on arguing, as my 
predecessor did, that banks should make more provisions instead 
of distributing profits. Still, the banks ignored my 
recommendations. Accordingly, we reviewed the banking rule 
dealing with the provisioning for NPLs, which had the result of 
reducing distributable profits, but not to an alarming degree. This 
initiative was undertaken at a time when banks were repairing 
their balance sheets in view of the Asset Quality Review (AQR).  
Recently, I came across a newly elected member of the European 
Parliament who wanted to see me and know what I thought of all 
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these bank changes and bank regulations. He said, 
“…introducing all these regulations, doesn’t this mean that 
banks will be less able to lend? Doesn’t this go against what is 
now required for a high rate of economic growth?” And of 
course, I explained that having a sound and healthy domestic 
banking sector is an important necessity for economic growth, 
and one should not rely on implicit government guarantees. 
Today, economies can no longer be dependent on implicit 
government aid, mainly due to the introduction of the bail-in 
element. I have the impression that some mistakenly argue that 
the pendulum has swung too far towards regulation at a time 
when the economy is weak. In addition, people believe 
economies have gone through harsh budgetary restrictions, so 
that a relaxing of regulations is needed. This presents a 
challenge, and although some gains have been made, some more 
gains are yet to come, such as some type of common deposit 
compensation scheme, which is in the background. At least some 
improvements need to be made in this direction. 
In the case of the Maltese economy, the banking sector has been 
showing signs of weak credit growth, and at the same time, 
NPLs have increased. Nevertheless, the economy keeps growing; 
in fact, it is growing by about 3 percent. Unemployment is 
falling, and employment growth is very strong due to the 
increased participation rate and the inflow of people from 
countries where low wages and high unemployment are causing 
a human-capital flight.  
When credit growth is negative, one has to examine also the 
substance of the causes behind it. Again, because I come from a 
very small country, I have the advantage that I can speak to all 
presidents of the banks and their chief executives, and the story 
differs from one institution to another. Sometimes the averaging 
process hides the substance of the argument, because there are 
cases in which a bank is restructuring and is still issuing new 
credit while the old credit is being reduced because of balance 
sheet repairs. 
  56  
Overall, it is possible to observe a negative credit growth within 
an economy that is growing, so the overall situation may be not 
that negative. This is one of the aspects that I have learned, that 
is, one also needs to disentangle the information within the 
aggregates.  
Panelist 2: Boris Vujčić, Governor, Croatian National Bank 
High credit growth rates and the significant rise in private sector 
debt in the CEE countries prior to the onset of the global 
financial crisis have generally not been perceived as a problem 
or potential danger. The rationale behind this way of thinking 
was based on the belief that these countries had been on their 
natural way of catching up with more developed countries 
through the process of real convergence. These “natural” 
developments have been additionally stimulated by the high 
level of global liquidity, low risk aversion, low interest rates in 
developed markets, as well as the high share of foreign banks in 
the banking sectors of most CEE countries, serving as an 
efficient transferring channel for foreign capital in search of 
higher returns. Despite the intensive catching-up process in the 
pre-crisis period, CEE countries’ debt levels are still relatively 
low compared to the advanced European economies, and neither 
corporate nor household indebtedness seems to be excessive.  
The level of corporate sector indebtedness in the majority of the 
CEE countries is lower than both the commonly used threshold 
of 80 percent of GDP and the EU average (Figure 1, top). A 
similar analysis shows that, for the household sector, this picture 
looks even better (Figure 1, bottom). 
The world financial crisis and the accompanying recession 
resulted in a substantial decline in the real income of households 
and the corporate sector in the majority of the CEE countries. 
Declining income and the worsening economic outlook reduced 
sustainable debt levels, which in some countries prompted the 
adjustment of the private sector’s balance sheet and resulted in 
deleveraging. 
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Figure 1. Corporate and Household Indebtedness 
 Source: Eurostat. 
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The adjustment of unsustainable levels of private sector debt, 
particularly in households, to the sources available for the 
servicing of this debt (current income and financial and real 
assets) may lead to significant economic costs in view of the 
importance of private consumption as one of the key generators 
of economic growth. It is therefore vital to achieve a better 
understanding of the process of household deleveraging, 
particularly its required intensity and duration, which is a 
prerequisite for creating adequate expectations of short-term and 
medium-term economic growth and for developing 
macroeconomic and macroprudential measures in line with the 
fundamentals. 
Household sector—is there a need for further adjustment? 
The most common questions associated with household 
indebtedness are related to the estimation of the necessary short-
term balance-sheet adjustment of the household sector, the 
potential need for additional adjustments, and the driving forces 
behind the adjustment. When analyzing levels of indebtedness, 
the question is which benchmark to use––other CEE countries, 
EU or euro area countries, or something else. 
But even when the benchmark is chosen, there is still a question 
of how to know whether a country is over-indebted or not. Stable 
levels of debt in literature were until recently based on a static 
threshold value determined on the basis of historical data such as 
a specific pre-crisis level, positional value in the distribution of 
debt of a group of countries4 or a trend level.5 According to the 
                                                 
4 The indicators of macroeconomic imbalances of the European Commission (MIP Scoreboard 
Indicators) take (consolidated) private-sector debt-to-GDP ratio of 133 percent as the threshold 
value. 
5 Methodology of countercyclical capital buffers. 
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new approach,6 the level of debt that is economically reasonable, 
given the current level of income, should be determined based on 
models taking into account key macroeconomic determinants. 
The selection of the econometric method (and the estimator) 
enables an individual approach and better identification of the 
specific country features. 
According to the usual indicators, it does not seem that the 
household sector in the CEE countries is excessively indebted. If 
the model for the non-risky level of indebtedness is estimated for 
other countries, it is expected that most of them would not “flash 
red.” Therefore, it could be concluded that the non-risky level of 
indebtedness depends on the prospects for GDP growth and 
household income growth, which are very difficult to predict. 
This additionally complicates the estimation of the optimum 
level of household indebtedness, making it almost impossible.  
In order to assess the level of household sector indebtedness—
which is determined by key current macroeconomic factors and 
is thus country- and period-specific—as well as to determine 
which part of the necessary short-term balance-sheet adjustment 
of the household sector in the EU countries has already been 
made, the Croatian National Bank (CNB) has estimated a model 
on the basis of quarterly data for 28 EU countries in the period 
from the beginning of 1999 to the end of 2013. 
In 2013, in almost one-half of the observed countries, 
households were on average capable, given the disposable 
income, of taking on additional debt. Croatia belongs to a group 
of countries with a relatively low need for further adjustment of 
debt to the disposable amount of income (below 10 percent). If 
                                                 
6 Empirical research of a thus-specified optimum level of debt has only appeared recently, mainly 
for the United States; please see Albuquerque B. et al. (2014): Has U.S. Household Deleveraging 
Ended? A Model-based Estimate of Equilibrium Debt, ECB Working Paper Series 1643. 
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the countries for which the estimated model did not prove to be 
statistically significant are excluded from the analysis, in the 
process of adjustment, under existing conditions, 5 percent of 
deviations should be eliminated within a period of one to three 
years (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Household Indebtedness in the EU 
 
   Sources: Eurostat and CNB calculations. 
   Note: Household indebtedness is measured as the ratio of loans granted to households 
adjusted for exchange rate changes to their disposable income and is modeled by a set of 
macroeconomic factors: household interest rate, homeownership rate, the consumer confidence 
index, unemployment rate, real GDP growth rate, and the ratio of residential property prices to 
disposable household income. The mark shows the insignificance of the error correction 
component, i.e., its positive value.  
 
In the period of strong credit expansion and economic growth in 
Croatia, the aggregate creditworthiness of households, measured 
by the economically justified level of indebtedness, rose steadily, 
so the underestimation of the realized levels of household debt 
compared to those implied by the fundamentals left room for 
further borrowing. However, with the slowdown in economic 
growth in early 2007, the potential for further borrowing first 
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started to decline, and then vanished completely with the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis and its spillover to the 
domestic real sector. The last six years of recorded recession in 
Croatia prompted households to adjust their credit liabilities to 
some degree to their disposable income (by approximately 
10 percent since end-2008). However, this debt reduction was on 
average slower than the fall in income, with the result that in the 
entire recession period the need for further short-term household 
deleveraging fluctuated around a relatively low four percent 
(Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Observed and Modeled Level of Indebtedness for Croatia 
 
Sources: Eurostat and CNB calculations. 
Note: The modeled level of household indebtedness is shown as a four-quarter moving 
average. 
 
Corporate balance sheet—in need of repair 
The average profitability of Croatian companies is lower than in 
the majority of EU countries, resulting in a relatively high debt 
burden compared to profits. Croatian corporate sector 
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already negative trends (Figures 4 and 5). There are many loss-
making enterprises, among which companies from the 
construction sector dominate.  
Figure 4. Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) for 
the Corporate Sector 
 
 
 
 
 Sources: BACH (Banque de France) and Financial Agency. 
Indicators presented in Figures 4 and 5 lead to the conclusion 
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means that efforts to restructure the corporate sector and improve 
its profitability should be stepped up, while debt reduction might 
not resolve the underlying issue of inefficient capital allocation.  
Figure 5. EBITDA over Interest on Financial Debt and EBT over 
EBIT 
 
 
 
Sources: BACH (Banque de France) and Financial Agency. 
Note: EBT/EBIT; higher values on the chart represent lower interest share in expenses and therefore lower 
interest burden; includes only companies with interest on financial debt. 
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and represents a temporary (one-off) “Chapter 11” type of 
procedure aimed at fostering corporate restructuring. About 
6,600 companies entered into this procedure, which is 7 percent 
of the total number of companies, and they employ about 55,000 
people, against 850,000 in the corporate sector. An analysis of 
the capital-to-asset ratio and return-on-assets ratio of companies 
in the PBS procedure and the rest of the nonfinancial sector 
shows that companies in the PBS are loss-making with high 
leverage, which is a result of little or no capital (Figure 6).  
Figure 6. Capital-to-Asset Ratio/Return on Assets 
Source: Financial Agency. 
Methodology notes: Includes total NACE for the nonfinancial sector without K642 (Activities of holding 
companies) and M701 (Activities of head offices), includes companies of all sizes; for HR: companies>1 
employee. Measures represent by country/by year-weighted mean ratios in percent. 
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Banks’ exposure to these companies amounts to 
HRK 0.5 billion, which is approximately 10 percent of all banks’ 
corporate exposures. About 50 percent of bank clients in PBS are 
from construction activities, but it should be noted that a 
significant part of professional, scientific, and technical activities 
are also closely linked to construction (Figure 7).  
Figure 7. Structure of Banks’ Clients in Pre-Bankruptcy Settlements 
 
Source: Financial Agency. 
 
The first preliminary analysis conducted after a year and a half 
from its introduction shows that PBS still has a long way to go, 
but according to the percentage of reached or executed 
agreements, PBS for bank clients seems to be progressing 
slightly better than for the others (Figure 8). Ensuring profitable 
business models still remains one of the biggest challenges, 
together with the fact that most of these companies need fresh 
capital. 
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Figure 8. Progress in Pre-Bankruptcy Settlements—All Companies vs. 
Bank Clients 
 Source: Financial Agency. 
there is too much credit or not. From the central bank's point of 
view, this presents a major challenge; yet it also encourages the 
view that policymakers should react not necessarily only to the 
level, but also to the rate/pace of credit growth. This means that 
if credit is growing rapidly, the central bank should act, even if 
models do not show explicitly that the growth pace is excessive. 
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Therefore, if the credit growth rate is high, and the analysis 
shows that there are signs of overheating in the economy—even 
without analytical confirmation of an excessively high 
indebtedness level—it would be reasonable to conduct a policy 
aimed at slowing down credit activity. The Croatian case 
confirms this conclusion. In the pre-crisis period, the CNB had 
introduced a set of monetary and macroprudential measures 
aimed at restraining both credit growth and the buildup of 
external vulnerabilities. Although these measures were criticized 
at the time, the crisis has proven that the rationale for introducing 
such a set of measures was right. Therefore, despite the fact that 
analytical tools and models often present the main tool for 
making decisions, which is good and necessary, central bankers 
and all other market participants should always be aware of the 
potential limitations of these models. 
Low credit activity—what could be done? 
When trying to find an answer for stagnating credit activity in 
banks’ balance sheets, the high level of NPLs in the CEE 
countries is usually seen as one of the main credit growth 
constraints. But this is true only if NPLs are not adequately 
provisioned. If a bank has an adequate provisioning policy, it is 
possible to dispose of NPLs or put them into the asset booth and 
manage them separately, leaving enough room for granting new 
loans. Conversely, if NPLs are not adequately provisioned, 
banks may lose a lot of energy in trying to evergreen and 
restructure them in order to hide the real situation in the balance 
sheet, which they should actually show to their shareholders, 
owners, and depositors. 
This implies that regulators in that area have a very important 
role. Considering the fact that Croatia has a higher NPL ratio 
than the EU average, the above reasons motivated the CNB to 
tighten provisioning standards in order to deal with the seizure of 
collateral and related procedures which create obstacles to an 
efficient unwinding of NPLs (Figure 9).   
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Figure 9. Nonperforming Loans Ratio 
(In percent) 
 
Source: IMF, FSI, (bank assets) weighted averages. 
Note: CEE countries include Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia 
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they should make the necessary provisions, even if the loan is 
fully collateralized, amounting to at least 30 percent of the loan 
value two years after delinquency, and then 5 percent 
subsequently every six months. At some point it will become 
very unreasonable for banks to wait, and the measure will serve 
as an incentive to clean up the balance sheet in order to dispose 
of NPLs.  
The other very important factor for repairing and cleaning banks’ 
balance sheets is the surroundings in which banks operate. In 
that sense, the CEE countries do not represent a stimulating 
environment, primarily due to the fact that creditor protection 
rights are relatively weak as seizure of collateral is often very 
difficult, sometimes even impossible. This represents a serious 
obstacle in disposing of NPLs. This problem is very difficult to 
solve even if distressed debt managers are engaged; they also 
face the same (usually) legal problems as it gets very 
complicated to seize collateral or to dispose of collateral without 
entering into uncharted legal waters. Thus, one of the key issues 
for increasing the efficiency of NPL resolution is improving the 
legal environment in which banks—as well as potential buyers 
of distressed debt—operate. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
make these changes in a short period of time, meaning that banks 
still have to rely on their prudent policies, as well as on forward-
looking regulators.  
The high share of NPLs is also related to the elevated probability 
of default, which may induce banks to grant less credit. If the 
quality of loans is analyzed according to their vintage, it can be 
observed that more recent loans have a lower probability of 
default, while the most problematic loans are those which 
originated in the period from 2003 to 2008. During the crisis, 
banks have tightened their lending standards and extended less 
credit, and the quality of these loans has been better than that of 
the loans granted during the boom period. Banks' behavior is 
determined not only by models, but also by people who are 
running the banks, meaning that the quality of granted loans does 
not only depend on models and risk analysis, but also on the 
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quality of bank management—a factor that is often neglected in 
the debates on how to ensure good loan quality.  
Concluding remarks 
It is not clear that credit growth is crucial for growth as such. A 
detailed analysis reveals that the main problem lies in corporate 
balance sheets that need to be repaired primarily because of low 
profitability. The ROE of companies is an important indicator in 
this regard and points to the heart of the problem. Efforts to 
restructure the corporate sector and its profitability are needed, 
and for that purpose Croatia has introduced PBS.  
In practice, too much emphasis is generally put on credit growth 
as a way of problem solving. There is no clear evidence that 
more credit is necessarily related to stronger economic growth. 
This broken link has been confirmed by the Croatian data as 
well, as Croatia had the highest rate of credit growth in the EU 
over the last five years and one of the lowest rates of GDP 
growth. I would say that we should look again at the familiar 
evidence from international finance and open macroeconomics, 
which has taught us that there is usually enough capital, but the 
issue is how good and how efficient is the process of financial 
intermediation. If the intermediary directs capital into the wrong 
sector or company, this will certainly reflect on the future level 
of NPLs and reduce the countercyclical potential of the banking 
sector in the downturn.  
In that context, the main challenge is to find a long-term viable 
growth model based on an improved allocation of capital and 
underlying corporate profitability, which will simultaneously 
improve the debt sustainability arithmetic. The first task, in that 
sense, is to repair corporate sector balance sheets, rather than 
focus on banks’ balance sheets and credit. 
Panelist 3: José Ramalho, Vice Governor, Banco de Portugal 
In Portugal, we have a long experience of dealing with unsound 
balance sheets that can be useful for other countries. There are 
three main ideas. First, we made a lot of mistakes, so if you can 
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avoid them, good for you; second, we had some success in 
correcting balance sheets and so if the measures that we have 
taken are useful for you, that’s also good; and third, we still have 
a lot of work to do.  
As you can see, over-indebtedness is a serious situation in 
Portugal, not only in the public sector but also in the private 
sector. The figures we have are much higher than those 
presented by my neighbor Boris Vujčić, on Eastern Europe debt. 
The household debt ratio was above 100 percent and the 
corporate debt ratio was above 140 percent of GDP in 2010. The 
private sector debt accumulation was reflected in a strong 
expansion of banks’ balance sheets that showed signs of 
unhealthy developments. Then, in 2010, we lost market access 
and, in the context of the sovereign debt crisis, we had to ask for 
an adjustment program, which started in 2011. 
The program had three pillars. One of them was financial 
stability, which involved several work streams and several 
instruments. There is one instrument that I would like to 
highlight because it has proven to be very useful for us. This 
instrument is the Funding and Capital Plans. These are quarterly 
forward-looking reports that banks had to prepare and that have 
proven instrumental in enabling the central bank to gear the 
adjustment of banks’ balance sheets towards the capital and 
funding targets. 
The main results overall have been very positive; by 2013, we 
had a much healthier financial situation. The borrowing needs or 
the lending capacity of every domestic sector has improved. The 
country achieved a net lending capacity, i.e., an external surplus, 
after several years with an external deficit close to 10 percent of 
GDP. And we are now seeing debt repayment flows from 
corporations to banks and from banks to the central bank and to 
the external sector. Debt ratios started to improve very clearly in 
the household sector. In the corporate sector, this improvement is 
more recent and more limited. The public sector debt ratio is 
expected to start declining this year, but I will leave the public 
sector out of this presentation.  
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Now, concerning the banks, results were broadly positive. 
Solvency strengthened significantly, liquidity and funding 
structure became much more stable. We have been able to 
manage a more or less orderly process of balancing deleveraging 
needs with the financing of the economy. This was particularly 
challenging, because we needed to deleverage but at the same 
time we could not leave the economy without finance. Here I 
would like to make two points. Firstly, a large part of 
deleveraging was done by reducing external assets. This was the 
case in Portugal; maybe it is not possible in other countries. 
Secondly, credit has declined, but we have evidence that some 
degree of discrimination has been achieved in favor of the most 
dynamic sectors. This is very positive, because, as the Governor 
of the Bank of Slovenia said, the allocation of credit is crucial 
when you are deleveraging. And then the inevitable weak point 
is the NPLs. NPLs have increased a lot because of two factors––
economic recession and stricter supervisory action by the Bank 
of Portugal. Because of that, banks have recorded losses for three 
years in a row and only in 2014 are they returning to 
profitability, if we exclude Banco Espírito Santo, which is an 
idiosyncratic case.  
Let’s turn to households. The developments have also been very 
positive. Households have improved the capacity to service their 
debts and the incentives to engage in new borrowing have been 
reduced. What I would like to highlight is that these positive 
developments were the result of a combination of different 
policies and changes in behavior. There was a change in the 
savings behavior of households that adjusted consumption 
downwards and consequently increased their savings rate and net 
lending capacity. Monetary policy also made a contribution in 
this particular sector, namely because there was a pass-through 
of lower interest rates to existing mortgages that benefited 
existing mortgage borrowers. There was also a contribution from 
structural reforms, particularly through the development of the 
housing rental market that decreased the demand for housing 
credit. And there was also a contribution from fiscal policy—the 
tax deduction of mortgage interest payments was sharply 
reduced for old loans and actually eliminated for new loans; this 
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also reduced the demand for housing credit. Debt ratios benefited 
from these measures and started to decline consistently, and 
there were no major problems of debt restructuring or household 
over-indebtedness. 
In regard to corporations, the story is more complex. There we 
had more mixed results because there were many more blocking 
factors that prevented a holistic approach from being fully 
pursued. And so this led us to launch a corporate debt 
restructuring program with the following key points: 
discriminate between the viable and nonviable firms; restructure 
viable firms; and resolve or liquidate the nonviable firms. The 
major problems that we are trying to overcome are the risk of 
evergreening temptations by banks, the lack of coordination 
among creditors and with debtors, and the blocking power of 
debtors. There are multiple measures that were implemented or 
are in preparation under the program, including microprudential 
supervision actions, changes in insolvency regimes and other 
legal changes, the reinforcement of the role of the credit 
mediator, and different measures to promote the capitalization of 
firms. 
Lessons learned. The first set of lessons has to do with 
monitoring and prevention; this is crucial. Monitoring market 
development is not enough; it may lead to complacency and 
delayed action, and we have been misled by that in a way. We 
also need to carefully monitor information on the behavior of 
economic agents, namely the savings evolutions and patterns, 
balance sheet structures, and all that; particular attention needs to 
be given to credit growth. Another lesson is that the financial 
sector is instrumental in the process of debt accumulation. So it 
is very important to have sound policies for banks. Now we have 
macroprudential policy instruments that we did not have at the 
time, and we hope that they will be very useful in the future. 
A second set of lessons has to do with correction, once we are in 
a situation of excessive debt. One lesson is that the correction of 
over-indebtedness is very likely to have recessionary impacts, as 
economic agents’ attempts to restore or improve their debt-
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servicing capacity in a stressful situation are likely to negatively 
affect consumption and investment. A second lesson is that bank 
deleveraging is important, but it is not enough. The central bank 
has a strong influence on the balance sheets of banks and can—
to some extent—gear the correction of these balance sheets. But 
this is not enough to correct balance sheets of households and 
corporates. And for those other balance sheets, we need what we 
call a holistic policy response––the combination of different 
policies, addressing both stock issues and flow issues. This 
response involves contributions from conventional monetary 
policy, non-conventional monetary policy, prudential measures, 
fiscal policy, and—last but not least—structural reforms. The 
latter vary from country to country; but in our case, they have 
proven to be very, very important—namely the change in the 
legal framework. 
Panelist 4: Stanislava Zadravec Caprirolo, Vice Governor, 
Bank of Slovenia 
The issues to address are the lessons from recent developments, 
the challenges ahead, and the policy response to the challenges. 
To begin with, we could ask: what happened; why it happened; 
what was the policy response; where are we now; and what 
further challenges do we face?  
The broad picture as to where we currently stand—as has already 
been discussed by previous presenters—is that we are facing 
very weak and constrained credit activity, not only in Europe but 
also globally. The observed credit dynamics are the result of 
country-specific factors and a mix of drivers that are common 
across countries, and are propagated by globalization and 
financial integration. We have to take into account such 
interactions when defining either common or country-specific 
policies at the European level or globally. We also need to take 
into account that we are limited and constrained by not having 
had some of the tools available, let’s say, 20 years ago (before 
the single monetary system). Also, the effectiveness of available 
tools is different and policy framework conditions and 
circumstances have changed. In such a context, some policy 
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responses might not have the appropriate feedback or desired 
impact.  
The common drivers of the crisis affecting us include: financial 
losses; the freezing of the interbank market and the sudden stop 
of capital flows; financial disintegration; and weak aggregate 
demand. While countries are commonly affected by these 
factors, they also exhibit specific conditions prior to the crises 
that magnify the effects––such as financial bubbles, highly 
leveraged corporate and household sectors, and so forth.  
Policy responses have been similar at the global and country-
specific level, and they have consisted mainly of balance sheet 
repair. The questions for today, particularly regarding banks, are: 
(i) Are the banks’ balance-sheet repairs sufficient to move 
countries to a sustained growth path? (ii) Are the banks’ balance 
sheets still subject to risk pressures? The response to both 
questions is clearly “No.” But then, what are the additional 
policies that we have to follow and push forward? Country-
specific policies have to tackle the specific weaknesses of 
nonfinancial private-sector balance sheets and address specific 
structural issues. In Marco Piñón’s presentation, the policy 
responses of different countries taken so far were reviewed. The 
presentation focused on the financial market response and the 
well-coordinated fiscal policy response during the first phase of 
the crisis. But now there is clearly  need to refocus the policy 
responses beyond the financial sector, on both the global and 
country-specific levels. 
In the list of priorities, it is not only the problem of credit supply 
that needs to be tackled, but also the problems of weak overall 
aggregate demand and weak confidence, which are holding back 
credit dynamics and recovery. Credit supply constraints, as we 
are aware, have been mainly addressed over the past five years. 
But the supply still remains constrained, and the question is why. 
Is it because there is not enough liquidity and/or capital, or is it 
because certain channels are not yet functioning; or are there 
other drivers affecting confidence?  
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Without doubt, on the aggregate demand side, there are also 
constraints to be addressed. Let me focus briefly on the 
Slovenian case, to just underline the broad versus specific 
dimensions that influence not only the policies that need to be 
agreed and measures to be taken, but also their effectiveness.  
Slovenia already experienced a banking crisis 20 years ago. The 
policy responses at that time in terms of the banking system were 
pretty much the same as those being taken currently. Policy 
measures included state recapitalization of banks and the sett-up 
of an entity to deal with NPLs removed from banks. However, a 
few elements of the policy set-up were very different and had a 
bearing on the policy outcome. One is whether or not to have an 
independent monetary policy. Clearly, within the monetary 
union, we have a common coordinated monetary policy; but its 
effect differs across countries. Thus, to ensure the desired 
effects, country-specific policy measures have to be focused on 
additional policies to achieve a given outcome. Another 
consideration is the global dimension of the crisis and the 
weakness of aggregate demand. Is this weakness country-
specific, limited to the euro area or global? It seems that weak 
aggregate demand that affects country-specific recovery is a 
more common problem, particularly at the euro area level, and is 
linked also to a lack of confidence that—of course—overlaps 
with country-specific conditions. The third important issue that 
is different in the current crisis is the institutional framework 
with global implications (i.e., regulation), particularly state aid 
rules and regulation affecting EU countries. 
Now let me turn to supply and demand shocks affecting credit 
activity, and those affecting Slovenia in particular.  
Supply shocks were broadly similar across the globe, affecting 
most large economies with few exceptions. An initial shock was 
the shutdown of interbank markets and the consequent liquidity 
crunch. The second was a fundamental shock to banks’ capital; 
equity losses in the banking system were followed by the 
reversal of wholesale funding. There were not only sudden stops 
of capital flows but also their reversal, which still continues in 
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some countries today. In some cases, like Slovenia, the capital 
flows were also affected by insufficient and untimely capital 
increases. Banking fundamentals, liquidity, and capital are those 
that really matter with regard to the credit supply. Insufficient 
and untimely capital increases triggered a confidence shock and 
deposit outflows in 2012 and 2013, in addition to those of bank 
deposits. The available supply of funds was strongly affected by 
the sizable private outflows (nonfinancial corporations and 
households) in 2013 (4.7 percent of GDP), which was similar to 
that of banks. But credit recovery does not depend only on 
supply but also on shocks affecting demand, which in Slovenia 
were very similar to the experiences of other countries. In 
particular, the collapse of domestic demand, weak external 
demand, and leveraged nonfinancial companies increased credit 
risk on the back of a collapse in asset prices, and consequently 
also resulted in the tightening of credit standards. 
The policy response evolved over time and was underlined by 
the global, broad policy responses of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
(Fed) and the ECB, and then by specific-country responses. 
Some affected credit supply, which is the first step to be taken 
but definitely not the only one. Now policies should address 
primarily the demand side, hopefully, with a faster speed than 
those addressing supply constraints.   
What is the current state of affairs?  
The banking sector is in general stable, liquidity is ample, capital 
is robust enough, and confidence has returned to some extent in 
terms of deposit behavior. But there are some extremely 
important elements to be addressed. These are the interbank 
market channel and interest rate differentials. The question of 
confidence is of utmost importance in this respect.  
What should be done to restore credit growth, confidence, and 
cross-border flows—especially within the weak economic 
environment where other alternative sources of financing are 
also limited?  
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The new supervisory infrastructure is now set up. The AQR 
exercise and the stress testing of banks’ balance sheets before 
entering into the Single Supervisory Mechanism is designed with 
the objective of restoring confidence by increasing transparency. 
It remains to be seen whether the expectations of this policy 
decision and measure are going to bring further positive effects 
in terms of restoring confidence in the banking sector and 
renewing cross-border flows. Aggregate demand is the key 
challenge to be tackled by policy responses now, which 
definitely goes beyond monetary policy. Balance-sheet repair of 
the nonfinancial sector is also a key policy priority. But on the 
other hand, there is also a need for policies to find the very 
delicate balance between structural reforms, in terms of their 
impact on aggregate demand, and fiscal stance in the medium 
term. There is a need for an overall EU fiscal stance to address 
the issue of aggregate demand and structural supply policies that 
should encompass the deleveraging of corporate and household 
sectors. This is particularly important because the fiscal space of 
many countries is quite constrained, while on the other hand, the 
monetary policy cannot do the job alone to further push the 
demand side.  
With this I conclude and look forward to your remarks. 
C.   Discussions 
Following the presentations, participants from the floor—several 
of them members of other panels—posed questions and raised 
important issues for discussion by the members of the panel.  
 Participants acknowledged the critical importance of 
addressing weak balance sheets—whether for banks, 
corporations, or households.  
 However, they questioned whether the discussion was 
over-emphasizing the need for credit growth. Several 
examples were given in which lower levels of credit, or 
credit growth, have been associated with higher GDP 
growth, and vice versa. In particular, when much of the 
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credit goes to the wrong sector, as happened in many 
CESEE countries before the crisis, countries end up with 
problems later on—such as high NPLs, or even a 
sovereign debt crisis.  
 Participants also asked whether enough emphasis has 
been placed on the appropriateness or viability of the 
business models followed by banks and corporations. In 
this sense, high NPLs in the bank’s balance sheets may 
not be so much a result of the level of indebtedness in 
corporations but rather a reflection of their 
fundamentals. In this connection, it was posited whether 
the problem is the banking model and whether the issue 
is how to create the right incentives for banks to start 
lending to highly dynamic, productive, and innovative 
firms. 
 Several participants questioned whether there had been 
an overreliance on monetary easing, which may have 
delayed needed reforms—including NPL resolution—
and, hence, the recovery. Prolonged easing can delay the 
recognition of losses, while low interest rates can lead 
banks to overestimate payment capacity and to keep 
nonviable and nonproductive businesses. Failing to 
resolve the NPL issue and allowing nonviable 
corporations to continue to operate increases the cost of 
funding for the viable economy and slows down 
economic growth.  
Panelists’ responses to questions and comments 
Credit level and funding. One panelist emphasized that the 
credit level is indeed important and that the funding channel is a 
part of what has to be restored. Some countries still lag behind in 
the recovery process because they have little diversification of 
funding sources. Other funding instruments have to be 
developed, particularly those that would benefit SMEs; for 
example, there is no equity channel. A policy is needed, and it is 
interesting that in the IMF survey presented in this seminar, none 
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of the CESEE countries had implemented any capital market 
measures. 
Allocation of credit. A panelist warned about the risks of having 
central banks—and authorities, in general—conducting a kind of 
industrial policy and channeling credits to certain sectors of the 
economy to the detriment of other sectors. This must be left to 
banks, because it requires micro information at the firm level. 
Central banks cannot be a substitute for adequate risk 
management by banks. 
Restructuring the financial system. Another panelist noted that 
this crisis has provided an opportunity to restructure the financial 
system, and it should be taken. To start a recovery, nonviable 
firms should be simply resolved and new ones should emerge. In 
this connection, having adequate provision for NPLs helps 
because then banks can more easily dispose of bad assets. 
Moreover, the companies can get rid of the debt and start from 
scratch, with some even getting some equity in.  
For example, in the United States, compared to Europe, 
recognition of losses and repair of balance sheets was easier 
because there is no recourse credit. If people cannot pay, they 
return their keys to the bank. Also, on the asset side of bank 
balance sheets, you had mostly mark-to-market assets, which 
entailed an immediate haircut, realized losses, and the need to 
recapitalize the banks.  
Monetary accommodation. In response to the concern that 
monetary accommodation could delay the restructuring reform, 
one panelist warned that this has to be put into the context of 
where we stand in terms of expected inflation. If there is a 
possibility that one can get stuck in a prolonged deflation 
situation, monetary accommodation is necessary. On how to 
stimulate new investments in SMEs, risk-sharing schemes have 
been implemented in some countries, which have been 
successful.  
Studies and experiments. A panelist emphasized that 
econometric analysis confirms that firms that go bankrupt 
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actually look pretty bad several years beforehand. If the banks 
paid attention and were willing to cut off lending at an earlier 
stage, they could probably avoid some of the NPLs. Moreover, 
there have been a number of experiments in the region on 
noncollateral-type lending, based on well-prepared business 
plans and cash flows. Econometric studies confirm that these 
seem to perform as well as the traditional collateral based loans. 
It may be good to know in future discussions why they have not 
been utilized more. 
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V.   PANEL 2: PROSPECTS FOR CREDIT GROWTH 
AND FOR FOREIGN BANK ENGAGEMENT IN THE 
REGION 
 
A.   Summary 
The panel reviewed prospects for credit growth and foreign bank 
engagement in the region, against the background of concerns 
that the global financial crisis and global regulatory reform were 
causing foreign banks to rein in their exposures to the region, 
thereby impairing credit and growth. 
The panel considered a range of issues. First, has credit growth 
been unduly impaired and, if so, what factors have been at work? 
The panel generally acknowledged that credit growth has slowed 
in recent years, and that in many cases this has been a cause for 
concern. As for the reasons for weak credit growth, three main 
factors have been identified: the high level of NPLs; pressures to 
boost capital, both domestically and internationally; and tighter 
regulation and supervision, both at home and abroad. However, 
some emphasized that weak credit growth was not being 
universally felt within the CESEE, and this diversity of 
experience illustrated that macroeconomic fundamentals were 
also an important driver.  
Others argued that deleveraging was the natural consequence of 
earlier credit excess, and therefore could not be avoided. And, by 
the same token, they cautioned that it was more important to 
address the structural constraints to credit than to take measures 
to subsidize or otherwise boost lending. These latter steps risk 
distorting the allocation of loanable funds, imposing fiscal costs, 
and could retard the more fundamental adjustments needed. 
Moreover, some warned that it would be important to take these 
steps quickly, since the current global environment is relatively 
favorable and the process of repairing balance sheets could be 
even more difficult once monetary conditions became less 
accommodative. 
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The panel also touched on the effect of regulatory reforms, at 
both the EU and international levels. It was recognized, as shown 
in bank surveys, that stricter capital and liquidity requirements 
has dampened credit provision, but the consensus view was that 
this was a necessary step to promote a more stable financial 
system in the long run. Moreover, it was recognized that the 
effects of regulation would be offset, at least in part, by 
improving confidence and lowering the cost of bank financing.  
Regarding reforms at the EU level, these too were viewed as 
favorable; but concern was expressed about the rules governing 
"state aid," whose complexity could impair the ability of 
jurisdictions to respond quickly and effectively to systemic 
threats.  
The panel debated the merits of domestic versus foreign 
ownership of banks, as well as the role this has played in 
dampening credit. Some argued strongly that foreign banks––
especially those that were larger, diversified, and well 
established––has brought considerable benefit to the CESEE 
before the crisis, improving the efficiency of intermediation and 
improving access to credit—especially for the corporate sector. 
During the crisis they had shown better financial performance, 
experiencing lower levels of NPLs and managing to maintain 
higher levels of credit.   
Others suggested that the distinction between foreign and 
domestic banks was overstated. These panelists emphasized 
more the role of management in explaining divergences in 
performance, the level of competition among banks, and the 
importance of both home and host supervisors in ensuring the 
soundness of risk management. It was suggested that it was 
important to ensure that foreign banks showed a long-term 
commitment to their host country, including by listing their 
equity on the local stock market. 
Structural issues were also identified as a potential factor 
explaining differences in credit growth. Notably, uncertainties 
about the legal structures in some CESEE countries—including 
those governing collateral collection, or the application of 
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sanctions as a result of the Russia-Ukraine conflict—were seen 
as driving the willingness to extend credit across borders. 
Moreover, while several panelists welcomed efforts to reduce the 
reliance of banks on short-term wholesale funding, they 
recognized that this was likely to adversely affect the willingness 
and ability of parent banks to fund their foreign subsidiaries. 
This argued for steps to improve access by banks to alternative 
sources of long-term funding.  
Several panelists also stressed the importance of steps to address 
the high level of NPLs in the CESEE. However, it was 
acknowledged that this was complicated because these NPLs 
largely reflected loans to the corporate sector, and were 
concomitantly harder to resolve given weaknesses in existing 
legal frameworks and the fact that NPLs were in many cases 
held by state-owned banks—and thus political hurdles would 
need to be addressed in the event of foreclosure. 
The panel expressed a range of views on the role of state banks 
in the recovery process. Some argued that state banks had in 
many countries performed poorly in the crisis and that these 
banks had grown in importance as a result of bail-outs. They 
worried that state involvement in credit allocation could lead to 
inefficiencies and (ultimately) fiscal costs, and they suggested 
that countries would be well served to act decisively and quickly 
to divest their ownership stakes. Others took a more sanguine 
view, arguing that divestment was less important than ensuring 
that state banks were subject to proper governance structures that 
ensure they operated under sound commercial principles. 
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B.   Presentations by Members of the Panel 
Lead: Christopher Towe, Deputy Director, Monetary and 
Capital Markets Department, IMF7 
Introduction 
Let me begin by saying how honored I am to be able to chair this 
session, which allows us to try and tackle a set of issues that are 
hugely relevant for the region—which has been struggling for 
the last several years to reinvigorate credit, especially by foreign 
banks. 
Fortunately, my panelists are both distinguished and deeply 
knowledgeable of the underlying problem and policy challenges.  
My role principally is to try and lay out a framework for the 
discussion and trust my panelists to follow up with a more 
substantive discussion. 
The issues before us, I think, can be distilled into the following 
three questions: 
1) Do we think economic activity will be supported by 
credit, and what conditions need to be in place for 
this to happen?  
2) To what extent should we fear that regulatory 
reforms, including Basel III and the Banking Union, 
will have an inappropriate impact on foreign bank 
engagement in the region? 
                                                 
7 Mr. Towe’s remarks were co-authored by Jeanne Gobat, Senior Economist, Monetary and 
Capital Markets Department, IMF. 
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3) What will be the implications for credit growth as 
foreign banks rely increasingly on local funding? 
Will credit support the incipient recovery? 
The good news is that most data suggest that economic growth is 
picking up in the region. In our April 2014 World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) projections, the CESEE—excluding Russia and 
Turkey—was projected to grow by 2.3 percent in 2014 compared 
to 1.2 percent in 2013. Our more recent projections are still 
being finalized, and it’s possible that global and regional growth 
forecasts may be revised down slightly—partly owing to the 
intensification of geopolitical tensions. But we still see the 
region as continuing on the recovery path. 
The less good news is that credit growth for the region, including 
cross-border lending, has remained sluggish compared to other 
emerging market regions. Indeed, while the Bank for 
International Settlements’ (BIS) quarterly report that was 
released last week showed that cross-border lending has 
rebounded generally, an important exception that of was 
emerging Europe, where cross-border credit fell for the fourth 
consecutive quarter.  
This suggests that, while the aftershocks of the global financial 
crisis may have receded for many regions, the hangover is still 
being felt here. 
And as my colleague, Marco Piñón, has already pointed out, the 
EIB’s most recent survey of bank lending suggests that credit 
conditions are likely to remain tight over the next six months. 
This survey is very informative about the factors that are likely 
to act as a drag on bank lending, and quite clearly suggests that 
there are both home-grown and international factors at play. 
At home, the survey suggests that three factors are most 
important: (i) the high level of NPLs; (ii) domestic regulatory 
reform; and (iii) looking forward to the next six months, concern 
that local market conditions may weigh on credit. 
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On the international front, the survey suggests that credit is being 
dampened by: (i) EU-level regulatory reforms; (ii) group-wide 
NPLs; (iii) levels of bank capital at the group level; and 
(iv) growing unease about market conditions. 
Should we be concerned about the weak prospects for credit 
growth in the region? I think the answer is an unequivocal “yes.” 
This issue has been studied extensively by my colleagues in the 
IMF’s Research Department, who conclude that—when 
recessions are associated with a credit crunch and asset price 
bust—output recoveries tend to be creditless, and that these 
creditless recoveries are usually suboptimal since the downturns 
are deeper and the recoveries slower than otherwise. 
This reflects not just the overhang of debt from the credit boom 
but also the dampening effects of balance sheet impairments, 
weak local capital markets, and limited access to foreign 
funding.  
What are the policy messages of these findings? I would not 
suggest that the answer is to drive up credit at all costs, since 
credit is neither necessary nor sufficient to drive an economic 
recovery—especially when the recession reflects the hangover 
from a credit boom.  
And policies to promote credit that are distortionary, impose 
undue fiscal burdens, or diminish incentives for balance-sheet 
clean-up should be avoided.   
Instead, I would argue for steps to fix the plumbing that is 
clogging up the credit channel; policymakers need to: 
 promote the recognition and resolution of NPLs;  
 adopt clear and credible plans for addressing capital 
shortfalls where they may exist;  
 take strong supervisory action when these plans cannot 
be met; and 
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 support these steps with legal and other reforms to 
facilitate corporate bankruptcy and debt workouts. 
Taking these steps would help relieve banks from legacy assets 
and improve their capacity to finance new, viable projects at 
reasonable interest rates.  
None of these steps is easy, and I don’t pretend that there is a 
one-size-fits-all approach; but early and decisive action is 
essential. 
How will the global regulatory reform agenda and the 
prospective banking union impact credit prospects in the 
region? 
Let me now shift to the next important question on how the 
global and European regulatory reform agenda could impact the 
credit outlook in CESEE as well as foreign banks’ engagement 
in the region. In regard to the European move to banking union, 
we see this as an important opportunity to address the 
shortcomings that were brought to light in the recent crisis.8 
The reforms are expected to establish a level playing field for 
bank regulation and supervision, consistency in bank resolution 
and deposit insurance frameworks, and (eventually) clarity on 
the financial backstops to break the adverse feedback loop 
between sovereigns, banks and the economy. And a crucial first 
step will be the AQR and stress testing exercises that are just 
concluding. 
These steps will have important implications for the CESEE 
countries, both because many are members of the euro area and 
                                                 
8 The EU measures include the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD) in 2013, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), and the adoption of 
harmonized standards for deposit guarantees. 
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because many are host jurisdictions for the European institutions 
that will be subject to the Banking Union.  
We see a number of positive implications of the establishment of 
the Banking Union for countries in this region:  
 It should help reduce the fragmentation of euro area 
banking and money markets that have emerged in recent 
years. But, this does not mean necessarily more cross-
border lending, but greater confidence and lending rates 
that are more clearly linked to underlying risk.  
 It will enhance consolidated supervision of euro area 
headquartered banks, including of their subsidiaries in 
the CESEE region, which should help improve host and 
home regulatory and supervisory coordination and 
consistency. 
 It will introduce common and harmonized standards and 
their implementation, reducing the likelihood of 
regulatory arbitrage or supervisory home bias. 
 The AQR should also help identify any remaining 
weaknesses in banks in the system and improve 
confidence. 
Overall, the reforms should help establish a healthier and better 
supervised banking system in the euro area and, given their 
systemic role in the region, should enhance the financial stability 
of CESSE banking systems. 
However, we also see a number of challenges, many of which 
were flagged in our recent Financial Stability Assessment 
Program (FSAP) and Article IV Consultation assessments of the 
EU. These include: 
 There will be operational risks that are associated with 
any major institutional change, and it will be critical that 
the transition does not result in a diminution of oversight 
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as responsibilities shift from national authorities to the 
ECB. 
 Even once banking supervision at the ECB is up and 
running, there will be the challenge of coordinating its 
work with the work of national authorities, which will 
continue to have sole responsibility for a very large 
number of banks. 
 Moreover, it remains to be seen how EU authorities can 
and will respond when there are divergences between 
national and region-wide priorities and conditions. 
 Notwithstanding the establishment of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), there remains a lack of full 
clarity about how the burden of large bank resolution 
will be shared among members of the Union. 
 The question of burden sharing is especially relevant for 
countries that are hosts to foreign bank subsidiaries.  
 And finally, the uncertainty surrounding the results of 
the AQR and stress tests has cast a pall over cross-border 
lending by euro area banks; while we may hope that the 
results will be confidence enhancing, this still remains to 
be seen.  
These issues are nicely laid out in the recent note by the Vienna 
Initiative Working Group.9 There, the point is made—which we 
endorse—that these uncertainties increase the premium on ex 
ante discussions with all parties on information sharing and crisis 
management arrangements.  
                                                 
9 Vienna Initiative Working Group on the European Banking Union and Emerging Europe,” April 30, 
2014. 
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And what about the implications of the global regulatory reform 
agenda? 
Regarding Basel III, I think the big unknown is how large an 
impact the new capital and liquidity requirements will have on 
the cost of funding and equity capital.  
Encouragingly, recent IMF research suggests that the effects 
should be manageable.10  
This study suggests that among the major financial markets, the 
effect would be to raise lending rates by only around 20 basis 
points. The relatively small size of the increase reflects the fact 
that much of the adjustment has already taken place, the 
assumption that the incidence of the measures will fall at least 
partly on the banks themselves through cost cutting, and partly 
investors will reward banks with lower costs of funding as they 
become safer.  
As for the impacts in the CESEE, we can take comfort from the 
fact that, in many cases, banks in this region are well placed to 
accommodate these new requirements because their capital is 
generally of high quality and—in some cases—loan loss 
provisioning has been raised.  
Indeed, our more recent analysis of bank activity suggests that 
the effects of regulation are also being mitigated by several 
factors including: the fact that these regulations are being phased 
in gradually; the extraordinarily easy monetary policy conditions 
throughout the world; the fact that many banks are adjusting to 
tighter regulations by scaling back their trading books; and 
                                                 
10 André Oliveira Santos and Douglas Elliott, “Estimating the Costs of Financial Regulation,” IMF 
Staff Discussion Note 12/11, September 11, 2012. 
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efforts by banks headquartered elsewhere (e.g., Australia, 
Canada, and Asia) to build market share.  
But we should not fool ourselves into thinking that these 
measures will not have a material effect, since the intention was 
to raise costs and curb lending, to reduce unwarranted risk taking 
and enhance buffers.  
And these costs are likely to be greater in jurisdictions where the 
under-appreciation of risk has been greatest and where the scope 
for accessing nonbank financing is the least.  
Moreover, it also remains to be seen whether credit spreads, 
which have fallen to unusual lows in recent years, are more 
vulnerable to the effects of the eventual unwinding of monetary 
accommodation in the United States and elsewhere than the 
effects of the tighter regulatory environment. To paraphrase 
George Soros’ famous commentary on the global financial crisis 
“It’s only when the tide goes out, that one sees who’s swimming 
naked.” 
What will be the implications for credit growth as foreign 
banks rely more on local funding? 
This leads me to the final question on what will be the 
implications for credit growth as banks rely more on a local 
funding model.  
At the global level, we have seen significant adjustments in 
funding structures, with banks moving away from reliance on 
short-term wholesale funding—including the interbank market 
and money market funds—and moving towards deposit and/or 
bond funding.   
This has been a relatively universal phenomenon but has been 
especially apparent among European banks. Indeed, work by my 
IMF colleagues suggests that the application of the net stable 
funding ratio (NFSR) would have a disproportionate effect on 
European banks. This reflects the fact that banks in Europe have 
tended to rely more heavily on short-term wholesale funding—
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including the interbank market, the dollar swap market, and 
money market funds—to support their lending. 
This suggests that the introduction of the NFSR, which will be 
fully phased in by 2018, could weigh on the funding provided by 
European banks to their CESEE subsidiaries.   
While this could seem to be an ominous development, there are a 
number of reasons why this should not be viewed with alarm. 
First, a lower reliance on wholesale funding is appropriate, since 
the crisis showed this can be dangerous and procyclical in times 
of stress.  
Second, we are seeing welcome signs that banks in the region are 
shifting their business models toward greater reliance on local 
deposits and other sources of funding.  
This should provide a more stable platform for credit 
intermediation in the region, and it will reduce incentives for 
foreign currency lending and reduce maturity and currency 
mismatches.  
Greater reliance on local funding will help insulate local markets 
from regional shocks. This is not to say that cross-border and 
intragroup funding will disappear; but hopefully, and thanks at 
least in part to regulatory reform, the risks associated with this 
type of funding will be properly priced.   
Concluding remarks 
So let me now offer a few concluding remarks, which are 
intended to help stimulate the discussion among the panel. 
I tend to agree with those that feel that financial regulatory 
reform at the global, EU, and national levels will dampen credit. 
However, I also tend to view this credit compression, at least in 
large part, as entirely appropriate. The leverage that was built up 
ahead of the global financial crisis was—with the benefit of 
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hindsight—unsustainable and too often directed to low-quality 
borrowers. And so the deleveraging we are seeing is, in many 
cases, the unfortunate and painful after-effects of this earlier 
excess, and the shift in business models that is underway will 
deliver more sustainable and sounder financial systems. 
However, I believe that there are policy measures that can and 
should be taken to help this adjustment, especially where credit 
is unduly constrained and having potentially long-lasting effects 
on growth potential. 
Although these will be discussed in more detail in our other 
sessions, my suggestion would be to focus on the constraints to 
credit growth rather than seek to circumvent them with stimulus 
measures. By this I mean: 
 Tackling the high NPLs, which act as drag on bank 
earnings and balance sheet position. 
 Strengthening capital markets, including markets for 
securitized lending and covered bonds. This would not 
only improve bank access to stable funding, but also 
provide instruments to meet the Basel III liquidity and 
funding requirements.  
 Addressing legal and administrative constraints on 
financial market services and infrastructures, and on 
corporate debt restructuring.  
 Supporting the development of a healthy pension and 
insurance sector, since these can be an important source 
of long-term funding, including the direct funding of 
corporates and projects through investment in bonds and 
equity.  
 Improving the quality and effectiveness of bank 
supervision, regulation, financial reporting, 
transparency, and governance, since these will help 
encourage the participation of outside investors.  
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Addressing these factors, as well as maintaining strong macro 
fundamentals, will keep banks committed to the region and 
provide the foundation for sustainable credit growth. 
Panelist 1: Boštjan Jazbec, Governor, Bank of Slovenia 
I would like to follow up on the puzzle between foreign and 
domestic banks. In my view, what really matters is effective 
management, and this ultimately depends on the exercise of 
proper ownership. Let me give four reasons why ownership 
really matters.  
The first reason is the governance issue. The roles of principal 
agents should be clearly defined by the proper owners and then 
made use of. It does not really matter if you have domestic or 
foreign banks, though it does matter if you have state-owned 
banks.  
The second issue is the ability to raise capital. In the European 
context, it is very difficult for any state-owned or public-owned 
bank to raise capital because of the punitive state aid rules that 
are currently in place. In Austria and Slovenia, we have already 
felt the consequence of this. It is also difficult to perceive how 
domestic investors will be able to raise the enormous amount of 
capital needed to make banks financially stable and meet the 
ever increasing capital adequacy requirements. This is the point 
where I would slightly disagree with Christopher Towe when he 
said that the new rules might impede credit growth. I am always 
puzzled with that because I understand that the capital is on the 
liability side of the balance sheets of the bank. If you increase 
capital then something has to match up on the asset side. So, it 
means that more capital might not necessarily reduce credit 
activity. In addition, more capital also reduces the cost of 
funding. This is something that has already been mentioned a 
few times today.  
The third reason why ownership matters is attitude towards risk. 
In my view, banks that have proper owners are more risk averse 
and have better risk management.  
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The fourth reason is approach to NPLs. This is also something 
that we are trying to resolve at this seminar. If you look at the 
Slovenian case, the approach to NPLs is different because it is 
also related to the attitude towards risk. And the way in which 
NPLs have been managed by foreign banks in Slovenia is 
different compared with domestic banks. Data show that, until 
2008, there was no difference in the level of NPLs between 
domestic banks and foreign banks. However, following the onset 
of the financial crisis, foreign banks were better in the 
management of NPLs. In my view, this also demonstrates that 
ownership really matters. In the case of Slovenia, most of the 
NPLs are related to problems in the corporate sector, unlike in 
some other countries such as Ireland and Spain, where NPLs 
were mainly related to the mortgage market. Since most of the 
NPLs in Slovenia are related to the corporate sector, 
transforming the NPLs also means ownership restructuring.   
There also may be a political dimension when you have 
ownership restructuring, as is the case in Slovenia. Since a 
majority of the banks in the country are state-owned banks, it 
means that, when the stakes of the banks (i.e., NPLs) are taken 
over through a debt-equity swap, we have a vicious circle that 
never ends. How can we solve this puzzle? We again come to the 
principal agent problem: Who is in the lead and who should 
make the final decision? All I know is that playing with other 
people’s money is really expensive in the long run.  
I will stop here and hope for more discussion of these issues.   
Panelist 2: Ewald Nowotny, Governor, OeNB 
The economic recovery in the region remains fragile in the light 
of increasing downside risks. Several factors are significantly 
contributing to the slowdown of the growth momentum in the 
euro area as well as the CESEE region, including the mounting 
geopolitical tensions across the globe, the still ongoing process 
of balance sheet repair in the financial and nonfinancial private 
sectors, and the continued need for further fiscal consolidation in 
some countries.  
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As the most recent growth forecasts have been revised 
downwards for the world economy, the euro area, as well as for 
the CESEE region, the challenges are clear. The recovery is 
lagging and uneven, mostly due to crisis legacies resulting in 
lower growth potential. Investment has been subdued and 
demand remains weak. Hence, reinvigorating (credit) growth in 
Europe appears high on the agenda of policymakers. Beyond the 
support of accommodative monetary policies, targeted reform 
measures are needed in order to avoid recoveries which go hand 
in hand with prolonged periods of weak output and employment 
growth. In general, structural reforms to strengthen growth 
potential or make growth more sustainable are needed. 
Due to its geographical and cultural proximity to CESEE, 
Austria has always had a special interest in the region. Austrian 
banks were among the first to enter the region, realizing the 
possibilities and potential of the region and thereby acting as a 
driver for banking sector development. Their long-term 
commitment to CESEE is also reflected in their broadly 
maintained total exposure to the region in the past years, which 
amounted to EUR 97.5 billion by mid-2014.11 With a total 
number of 62 subsidiaries as of June 2014, Austrian banks are 
still the major players in the region and contribute to a stable 
flow of credit to the local economies. Thanks to their traditional 
business model and higher than EU growth rates in CESEE, their 
activities in the region also continue to be an important 
contributor to the profitability of Austrian banks on a 
consolidated basis.  
However, CESEE operations also come with higher risks. Higher 
NPL ratios, goodwill write-downs, and political uncertainty in 
some countries pose challenges to Austrian banks operating in 
the region. These risks have translated into higher risk costs over 
                                                 
11 CESEE exposure of majority Austrian-owned banks (BIS definition). 
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the past few years. What is more, in the past, the profit sources 
of Austrian subsidiaries had been evenly distributed across 
CESEE, which also yielded risk diversification benefits; in 
recent years, by contrast, profits have increasingly come from 
just a few countries, namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Russia, and Turkey. This highlights a concentration risk and the 
need for a sustainable growth strategy in the region. Recent 
turmoil in some of these markets has also underlined the fragility 
of the current earnings situation. The reduction of exposure in 
some countries with a difficult economic environment or 
unorthodox economic and financial policy was more than 
compensated for by an increase in other CESEE countries, where 
Austrian banks’ subsidiaries have generated profits and 
registered a relatively stable credit quality in recent years.  
As far as foreign currency lending of Austrian banks’ 
subsidiaries to CESEE is concerned, these loans, which have 
declined by 7.1 percent year on year, amounted to 
EUR 4.2 billion at end-2013, taking into account exchange rate 
effects. Yet, the outstanding volume of foreign currency loans 
continues to pose a material risk both to households and to 
Austrian banks.  
The decreasing trend in foreign currency lending of Austrian 
banks reflects the success of the macroprudential tools already 
implemented by the Austrian authorities before 2014, most 
recently the revised minimum standards on risk management and 
new lending in foreign currency from early 2013. Furthermore, 
in March 2012, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) and 
the Financial Market Authority provided supervisory guidance12 
with a view to strengthening the sustainability of the business 
models of large and internationally active Austrian banks, in 
                                                 
12 For further information see http://www.oenb.at/en/Financial-Stability/Systemic-Risk-
Analysis/Sustainability-of-Large-Austrian-Banks-Business-Models.html. 
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order to ensure that they increase their capital buffers, rebalance 
the funding position of subsidiaries, and prepare recovery and 
resolution plans for potential crisis situations. Monitoring results 
from the end of the first quarter of 2014 indicate that a large 
majority of Austrian banks’ subsidiaries in CESEE have 
sustainable business models (on a year-on-year basis). 
Strengthening of the long-term stable funding of foreign 
subsidiaries goes hand in hand with developing domestic capital 
markets, which can be more difficult in small economies that 
have not (yet) adopted the single currency. These measures also 
reflect the spirit of the Vienna Initiative13 to promote a 
sustainable growth model underpinned by strengthened 
capitalization, while at the same time proactively preventing 
pronounced boom-bust cycles.  
Coming back to the conditions for reinvigorating credit growth, 
it is important to note that potential output growth is still higher 
in the CESEE region compared to the euro area. Many CESEE 
countries have followed a remarkable economic catching-up 
process over the past two decades, but have not yet reached the 
levels seen in most of the euro area countries. These differentials 
imply a great potential for above-average growth, not only for 
the CESEE region, but also for the countries with which the 
region maintains close relations. Owing to the slump in growth 
in the CESEE region caused by the global financial crisis, the 
previously substantial growth differential between the CESEE 
EU member states and the euro area has declined in recent years. 
                                                 
13 The European Bank Coordination “Vienna Initiative” is a platform for cooperation and discussion 
of all the relevant public and private sector stakeholders of EU-based cross-border banks active in 
emerging Europe, such as home and host country supervisors, the European Commission, 
international financial institutions like the IMF, and banks. The Vienna Initiative was launched at the 
height of the global financial crisis in January 2009 and played a key role in stabilizing the situation 
in the CESEE region. It helped to prevent a systemic banking crisis in the region and ensured that 
credit kept flowing to the real economies during the crisis. 
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Nevertheless, this growth differential is projected to persist until 
2019 according to the most recent WEO by the IMF.14  
Countries with a geographical proximity and traditionally strong 
ties with the region, like Austria, are in an excellent position to 
support this process. Austrian banks stay committed to a retail-
oriented business model and continue to focus on CESEE. In this 
regard, with a more sustainable business model, banks play a key 
role in providing finance to the real economy. This is particularly 
important as higher investment can boost demand, which—in the 
end—supports economic recovery. In order to tackle the policy 
challenges and possible responses in connection with 
reinvigorating credit growth in CESEE, it is critical to learn 
about the various experiences of different countries in the region 
and to exchange opinions. Moreover, as CESEE and the euro 
area are economically and financially integrated, close 
coordination between home and host authorities is vital. 
Panelist 3: Jan Tóth, Deputy Governor, National Bank of 
Slovakia 
The presentation consists of two parts. The first part deals with 
our experiences with foreign ownership of banks. The second 
part gives more detail about the Slovak banking sector. 
Today’s banking sector in Central Europe (V5 countries) could 
be arguably divided into three groups in terms of its healthiness 
and performance. The best group consists of Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic. Poland and Hungary are in the middle group, 
with the issue of foreign exchange loans. Slovenia seems to fare 
the worst, having the universal state banks as major players. 
                                                 
14 WEO (October 2014). 
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Slovakia’s policy lesson is simple: sell the state banks; attract 
foreign bank capital from the developed world; and have 
reasonably low and stable domestic interest rates (i.e., monetary 
policy of inflation targeting). The advantages of having foreign 
banks have vastly exceeded the disadvantages. Having state 
banks in post-communist Slovakia turned out to be extremely 
costly for the tax payer. 
Part 1: Slovak experience with foreign ownership of banks 
The Slovak banking system has emerged from the formerly 
common Czechoslovak communist banking system. In the early 
1990s, the Slovak banking system still had many characteristic 
features inherited from the previous regime and commercial 
bank activities were concentrated in a few specialized banks.  
Beyond the procedural difficulties faced at the very beginning in 
the newly stabilizing banking sector, the transformation process 
was impeded by the fact that most of the main financial market 
institutions had to be newly created, because the majority of the 
processes were originally managed from Prague—former capital 
of the Czech-Slovak Republic. The role of the newly formed 
National Bank of Slovakia was not only to supervise the 
development of a new banking system, but above all it was 
responsible for introducing a new currency and maintaining an 
independent monetary policy. 
A consequent period of hectic changes in Slovak society 
involved also the financial sector. The market has witnessed a 
dramatic increase in the number of financial institutions with a 
banking license (that peaked in 1996, when reaching 34). Within 
a few years, the share of foreign ownership in the sector 
increased to 50 percent. Simultaneously, employment in the 
banking system increased and so did the banks’ assets, liabilities, 
and loans. 
However, buoyant evolution in the unclear environment brought 
a significant increase in NPLs. The share of classified loans rose 
to almost 30 percent of total loans. This unpleasant development 
was fuelled by inefficient banking institutions, inexperienced 
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banks with an underdeveloped methodology for assessment of 
creditors, weak risk management, relatively widespread partisan 
rating of clients, and financially illiterate customers. 
Accumulation of NPLs was prevalent in the corporate sector. In 
the unhealthy political environment, coupled with an unstable 
economic environment, unfair practices of business managers 
were relatively common, coupled with political pressures to 
provide unprofitable loans to friendly businessmen. 
In the nonstandard economic environment, interest rates were 
very high. Interest rates on deposits were around 15 percent and 
the interest rates on loans were at the level of 20 percent per 
annum. The need for tightened monetary policy and a massive 
defense of the exchange rate was to a large extent a consequence 
of very loose fiscal policy and a lack of structural reforms. 
A natural component of transformation was privatization of state 
banking institutions. The inevitable intermediate step in this 
process was cleaning the banks of the accumulated NPLs. This 
happened in 2000 and 2001. Based on available estimates, NPLs 
represented one of the biggest costs of the overall transformation 
process, exceeding 11 percent of GDP in Slovakia. The value of 
the NPLs in state banks reached EUR 3 billion (more than 
9 percent of GDP). NPLs of well-connected local private equity 
accounted for another EUR 660 million (i.e., 2 percent of GDP). 
This is a huge cost that is fully comparable to what many 
observers would consider to be the biggest cost—a broad-based 
privatization process involving local friends during the 1994–98 
Meciar era. The price difference between the revenue and the 
accounting value of those companies was comparable at 
10.7 percent of GDP (EUR 3.2 billion). Hence, the state 
ownership of universal big banks turned out to be extremely 
expensive in a post-communist country. 
The early negative experience (the stigma of the banking crisis) 
and its high public costs helped shape the more conservative 
behavior of clients, bank regulators, and supervisors in Slovakia 
in the following years. 
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Next, the development of the Slovak banking system took place 
in an environment of low inflation supported by inflation 
targeting monetary policy. Interest rates declined substantially. 
At the same time, cleaning of the banking sector asset side and 
low inflation, which helped protect deposits, resulted in a small 
loan to deposit ratio in Slovakia. Loans and deposits in foreign 
exchange have been very limited. 
Based on theory, foreign ownership of banks brings several 
benefits and costs. Undisputed benefits include transfer of know-
how, higher competition, and better or “more independent” 
allocation of resources in the host country. Besides benefits, we 
may identify some costs related to weaker longer-term 
commitments. We may expect fewer financial resources to be 
available for corporates, because lending to corporates is more 
complex and requires stronger effort and more analysis. In 
general, the volume of available finances depends on the value 
of collateral and costs or complexity of monitoring. These 
factors may lead to higher lending to households and fuel real 
estate booms. 
However, the existence of these relationships in practice is not so 
straightforward. The experience of the Slovak Republic is based 
on the gradual creation of three different groups of commercial 
banks. The first group present in the market can be called “pure” 
foreign banks. These banks usually relied on capital from their 
home countries and concentrated on corporate private-sector 
clients. Therefore, they usually strongly supported policies that 
strengthened corporate balance sheets and investments, mainly 
structural reforms and low taxation. The second group represents 
“mixed” foreign banks. These are former state banks acquired by 
large Austrian or Italian banks, and they retained their positions 
of biggest players in the Slovak market. In these banks, we could 
observe gradual corporate culture changes, and in general their 
services are more expensive. The third group comprises small 
local banks that are often owned by local equity firms. These 
banks have tended to finance their owners and sometimes engage 
in more risky activities (e.g., Greek bonds). 
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As already indicated, the three groups differ not only in terms of 
their ownership, but also in terms of their behavior and historical 
development (Figure 1). 
1) “Pure” foreign banks could not rely on a wide 
branch network and they did not perceive Slovakia 
as their key market due to its small size. They 
focused on medium and large enterprises, and thanks 
to their connections with mother banks, they were 
able to dramatically improve their price 
competitiveness and introduce new investment 
banking products (structural finance).  
2) “Mixed” (foreign) banks took over mortgage and 
consumer finance as the theory would predict. These 
segments have remained the most dynamically 
growing until now. But the banks did not stop there 
and continued to service a corporate clientele as 
well, including SMEs. In fact, at present, there are 
some signs that the “mixed” banks are trying to price 
out “pure” foreign banks in the large and mid-
corporate sector.  
3) The group of small local banks relied on central 
bank financing due to limited access to money 
market activities. Also, their capital adequacy ratios 
are usually not as strong as those of the other groups.  
Euro adoption and the economic, financial, and debt crises 
influenced the three groups differently. Despite the ability to 
adapt to euro area prices and increase their price competitiveness 
(among the top seven lowest prices in the eurozone at present), 
we can observe a decrease in profit and market shares of “pure” 
foreign banks. The main reason seems to be the fact that foreign-
owned companies tend to finance themselves via corporate 
headquarters on a larger scale than before. In contrast, our 
“mixed” banks continue to benefit from a growing retail sector. 
Retail loans are growing at double-digit rates and the banks 
maintain very favorable returns on equity or assets. The prices of 
mortgages have been the highest in the eurozone. The last 
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relatively small group of local banks keeps on maintaining lower 
capital adequacy ratios and, due to worse access to the money 
market, they continue to prefer central bank financing. 
Based on our experience, the presence of foreign banks brings a 
lot of advantages for the stability of the banking sector. These 
include the transfer of know-how, liquidity, and capital support. 
The existence of large universal state banks turned out to be 
extremely costly.  
As a small disadvantage, unlike domestic banks, foreign banks 
tend to be more prone to limit their lending activities in the event 
of an economic downturn or uncertainty. As shown in the 
Figure 1, domestic banks continued lending while foreign banks 
slowed down their lending activities in recent bad times. 
Figure 1. Differences in Behavior of Domestic and Foreign Banks 
 
   Source: NBS. 
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it from the majority of the euro area banking sectors. As was 
already indicated, foreign ownership of the banks has been 
gradually growing. Today, foreign capital is highly engaged in 
the Slovak banking sector. Subsidiaries of foreign banks and 
branches of foreign banks represent almost 85 percent of total 
assets (Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Prevailing Foreign Ownership 
   Source: NBS. 
At the same time, the Slovak banking sector is much less 
sensitive to financial markets due to high domestic deposits. 
Clients’ deposits to total assets ratio is the highest in the EU 
(Figure 3). This aspect forms a very good funding position for 
the Slovak banking sector, because it eliminates reliance on 
funds from parent banks and lowers liquidity funding risk. 
Loans are fully funded by clients’ deposits. The loan-to-deposit 
ratio is lower than the euro area average (Figure 4). And both 
total and corporate loan-to-deposit ratios belong to the lower half 
of the EU countries (Figure 5). 
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Figure 3. Dominant Role of Clients’ Deposits 
 
   Source: ECB. 
 
Figure 4. Overall Loan to Deposit 
 
 
   Source: ECB. 
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Figure 5. International Comparisons of Returns 
(In percent) 
   Source: ECB. 
 
Capital adequacy remains one of the pillars of the banking 
sector’s resilience to external risks. The capital adequacy ratio 
has continued to rise, and in 2013 it reached 17 percent. 
Simultaneously, we could observe an increase in Tier 1 capital. 
The value of this ratio for the Slovak banking sector was higher 
than the median value for EU countries (Figure 6).Capital 
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Figure 6. International Comparisons of the Tier 1 Capital Ratios 
(In percent) 
  Source: NBS (Analysis of the Slovak Financial Sector). 
 
Figure 7. International Comparisons of Returns 
(In percent) 
 
Source: ECB (Consolidated Banking Data). 
   Note: True Values for Cyprus and Slovenia are 45 pe
rcent, and90 percent for Slovenia. 
  
0
5
10
15
VI.10 XII.10 VI.11 XII.11 VI.12 XII.12 VI.13 XII.13
Interquatile spread
Slovak banks (weighted average)
Median (EU)
Parent banks (weighted average)
Median (EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe) 
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
EE SK LV FI LX BE FR ES NL MT DE GR AT PT IT IE CY SL
Return on assets
  110  
Besides a good level of capital adequacy, Slovak banks have an 
adequate leverage ratio. The average value for the Slovak 
banking sector fluctuated between 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent in 
2013. In June 2013, large international European banks recorded 
a value of 3.0 percent. At the same time, banks operating in 
Slovakia follow conservative bank business models and maintain 
sound profitability.  
However, sound overall performance indicators do not mean that 
there is no scope for improvement. At a time when the corporate 
sector is curbed by a weak economic outlook and development is 
driven by the retail sector, we may identify several risks 
stemming from the low interest rate environment and limited 
demand. Low interest rates, in combination with high debt-to-
income ratios for selected clients, may indicate risks in case 
interest rates significantly increase in the future. In the retail 
sector, we also may observe rising loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
and a relatively high share of intermediaries taking over lending 
activities. Taking these risks seriously, measures formulated in 
the new European directives are already being implemented well 
in advance of deadlines and will be soon extended with our own 
country specific recommendations. They range from specific 
loan to value recommendations to individual clients’ stress tests 
and the introduction of third-party regulation. 
Panelist 4: Andrzej Raczko, Member of the Management 
Board, National Bank of Poland 
The main subject of our panel discussion is the prospects for 
credit growth and foreign bank engagement in the CESEE 
region. The example of Poland in this respect is interesting from 
the point of view of credit policy during and after the last 
financial crisis.  
Before proceeding to this issue, I would like to briefly 
characterize the significance and size of the foreign bank sector 
in Poland. In the Polish banking sector, 63.4 percent of equity 
belongs to foreign banks. Regarding the value of assets, their 
share is almost 58.8 percent of the assets of the whole of the 
banking sector. What differentiates Poland from the other 
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countries of the CESEE region is the significant diversification 
of the ownership structure of foreign banks, taking as a criterion 
the country of origin. Naturally, banks from the euro area 
prevail, but there are also banks from other regions and 
continents operating here, e.g., the United States (Figure 1). 
The significant diversification of the foreign bank sector 
diminished the risk of deleveraging. The risk of negative effects 
of deleveraging for the Polish financial sector resulting from the 
problems of some foreign parent banks is significantly reduced, 
as no banks from a single country dominate the sector. This is 
why neither the Greek crisis, nor the Irish crisis, nor the Spanish 
banking-sector crisis caused tensions in the Polish banking 
sector. The problems of parent banks led mainly to a change of 
owner and, to a small extent, an outflow of subsidiary bank 
financing. In other words, the parent banks in financial need sold 
profitable Polish subsidiaries to a new foreign company, which 
immediately offered liquidity support. For these reasons, the 
deleveraging process—unlike the cases of some other countries 
in the region—did not have a perceptible impact on credit 
growth in the economy. The outflow of foreign funding, which 
was noticeable in the first quarter of 2014, was related to banks’ 
originating mortgage loans in foreign currencies before the 
financial crisis. During the crisis, these banks stopped lending to 
households in foreign currency. As a result, the principal 
repayment of the existing portfolio of foreign-currency loans led 
to a gradual reduction in the need for foreign funding by the 
banking sector from abroad (Figure 2). 
The stable position of foreign banks in Poland results, to a large 
extent, from the convergence process that the Polish banking 
sector has undergone. On the one hand, Polish banks received 
the know-how of foreign banks; while on the other hand, the 
foreign banks learned how to adapt their services to the needs of 
the local market. If we compare the performance of both sectors, 
we see that they differ only slightly. ROE and net interest margin 
are practically at the same level; foreign banks have a slightly 
higher capital adequacy ratio.   
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Figure 1. Ownership Structure in Terms of: Assets, Loans, and Equity 
 
 
 
Source: NBP 
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The considerable difference between the cost-to-income ratios is 
caused by the significant share in the domestic bank sector of 
one state bank (Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego), which finances 
large infrastructure projects and manages foreign credit lines 
obtained from international financial institutions, e.g., the EIB 
and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD). Due to the profile of its operations, this bank—unlike 
other universal banks—does not pay the high costs of 
maintaining a network of branches (Figure 3). 
Similarly, there are no major differences in the structure of the 
balance sheets of domestic and foreign banks. An important 
difference is the higher share of foreign funding and a 
correspondingly higher share of mortgage and corporate loans in 
the structure of foreign banks compared to domestic banks. 
These differences are entirely understandable. Foreign banks 
benefited from easy access to foreign funding from their parent 
banks. Through foreign subsidiaries, these funds were used to 
grant mortgage loans denominated in foreign currency to Polish 
households and large enterprises, mainly Polish exporters 
(Figure 4).  
Domestic and foreign banks have stopped granting foreign 
currency denominated loans to households that are not hedged 
against exchange-rate risk. The problem of foreign-currency-
denominated mortgage loans was not such a painful experience 
in Poland as in other CEE countries, since at the beginning of the 
credit boom the Polish Financial Stability Authority (KNF) 
introduced quite restrictive conditions for borrowers of foreign 
currency loans (the so-called Recommendation “S”). As a result, 
foreign-currency loans were granted only to households with the 
highest incomes. During the crisis, these households were able to 
service their debt despite a significant depreciation of the zloty.
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Figure 2. External Positions of BIS-Reporting Banks vis-à-vis All 
Sectors, 2013:Q1–2014:Q1 
(Change Percent of 2013 GDP, Exchange-Rate Adjusted) 
 
   Source: Vienna Initiative CESEE Deleveraging and Credit Monitor, August 4, 2014. 
   External Positions of BIS-reporting Banks vis-à-vis all sectors, 2013:Q1–2014:Q1 (Change, 
Percent of 2013 GDP, exchange-rate adjusted. 
 
Figure 3. Selected Profitability and Capital Ratios, 
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Domestic and foreign banks have stopped granting foreign 
currency denominated loans to households that are not hedged 
against exchange-rate risk. The problem of foreign-currency-
denominated mortgage loans was not such a painful experience 
in Poland as in other CEE countries, since at the beginning of the 
credit boom the Polish Financial Stability Authority (KNF) 
introduced quite restrictive conditions for borrowers of foreign 
currency loans (the so-called Recommendation “S”). As a result, 
foreign-currency loans were granted only to households with the 
highest incomes. During the crisis, these households were able to 
service their debt despite a significant depreciation of the zloty. 
Let us now focus on the credit policy conducted by banks of both 
sectors. Are foreign banks more risk averse than domestic 
banks? The level of NPLs is a significant indicator of the scale of 
credit risk undertaken by banks. Although the NPL indexes are 
approximately at the same level, it is easy to explain some small 
differences. The level of NPLs for corporate loans is higher in 
domestic banks than in foreign banks. This difference is 
explained by the larger share of large enterprises in the credit 
portfolio of foreign banks (often these are subsidiaries of foreign 
firms or domestic exporters). In turn, domestic banks have a 
larger share of SMEs in their credit portfolio, which have a 
higher level of credit risk. The NPLs of consumer loans are at a 
similar level; however, the higher share of NPLs for mortgage 
loans is related to the structure of these loans. As previously 
mentioned, mortgage loans denominated in foreign currency 
were granted to the wealthiest clients, which is why they have 
the lowest NPL level. These, however, dominate in the mortgage 
loan portfolio of foreign banks. It seems that foreign banks are 
more effective in assessing credit risk, although they undertake it 
on a larger scale than domestic banks, which is shown by the 
higher risk-weighted assets (Figure 5). 
It would be beneficial to get a more comprehensive picture of 
credit policy before, during, and after the financial crisis. The 
National Bank of Poland (NBP) examines changes in credit 
policy by using opinion polls of senior loan officers. 
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Figure 4. Balance Sheet Structure of Domestic- and  
Foreign-Owned Banks 
Source: NBP. 
Note Data as of 2014H1. 
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An indicator based on the survey shows easing or tightening of 
credit standards. A comparison of the credit policies between the 
foreign bank sector and the domestic bank sector in the years 
2005–14 is presented in Figure 6. 
Figure 5. NPL Ratios of Domestic- and Foreign-Owned Banks for 
Different Client Groups 
 
 
Domestic banks accepted a level of risk for corporate loans close 
to that of foreign banks in the period  
2005–08. Beginning from 2008, foreign banks abruptly tightened 
their criteria for granting loans to enterprises, while domestic 
banks introduced such a tightening more gradually. Ultimately, 
together with the economic recovery, the monetary policy stance 
was at a similar level.  
Figure 6. Cumulated Changes in Credit Standards 
Source: NBP. 
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In the case of mortgage loans, the lending conditions were 
tighter in the foreign bank sector. Foreign banks granted mainly 
foreign currency loans, which—in accordance with the 
requirements imposed by the Polish FSA—required tighter 
criteria for granting credit than in the case of loans in zlotys. 
After 2012, foreign banks further tightened credit conditions due 
to the imposition of stricter prudential requirements on the way 
in which the portfolio of foreign loans should be managed. 
Consumer loans were granted on similar lending conditions in 
both sectors. Significant easing of lending standards in the 
segment of consumer loans observed since the beginning of 2013 
can be to a large extent attributed to amendments to the Polish 
FSA’s Recommendation “T” on granting these loans. The 
amendments were particularly vital for the granting of low-value 
loans, for which the requirements on creditworthiness 
assessment were significantly eased. The segment of low-value 
consumer loans is dominated by foreign-owned banks. As a 
result, it was this group of banks that took the biggest advantage 
of the amendments in Recommendation “T” (and improving 
macroeconomic conditions) and expanded their activities in the 
consumer loans market. 
Although there were some differences in the credit policy of the 
domestic and foreign banks in Poland, the dynamic of credit 
supply has not varied significantly between the sectors in recent 
years. This is explained by the convergence process of the 
domestic and foreign banking sectors, which has accelerated 
since 2004.  
The fundamentals of the banking convergence process were 
established in the middle of the 1990s. Initially, green-field 
investments dominated in the foreign bank sector. At this time, 
foreign subsidiaries differed significantly from the domestic 
banks in terms of the acceptable risk profile, financial 
instruments applied, management principles, and client base—
which were made up mainly of foreign companies operating in 
Poland. In the second half of the 1990s, a period of intensive 
privatization of the banking sector began. A significant number 
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of state banks were purchased by foreign investors. The method 
of privatization was important; it consisted in finding a strategic 
investor, who in the privatization agreement pledged to ensure 
conditions for the long-term development of the acquired bank, 
mainly in terms of constant capital accumulation. An important 
role was played by the Polish banking supervisory authority. Its 
rigorous approach meant that decisions regarding the 
management of subsidiary banks had to be taken at the 
boardroom level of these banks and not at the level of the 
headquarters of parent banks. Headquarters only controlled 
strategic decisions, which gave quite a significant amount of 
autonomy to the local staff. As a result, the value added brought 
by the foreign investor in the form of capital, a management 
model (particularly of risk management), and new financial 
instruments were adapted to local conditions. The privatized 
bank maintained the client base, the local staff, and––in general–
–the universal business model of the bank. Banks created as 
green-field investments soon lost significance in the foreign-
bank sector; they either remained as niche banks servicing only a 
certain segment of the market (for example, banks financing the 
purchase of cars) or became absorbed by large foreign banks that 
were created as a result of privatization.  
Competition from large universal foreign banks also forced 
important changes in the domestic bank sector. Domestic banks 
were compelled to introduce modern technology (information 
technology (IT) systems), banking services,. and risk models 
similar to those of foreign banks. The need to constantly 
accumulate capital forced domestic banks to look for capital on 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange. This process also affected banks 
controlled by the state, leading to their gradual privatization. The 
requirements for a listed company curtailed the negative impact 
of state ownership on credit policy.  
Let us summarize: The diversification of the Polish banking 
sector—both in terms of the significant share of domestic banks 
and the broad representation of foreign investors from various 
countries—helped ensure a sufficient level of competition, 
particularly in relation to credit operations. Polish banking 
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supervision and an appropriate mechanism of privatization 
resulted in a constant accumulation of capital in the foreign bank 
sector; consequently, capital has not been a barrier to constantly 
increasing credit activity. Sound domestic supervision 
regulations and the adaptation of foreign credit risk models to the 
Polish situation compelled the banks of both sectors to pursue a 
prudential credit policy. The significant role of local staff in the 
management of subsidiary banks prevented a credit crunch, even 
though their parent banks were hit by a sudden stop of credit 
activity during the last crisis.  
Panelist 5: László Baranyay, Vice President, EIB 
Thank you very much. Let me start my remarks in a light way 
and perhaps a somewhat unusual approach, as Hungarians 
sometimes do, even in economics. On my way to Ljubljana, I 
stopped to buy a book—The Alchemists—which was named 
business book of the year. The book is about three famous 
central bankers, calling themselves alchemists without adding a 
question mark. I think the difference between an alchemist and a 
central banker is that alchemists never managed to produce gold, 
which was their main target. However, central bankers today try 
to use several new tools and facilities with the objective of 
supporting economic recovery, which is why I think it is an 
interesting book to read, even though the title may not be very 
adequate.  
I thought about my role in this important meeting of highly 
respected representatives, politicians, and academics. It is 
perhaps a bit of a special one because I represent an international 
financial institution that directly invests in the real economy, 
while here we are talking a lot about the national banks’ role, the 
central banks’ role, the banking sector in general, and the special 
case of foreign-owned banks, etc. The role of EIB in the 
European economy is therefore somewhat different. 
But first let me ask a question. I always begin with a question. I 
follow J.F. Kennedy’s way of thinking, who once suggested not 
seeking the Republican or Democratic answer, but simply the 
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right answer. But I think that before doing that we first have to 
think about the right questions!   
What are the prospects for credit growth? 
I think discussing the prospects for credit growth is indeed 
important, but the more fundamental issue concerns the 
revitalization of economic growth in Europe and all around 
world, as was mentioned earlier by the Croatian Governor. So 
what is the macroeconomic situation in the world, and what is 
the macroeconomic situation in the countries that we have 
mentioned? Let me highlight only one figure about these 
countries––GDP growth. Several countries have not reached the 
level of economic growth and economic performance that they 
had before the crisis, e.g., Hungary and some other countries. At 
the same time, we cannot generalize. Poland is absolutely 
different because the Polish economy is in a sustainable 
economic situation and faces comparably few problems in the 
banking sector, which supports its economic growth and 
sustainable public finances.  
Where are we then? Are we in the middle of the crisis, after the 
crisis, or before the next crisis? Well, I know that—in regard to 
the economy—we are always before a crisis, and we never know 
when the new crisis will begin.  
I think the last crisis was not a normal cyclical crisis, and that’s 
why I propose quite different tools to be used for the 
management of the consequences of the crisis.  
The situation is quite controversial, and I think it is important to 
make clear this distinction when we discuss the problems in and 
outside the eurozone. There are some very important economies 
outside the eurozone as well (e.g., Great Britain) and some of 
them are actually not candidates to join the eurozone. So it is 
important to see the whole banking sector, not only the part of it 
that is in the eurozone. The banking regulation and the ECB 
must observe it as a single sector.  
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In the CEE region, the foreign-owned banks have a special role. 
The parent companies of these foreign-owned banks settled 
mainly, but not exclusively, in the eurozone. That’s why many of 
them can be regarded as banks of the eurozone, but others not. 
Furthermore, there is a very significant, active, and consequently 
very important financial institution in this region, which comes 
from outside the EU.  
In summary, I think there are new challenges and we have to 
find new answers for new challenges.  
I mention the phrase “global metamorphosis’” because—as you 
may know—Zeus had several metamorphoses, but always with 
the same aim, yet it was not a politically correct one. We have a 
politically correct aim because we want to increase the 
investment capacity of governments, economies, and by 
extension the competitiveness of the EU. The current global 
economic situation is a big challenge for the European countries 
and EU member states. The investment bank’s tools and 
opportunities are different from those of the central banks. EIB 
has several special activities, and the most important ones are its 
lending, blending, and advising activities, which are well known.  
Advising capacity and advising activity are quite important for 
the creation of new investment projects that are bankable for the 
commercial banking sector. The impact of such projects on the 
economy is good, not only for economic growth, but also for the 
employment situation. Furthermore, I think one of the key 
challenges for the future of Europe is the issue of youth 
unemployment, because the level of youth unemployment is very 
high in several countries and we will have to do everything we 
can to reduce it. Besides project finance and investment advice, 
we operate our advisory services for these dedicated goals as 
well.  
The EIB is not only a single bank, but also a banking group. This 
is important because of the opportunities for investing offered by 
the European Investment Fund (EIF), the EIB Group’s equity 
subsidiary, which also provides guarantees for SMEs. It is quite 
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important when, in this region and also in other regions of 
Europe, companies are partially undercapitalized. 
By way of conclusion, I would like to mention that when we are 
working together with the commercial banking sector, we also 
cooperate with the other international financial institutions.  
Our cooperation with other international financial institutions, 
the national promotional banks, and the commercial banks is 
excellent. I would point out that the cooperation with the 
national promotional banks (even though some countries don’t 
have such an institution, e.g., Slovenia and Poland), but where 
they exist, the cooperation is highly appreciated and fruitful.  
There is enough liquidity available in the markets and the 
funding is cheaper than previously. The question should be 
posed differently; because the real question is not who should 
provide the financing, but rather what can be financed in a 
responsible manner to increase growth? That is the question for 
the future. 
C.   Discussions 
Following the presentations, participants from the floor raised a 
number of issues, mainly centered on the relative importance of 
foreign- and state-owned banks in explaining the credit boom 
and its eventual bust.  
 One participant noted that banks had had differing 
experiences with the growth of NPLs after the credit 
boom, with some being more successful than others in 
maintaining credit quality. He suggested that western 
banks, in particular, had benefited from better risk 
management during the boom years, which—in turn—
had helped insulate them when the bubble burst. He also 
wondered whether state-controlled banks had been 
subject to insufficiently rigorous governance and risk 
management. 
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 Another participant acknowledged these differences, but 
suggested that it was the banks’ business models rather 
than their ownership that was the more important factor. 
In his experience, more important factors were the fact 
that banks that had entered the region as green-field 
investors, versus having partnered with an established 
entity, and the quality of management ownership. And 
private ownership was also no guarantee of proper risk 
management. Moreover, he questioned whether 
European rules for state aid could be applied easily in 
the region, given the already heavy involvement of the 
public sector in the financial sector. 
 Another comment was that public ownership of banks 
could be helpful in times of crisis, since it facilitated the 
crisis response. While there were legitimate concerns 
about the inefficiency of public banks, state control of 
banks was less of an issue in determining the efficiency 
and stability of the financial sector than the quality of 
public institutions and their policies. 
 A contrasting view was that public sectors were tempted 
to direct credit in ways that delayed corporate 
restructuring and the recognition of losses, which created 
inefficiencies in the allocation of credit and the economy 
more generally. These problems were compounded by 
shortcomings in bankruptcy law, tax law, and the 
efficiency of credit allocation.  
 Another participant argued that the improvement in 
corporate governance brought by foreign-owned banks 
was immense, especially given that they were less 
subject to vested interests. However, he cautioned that 
foreign banks tended to share common risk 
methodologies, often based on historical data and 
relationships that were not attuned to the specificities of 
the CESEE region. This created the risk of an overly 
procyclical reaction to a crisis.  
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Panelists’ responses to questions 
Resource mobilization. One panelist suggested that a key issue 
in the region was the dearth of funding for investment, and for 
this reason he viewed as significant the Juncker Plan and a 
similar proposal by the Polish Finance Minister, which promised 
to mobilize resources from the public and private sectors, as well 
as from international institutions. He viewed prospects for a 
European consensus on these proposals as encouraging.  
Bank ownership. Several panelists expressed their views on this 
issue: 
 One panelist stressed the critical importance of high-
quality corporate governance and management, which 
needed a proper balance between foreign headquarters 
and local staff. At the same time, the domestic 
supervisory framework could play an important role in 
ensuring that (i) foreign investors in the banking sector 
took an appropriately long-term view of their 
participation, and (ii) there was healthy competition 
between domestic and foreign-owned banks. This 
emphasis helped explain the relatively favorable 
experience of the foreign banks in Poland. For example, 
to help encourage this longer-term perspective, the 
Polish supervisor had insisted that foreign-owned banks 
be quoted on the Warsaw stock exchange, which helped 
improve local capital markets and the transparency of 
bank operations. Another key to success was an effective 
deposit guarantee scheme, which in Poland was solely 
bank funded, helping to avoid the transfer of risk to the 
public sector. The Polish authorities’ conservative 
response to bank stress—the central bank was not asked 
to provide liquidity to insolvent banks—had also 
encouraged strong risk management and corporate 
governance. 
 Another panelist strongly disagreed with the notion that 
state ownership was irrelevant for the quality and health 
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of the banking sector. In his view, it was not sufficient to 
simply appoint strong managers, because the experience 
of the crisis illustrated clearly that state-owned banks 
had performed the worst. Indeed, the relatively high 
costs of state-ownership of banks could be seen not just 
in the region but globally.  
 A third panelist agreed, but also noted that strong 
competition was needed to ensure efficiency, either on 
the funding side or the lending side. The experience in 
Austria illustrated that public ownership was particularly 
problematic when the bank operated in a niche market 
and was not subject to healthy market forces. He also 
cautioned that the recently agreed rules on bank 
resolution could impair the ability of authorities to 
respond quickly to banking sector stress, since the 
consultation processes appeared to be cumbersome. He 
suggested that these rules still needed to be fine-tuned to 
enable a quick and effective response to crises.  
 The final panelist agreed that the response of the state-
owned banks in the crisis had tended at times to be 
unhelpful, especially given their reluctance to write off 
loans. He also viewed the deleveraging process as a 
natural response to the excessive inflow of capital that 
had occurred during the boom years, and was not 
something that could be resisted. 
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VI.   PANEL 3: MEASURES TO REVIVE CREDIT 
MARKETS: BEST PRACTICES AND PITFALLS 
 
A.   Summary 
The panel discussed various possible measures to revive credit 
markets and a range of best practices and associated pitfalls in 
the environment following the financial crisis, with the prospect 
of slow and potentially creditless recovery.   
In the introduction, it was stressed that central banks face two 
main challenges during financial crises. The first challenge is to 
provide sufficient liquidity to the financial system, while the 
second is how to ensure that this liquidity is transmitted into 
credit growth. All the panelists agreed that there were important 
bottlenecks in channelling credit to the real economy and that 
innovative approaches are needed to successfully resolve this 
issue.  
Several schemes aimed at channelling liquidity provided by 
central banks to the real economy were discussed. While 
panelists largely agreed that the funding-for-lending scheme in 
the United Kingdom had had limited success, some argued that 
in other jurisdictions, and depending on the design of the 
scheme, they can have even stronger positive effects. Some 
touched upon the ECB's purchases of asset-backed securities 
(ABS), and while they viewed it as a positive measure, nobody 
saw it as a sufficient one. One panelist stressed that the funding-
for-lending scheme in the United Kingdom was successful only 
in sectors where there was sufficient collateral. A consensus 
view was that these programs only provided resources, but did 
not provide proper incentives for banks to lend, especially to 
SMEs. Because it is incentives that matter most, additional 
measures were needed to increase banks' incentives to lend.  
The panel discussion touched upon direct intervention by central 
banks as a potential option. While one panelist suggested that 
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central banks should directly target SMEs, most panelists 
emphasized that such an intervention poses risks. Several 
panelists mentioned that such measures are especially prone to 
political interference, as they entail directed lending towards a 
particular sector. One panelist pointed out that the provision of 
targeted subsidized loans to SMEs by government-owned banks 
worked well when such banks were not given orders regarding to 
whom to lend, but were left to their own decisions within the 
allocated budget. Some panelists suggested that multilateral 
institutions could stand in as intermediaries and that this could 
help to avoid central banks having to channel credit directly to 
the real economy.  
A few panelists stressed that it is necessary to first identify the 
friction that is preventing credit growth and then apply 
appropriate policies to address this friction. One panelist 
suggested that credit demand and supply factors should be 
disentangled and that a decrease in credit is not problematic 
when this is due to falling demand related to over-indebtedness. 
It was emphasized that new credit should be channelled to viable 
companies and that the quality of new credit is more important 
than quantity. Another panelist argued that negative aggregate 
credit growth may be a result of the situation where viable 
companies are able to obtain new loans, but over-indebted or 
unviable companies are not. In such cases, negative credit 
growth implies a correction of imbalances and an improvement 
in the credit quality, which is a desirable outcome from a policy 
perspective.  
The panel debated the issues of confidence in the banking sector. 
Several panelists mentioned that confidence needs to be restored 
before credit growth can be expected. One panelist argued that, 
while AQR and stress tests help in restoring confidence and 
credit growth in the medium run, they may nevertheless result in 
credit contraction in the short run—especially in banks that are 
short of capital. Another panelist argued that confidence issues 
resulted in a fragmented financial market in which banks in 
different jurisdictions face different nominal interest rates. 
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Panelists agreed that cross-country differentials in real interest 
rates can be exacerbated due to inflation differentials.  
The panel discussed alternatives to bank funding, especially for 
the SMEs. The consensus view was that alternatives to bank 
financing should be developed, and that financial markets should 
have a greater role. Several panelists saw securitization and 
further development of ABS markets as a plausible alternative to 
bank lending. Venture capital funds, joint venture funds, and 
development of mini-bond markets were also mentioned as 
alternatives. Some panelists viewed ABS markets as a way of 
easing credit risk management for originating banks. One 
panelist emphasized that credit risk models used by banks should 
be tailored to the country where the bank is active and should be 
less reliant on history-based risk models in countries that are 
undergoing a structural change by reorientation to different 
drivers of growth.   
Several views were expressed regarding the costs and benefits of 
a creditless recovery. Some panelists argued that a creditless 
recovery is typical following a financial crisis. New investment 
had been slow and therefore new credit is not required because 
of substantial spare capacity. However, others argued that credit 
growth would speed up the recovery. One panelist stressed that 
economic growth in the region would have stalled even without 
falling credit, because structural reforms have stalled. When 
these reforms are revived, both economic growth and credit 
growth will return. 
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B.   Presentations by Members of the Panel 
Lead: Fabrizio Coricelli, Paris School of Economics and 
CEPR15 
Creditless recoveries and deleveraging 
Creditless recoveries have been a typical feature of recoveries 
from financial crises and sudden stops in emerging economies, 
as documented by Calvo et al. (2006). Calvo et al. define a 
creditless recovery as an episode in which the GDP recovery 
point has been reached—when GDP has gone back to its pre-
recession peak—but the real stock of credit has not recovered its 
pre-crisis level. Coricelli and Roland (2011) take a broader 
perspective and analyze a sample of 143 countries over the 
period 1963–2003, thus excluding the Great Recession. They 
identify 421 recession episodes for both advanced and emerging 
economies. Table 1 summarizes the frequency of creditless 
recoveries and the depth of the recession in creditless recoveries 
(defined as the drop in GDP from the pre-recession peak to the 
trough).  
Table 1: Creditless Recoveries 
(In percent) 
  
Creditless Recoveries Recoveries with Credit Proportion of Creditless 
Recoveries Output Decline Stock 
Output 
Decline Stock 
Developed 
Countries 2.6 -10.5 2.0 18.5 35.8 
Emerging 
Markets 5.0 -18.6 2.5 24.9 40.6 
   Source: Coricelli and Roland (2011). 
   Note: Output Decline = Average decline in GDP per capita during the recession period; 
Stock = Change in credit per capita between the pre-crisis peak and the full-recovery year. 
                                                 
15 Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
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Interestingly, creditless recoveries are not uncommon. 
Furthermore, they are associated to a deeper recession and to a 
longer duration of the period from peak to recovery (3.2 years 
compared with 2.7 years in the “with-credit recoveries”). 
Creditless recoveries may be a cause for concern not only 
because of the more persistent recession phase, but also because 
of the likelihood that either the post-recovery level of GDP 
remains permanently below its pre-recession trend or that the 
post-recovery growth rate remains below its pre-recession trend 
growth. These two possibilities are presented in Figure 1 and 
contrasted with the pattern common to the with-credit recoveries, 
defined as a “Friedman recession” (Cerra and Saxena (2008)).  
In emerging Europe, following the Great Recession, there is a 
highly heterogeneous set of experiences. Some countries, such as 
the Baltic States, experienced a creditless recovery. Several 
Southern-Eastern European countries experienced a creditless 
“nonrecovery,” as GDP has yet to recover its pre-crisis peak—a 
phenomenon shared by most European and euro area countries. 
Finally, there are countries such as Turkey, which did not 
experience any fall in credit and still faces the problem of 
containing credit growth. With the exception of Turkey, most 
emerging Europe is either in the state described by the first panel 
of Figure 1 (“Hamilton recession”) or in the third panel (with a 
fall in the growth rate). 
Furthermore, with a few exceptions most emerging European 
countries face tight credit conditions as a result of their 
dependence on the supply of credit originating in the euro area, 
which is struggling to reactivate credit supply in a bank-
dominated financial sector. 
The nature of the recovery has crucial implications for the 
assessment of the deleveraging process. Indeed, a permanent loss 
in output—or, even worse, a permanent loss in the growth rate of 
output—implies a growing debt burden in terms of output. 
Moreover, lack of inflation, or deflationary pressures present in 
the eurozone, further increase the burden of debt. 
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Figure 1. Patterns of Post-Recession GDP Dynamics 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Deleveraging 
The eurozone fits into the worst scenario in terms of Figure 1. 
Indeed, while the United States seems to replicate a Hamilton 
recession, the eurozone is travelling along a dismal growth path, 
with no recovery of a pre-crisis growth rate. In fact, six years 
since the start of the Great Recession, the eurozone experience 
can be defined as stagnation (Figure 2). 
As a result, eurozone countries have not yet begun the process of 
deleveraging, as the adverse dynamics of output have increased 
rather than decreased the total debt to GDP ratios. Looking 
forward, this is extremely dangerous. Although the real economy 
suffers from a lack of credit, the need to reduce the burden of 
debt is a clear obstacle to the revival of credit in the economy.  
As households and firms are faced with either the burden of their 
own, private debt or with the uncertainty of the future burden on 
their income of the government debt, European countries are 
confronted with a difficult prospect in revitalizing private credit. 
However, the deleveraging process is only one dimension of the 
problem.  
The other dimension, perhaps even more important, is associated 
with the inability of the banking sector to channel credit to the 
system, even when central bank policies have induced an 
increase in liquidity in the system. 
How to revive credit to the economy in Europe 
The financial sector of emerging Europe is dominated by the 
presence of banks from the eurozone. Therefore, credit supply in 
emerging Europe depends on the health and lending policies of 
banks of the eurozone. The EIB CESEE Bank Lending Survey 
(2013) identifies in the large stock of NPLs and regulation the 
two main obstacles to reviving bank credit in Europe.  
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Figure 2. GDP Dynamics Post Crisis—United States vs. Eurozone 
 
Source: Geneva Report on the World Economy 16, (2014). 
 
Figure 3. Debt Levels in the Eurozone 
 
Source: Geneva Report on the World Economy 16, (2014) 
 
Against this background, two types of policies have been tried in 
Europe. One is the so-called funding-for-lending scheme, 
implemented in the United Kingdom during the recent recession, 
as well as in Hungary (funding-for-growth scheme) and in some 
ways also by the ECB in its targeted longer-term refinancing 
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operations (TLTROs). The second is the policy recently 
introduced by the ECB to purchase ABS in the market, with a 
special focus on SME loans and mortgage loans. We will briefly 
discuss these two policies. 
 
Funding-for-lending 
The scheme was implemented in the United Kingdom in 2012, 
and mainly consisted in reducing the funding costs for banks and 
building societies by providing them with relatively cheap 
liquidity. Banks received as loans treasury bills for up to four 
years in exchange for the widest possible range of collateral, 
including existing portfolios of loans. Those treasury bills could 
be used as liquid assets to increase lending or turned into cash if 
necessary. Banks faced favorable conditions on the funding as 
long as a bank’s stock of lending did not contract over the period 
to end-2013.  
It has been widely recognized that the effects of the scheme were 
very disappointing. Mortgage loans showed some signs of 
recovery, but loans to SMEs failed to recover; in fact, they 
continued declining. 
From this experience, one can conclude that reducing the cost of 
funding is not sufficient to increase bank loans. Furthermore, in 
terms of allocation across types of borrowers, it emerged that the 
scheme suffered in consequence of the collateral requirements 
that characterized bank loans, collateral requirements that tend to 
be tightened in a period of financial distress. Indeed, mortgage 
lending may respond, as it is based on ‘’real collateral,’’ whereas 
SME lending is harder to revive, as SME projects possess much 
less collateral. 
ECB purchases of ABS 
The ECB has launched in August–September 2014 a plan to 
purchase ABS. The rationale of the program is to free resources 
for banks that have in their books ABS that are not traded, and in 
this way revitalize the ABS market. The final objective of the 
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program is to increase credit to the economy, especially for 
SMEs and possibly for households. 
The scheme has drawbacks: The most serious is likely to be due 
to the fact that, if new flows of loans to SMEs are not 
guaranteed, banks will be reluctant to lend to SMEs—even if the 
ECB buys the existing stock of ABS. Therefore, why may the 
program fail in reviving credit flows to the economy? The 
reasons are similar to those that have led banks to invest the 
funds obtained through the LTRO in treasury bills rather than 
bank loans. Indeed, left to make their own decisions, banks may 
have incentives to reduce loans where they are most needed. 
Market failure is a salient feature of financial crises, during 
which banks become dysfunctional.  
Reallocation of resources 
In addition to the negative effects of a large stock of NPLs and 
procyclical regulatory measures, there is a fundamental problem 
impairing the efficient functioning of credit markets during the 
recovery from a financial crisis.  
The problem is that loan contracts tend to be associated to 
collateral requirements. During a financial crisis, collateral 
values collapse and, thus, the firms’ borrowing capacity falls. 
Banks are more risk averse in the aftermath of crises, and thus 
collateral requirements are likely to be tightened. Most 
important, the availability of collateral is not correlated with the 
production efficiency of the borrower. The amount of collateral 
available for the firm is largely a technological parameter, as it is 
linked to the tangibility of its assets. For instance, real estate 
tends to be associated to real collateral. Even though the fall in 
real estate prices experienced during the crisis has sharply 
reduced the value of housing as collateral, it is remarkable that 
after the crisis real estate experiences a more rapid recovery than 
many manufacturing SMEs (see above example on the United 
Kingdom). The hoped-for reallocation of resources away from 
real estate and construction—spurred before the crisis by 
excessive lending—to dynamic manufacturing or service firms is 
impeded by imperfections in financial markets. 
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Therefore, even accepting the view that rather than an overall 
increase in credit to the economy, an efficient recovery, 
consistent with gradual deleveraging, should rely on a better 
allocation of credit, it remains true that the market is unlikely to 
achieve such efficient reallocation of resources. 
Dilemma and solutions 
In summary, it is hard to revive credit without more direct and 
targeted interventions by central banks. How can we reconcile 
this with the objective of avoiding political capture and a large 
distortion of the private banking sector? It is hard to find 
solutions. Nevertheless, it is hard to escape innovative measures 
that are able to reach directly the real economy and the firms and 
sectors more in need of credit. Adam Posen has suggested that 
the United Kingdom create a state-backed and dedicated small-
business lending bank with funding support from the Bank of 
England. Similarly, for the euro area, proposals have been 
advanced to complement purchases of SME-related ABS with 
guarantees from the ECB for new loans to SMEs, which will be 
later on be securitized (Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2014)). 
In general, a more pragmatic approach is needed, perhaps 
learning from the Brazilian experience after the Argentinean 
crisis at the beginning of the 2000s, whereby the central bank 
lent directly to exporters with large immediate benefits for the 
real economy (Calvo et al. (2013). 
Panelist 1: Erdem Başçi Governor, Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey 
Thank you very much Fabrizio, and thank you for the invitation. 
It is always a pleasure to be in Slovenia.  
It is an interesting feeling to be the first speaker on this panel and 
to talk not about how to revive credit markets, but about how to 
contain credit booms. Fortunately, our problem is a rather nice 
one, as we are still trying to contain and direct the credit 
expansion in Turkey. There are many reasons why we still have 
a relatively rapid credit growth in this global environment.  
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One of the reasons is the low household sector leverage that we 
had initially. Macroeconomic stability has been achieved after 
four decades of extremely high and volatile inflation and 
extremely heavy fiscal dominance. Turkey solved the fiscal 
dominance problem by bringing down the budget deficit-to-GDP 
ratio from double-digit levels to below 2 percent as of now. With 
the inflation targeting regime, we have also addressed the 
inflation problem and decreased it to single digit levels. Since 
then, access to long maturities and the low cost of credit have led 
to a significant demand coming from households and firms for 
all sorts of credit. 
Now, the question is, what do you do with your external 
account? If the private-sector debt is booming instead of public-
sector debt, then you have a low domestic savings rate and, 
inevitably therefore, a high external deficit. Having an external 
deficit at levels like 10 percent of GDP in 2011, may sound a 
good idea if you had ample liquidity thanks to quantitative 
easing in major central banks. But when people start talking 
about normalization, then the spotlight turns on the countries 
with external deficits. It is, therefore, a good idea to contain the 
extremely rapid credit growth in the private sector through 
macroprudential policies. Turkey has used those effectively, 
together with monetary policy. 
I would like to express two points that are essential to revive 
credit––first, to provide liquidity from the central bank, and 
second, to ensure that central bank liquidity is allocated to useful 
ends by the banking sector. 
In our case, the situation is somehow similar, but the opposite. 
We basically should reduce liquidity, including the creation of 
“inside money.” Regarding the second point, we should ensure 
that liquidity continues to support productive forms of credit at a 
sustainable pace, which I call a “targeted credit policy.” How do 
you run a targeted credit policy? One very nice example, which 
works well in Turkey, is a state-owned bank that is directly 
targeting SMEs. This is basically a bank, which is eligible to get 
some subsidy from the government’s budget. Therefore, in the 
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budget there is an amount which will be transferred to specific 
types of SMEs through subsidized loans. This has been there for 
a long while, since the bank was established many decades ago. 
It is working well.  
Previously, before Turkey’s 2001 crisis, the problem was that 
this subsidy was not budgeted; the bank was directly ordered to 
lend to SMEs at a low cost and thereby made losses. That was a 
very bad idea, and then after a reform in 2002, this process 
became very transparent––there is a budgeted amount, 
everybody knows the fiscal costs, and the bank makes money off 
these loans. The purpose is served by this budgetary subsidy 
mechanism. The second example is coming from history. The 
central bank has been using funding for an exports program. 
Turkey has an export deficit problem; therefore, it is a good idea 
to fund exporters directly. The second use of this program is 
lending to exporters in domestic currency, but with FX indexed 
to LIBOR, through the Turkish Eximbank (state-owned 
investment bank for financing exports) and any other bank 
willing to use this facility. They then put a very minor spread on 
these funds and lend them to the exporters. This is, in essence, 
like buying FX from our exporters, so we are building our 
reserves through this channel. This facility has been used from 
time to time in history, and after the global financial crisis in 
2008, we have reactivated it by increasing the line. Today, the 
stock of receivables we have from this channel is US$9 billion, 
and we are going to add this amount to our reserves within the 
coming eight months. 
These are just some examples. But then, what do we do about 
consumer loans? The pace of consumer credit growth reached 
35 percent, 40 percent nominal, when QE2 started at the end of 
2010. That was simply unsustainable and not very good for the 
current account deficit as well. Our research has also shown that 
consumer loans are the main drivers of the current account 
deficit, in sharp contrast to business loans. We have really taken 
a lot of macroprudential measures such as higher risk weights on 
nonmortgage consumer loans―100 percent and 150 percent, 
depending on the maturity, well above the Basel II minimum; 
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and also 50 percent instead of 35 percent on mortgages. We have 
introduced a LTV restriction of 75 percent on housing loans; also 
recently, loan-to-income restrictions initially for credit cards, and 
we will then extend these restrictions to broader types of 
consumer loans. All in all, it works. Now, the pace of consumer 
credit growth has come below 10 percent, which is compatible 
with our macro objectives, including the external deficit. But 
commercial loans still keep growing at about 20 percent, 
nominal. So basically, the composition is shifting from consumer 
loans to commercial loans. But as a central bank, we have not 
been able to do it alone; the bank regulator and the Government 
had to take action to achieve this by using macroprudential 
policy instruments. 
Thank you very much for your attention. 
Panelist 2: Adam Balog, Deputy Governor, Central Bank of 
Hungary 
Thank you for the invitation. I am really sorry that the Governor 
could not come; it was a last minute issue. I will try to convey 
what he wanted to explain. 
The first thing about Hungary––it is a very small and open 
economy. It is among the top ten most-open economies in the 
world, which means a lot of things strategically in the credit and 
capital markets. First, half of our GDP is produced by 
multinational companies, who are financed by their parent 
companies. We do not have much to do with that.  
Second, we have the SME market, which is responsible for the 
second half. This is highly fragmented, and very hard to finance 
through the capital market; only bank credit is an option for 
them. However, our banking sector is to a large extent foreign-
owned; but this would not be a problem, except that they are 
foreign-directed banks and it is really hard for them to 
understand how the Hungarian SME market works. That is the 
reason why there are constant problems in solving credit issues 
with the SME sector.  
  141  
Third, we have the household sector, which is about 40 percent 
employed by either multinationals or the state, and it is a 
relatively lucrative segment for the banks.  
All in all, this situation resulted in some issues for SME 
financing even before the crisis, but especially after it. In 
practice, it meant that competition among the banks took place in 
the household sector, in the form of FX lending, or in the 
multinational sector, where, as I just said, we do not have much 
to do, or in commercial real estate lending, where a small 
Hungarian real estate bubble evolved. Thus, poor SMEs with a 
normal business have always had a problem in accessing credit 
in Hungary.  
Then the crisis came, and—in a country like Hungary with an 
open economy, a huge budget deficit, and growth problems—
unfortunately it not only resulted in contraction in lending where 
the problems occurred; I mean here particularly the household 
sector, but also in SME lending, where excessive lending had not 
taken place. SME loans outstanding amounted to 14–15 percent 
of GDP, which, when compared to other countries, is less than a 
quarter, less than a half. Still, after 2009, a steady contraction in 
SME lending started, reaching minus 5–6 percent annual growth 
rate.  
Hungary needed a targeted solution. First we had to understand 
where the problem was, because there was not a liquidity 
problem in Hungary. We have seen the decrease in other sectors 
more as normalization and not a problem; only in the SME 
sector did we see it as an issue. We reviewed the situation 
regarding debt and found both supply and demand problems. For 
SMEs, the cost was actually too high; interest rates of 8, 10, and 
12 percent were not affordable to the SMEs, while banks—due 
to issues with the government, the legislation, and the general 
problem of the banking groups in Europe—decided to change 
their credit conditions negatively. For SMEs, they increased 
considerably the role of collateral, making it almost impossible 
for SMEs to fulfill these conditions. Hence, all other steps were 
very negative to SMEs.  
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The Hungarian National Bank decided on a funding for lending 
scheme, a targeted scheme with two phases. First, the goal was 
to revive SME lending. Here we allowed the refinancing of 
outstanding loans, including the refinancing of FX loans to 
Hungarian florint loans, and only to a small extent were banks 
asked to finance, for example, investments. The interest rate 
charged to banks by the national bank was zero percent, and they 
were allowed to lend to SMEs at a maximum of 2.5 percent. It 
was not a general easing, but a targeted one. Nevertheless, the 
administration was managed by the banks, the selection of SMEs 
was made by the banks, and risks were assumed by banks as 
well. Even if we accepted the SME loans as collateral, we did so 
with a 50-percent haircut, while the other 50 percent of the 
collateral had to be standard eligible securities.  
The first phase was, in our view, very successful because in three 
months EUR2.3 billion was lent, which stopped the decrease in 
SME lending. Even the annual growth rate went to slightly 
positive territory, so we saw a small but steady increase in SME 
lending. It is largely attributable to the scheme, but we also saw 
signs that normal lending had started to improve as well.  
The second phase was different; it was even more targeted. Here 
we allowed basically only new loans, as 90 percent of the 
scheme has to be used for new lending and only 10 percent is 
allowed for refinancing. Investment loans are preferred within 
new loans.  
This scheme stopped the decrease in SME lending and the 
second phase has already boosted the economy in Hungary, 
which all in all, according to our calculations, may lead to a 0.5–
1 percent GDP increase this year and next year. We are also 
writing a paper about that, which is already underway and will 
be ready in few weeks. Thank you very much. 
Panelist 3: Yannis Stournaras, Governor, Bank of Greece 
The global financial crisis has impaired the ability of the 
financial system in the euro area to channel funds to the real 
economy, in particular, for the financing of long-term investment 
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and SMEs. Banks in the euro area have been particularly 
affected as the financial crisis was followed by a sovereign debt 
crisis, which has set in motion a negative feedback loop between 
banks and sovereigns. As a result, over the past six years, bank 
credit to the real economy and, in particular to SMEs, has fallen 
dramatically in the EU. Credit, which had been growing at 
double-digit growth rates before the global financial crisis, has 
contracted during the past few years. 
The crisis also hit banks in the CESEE region, as foreign bank 
engagement in the region declined and the over-indebtedness of 
households and businesses, a legacy of the earlier credit 
expansion, led to a large and rising volume of NPLs. In some 
cases, those have reached, or exceeded, 20 percent of total loans. 
As a result, bank credit in the region declined from average 
growth rates above 30 percent in the period 2003–08 to close to 
zero or even negative rates of growth in recent years. 
Bank credit is particularly important for economic growth in the 
EU. This situation is attributable to the fact that European 
economies are heavily dependent on bank financing. This 
dependence on banks is in contrast to the United States, where 
capital markets play a bigger role in financing the economy. 
CESEE economies are also bank-based financial systems in 
which capital markets remain relatively underdeveloped. 
Consequently, bank deleveraging, combined with increased risk 
aversion on the part of investors, has affected the ability to 
finance sustainable growth throughout the region. 
A key characteristic of the economic recovery in the euro area at 
the present stage is the weakness of bank lending to the private 
sector in general and to companies in particular. This situation 
applies at both the aggregate level and for many individual 
countries. 
The situation appears to be better in the CESEE region (perhaps 
with the exception of Turkey), as credit growth remains on 
average positive, but is nevertheless too weak to support 
satisfactory rates of sustainable growth. In particular, there are 
countries—like Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
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FYROM—where credit to the private sector is experiencing a 
moderate recovery;, but in other countries—such as Slovenia, 
Serbia, and to a lesser extent Croatia and Romania—bank credit 
growth to the private sector, and in particular to enterprises, is 
still negative. 
As Fabrizio Coricelli has discussed in his presentation, creditless 
recoveries are not uncommon in the aftermath of financial crises, 
in particular, when the financial crisis has been preceded by a 
credit boom to the private sector. Calvo et al. (2006), in a 
seminal paper published in the American Economic Review, 
describe creditless recoveries as “Phoenix Miracles.” The 
phenomenon of creditless recoveries has been documented 
mainly in emerging market and low-income economies, but 
seems to also play a role in industrial countries. Empirical 
evidence suggests that creditless recoveries are more likely when 
the preceding recession was deep and when the recession 
coincided with a banking crisis. Several other factors also play a 
role: the openness of the economy to financial flows; the degree 
of export dependence; the degree of external adjustment during 
the recession; and the stance and mix of fiscal and monetary 
policies. 
Several explanations of this phenomenon have been proposed in 
the literature. One explanation is that economies can rebound 
without bank credit because capacity utilization is low during a 
recession, allowing GDP to recover mainly through the 
absorption of unused capacity rather than through investment. A 
second explanation is that, in the absence of bank credit, firms 
increasingly use internal finance and trade credit. Furthermore, 
even if bank credit is declining, it may be reallocated toward 
more dynamic sectors, thus allowing an economic rebound. 
Empirical research at the Bank of Greece suggests that the 
probability of a creditless recovery depends on two additional 
features of the economy: first, the saving investment gap—in 
other words, the net financing needs of the private sector; and 
second, the degree of a country’s fiscal and external adjustment 
during the recession. In particular, the lower the net financing 
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needs of the private sector at the bottom of the recession, the 
more likely it is that the economy can recover without bank 
credit. Since the gap between investment and savings can be 
financed through either capital inflows from abroad (in other 
words via current account deficits) or through lower budget 
deficits (in other words by freeing private savings to finance 
investment), saving-investment imbalances naturally correspond 
to fiscal and external imbalances. 
A second important implication of this research is that the degree 
of a country’s fiscal and external adjustment during the recession 
plays a significant role during the recovery. In particular, the 
probability that a country may experience a creditless recovery is 
higher in countries that have followed economic adjustment 
policies during the recession to reduce their external and fiscal 
deficits. This result has important implications for both countries 
of the euro area periphery and countries of the CESEE region. 
Nevertheless, creditless recoveries are suboptimal outcomes 
from an economic policy perspective since, as has been observed 
by several researchers, creditless recoveries are on average 
weaker than recoveries with credit. As Fabrizio Coricelli also 
points out, creditless recoveries may have negative effects on 
long-run potential growth by affecting investment and the stock 
of productive capital, but also by increasing long-term 
unemployment. 
A number of actions may be undertaken in order to address the 
problem. I will confine my remarks to three areas: monetary 
policy; confidence in the banking sector; and initiatives that 
target the mobilization of funds from capital markets, thus 
broadening the sources of financing the economy. I will focus on 
our recent experience in the euro area, in general, and Greece, in 
particular—where the banking system has undergone a 
significant transformation over the past few years. Overall, my 
emphasis will be on measures that aim to revive bank credit and 
to mobilize funds from capital markets. 
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Monetary policy 
On monetary policy, the ECB has taken important actions to 
improve confidence and to restore the smooth operation of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. Credit growth would have 
been significantly more negative had it not been for these 
actions. 
The policy rate is now at a historical low of five basis points. 
Nonstandard measures, including the TLTROs, the ABS 
Purchase Program and the third Covered Bond Purchase 
Program, will inject liquidity into both banks and markets. 
Confidence in the banking sector 
The establishment of the Banking Union is restoring confidence 
in the banking sector. The supervisory authorities are assessing 
the resilience of banks and requesting injections of capital, so 
that confidence in the quality of bank balance sheets will be 
restored. In this respect, the Comprehensive Assessment and the 
EU-wide stress tests, which are currently underway, will be key 
to improving confidence in the banking sector. The Banking 
Union will also help reduce financial fragmentation. 
The faster that banks clean up their balance sheets, the easier it 
will be for them to regain confidence, to attract fresh capital 
from private investors, and to provide credit to the economy. 
At this point, allow me to say a few words about Greek banks. 
Following the first recapitalization of our banks in 2012, we 
began to reform and consolidate the banking system. Banks 
sharply reduced reliance on central bank funding, while forming 
provisions for bad loans. As a result, they have been able to 
attract private investors. 
Early this year, we concluded follow-up stress tests that were 
exceptionally well received by the markets. Following the 
release of the results of the stress tests in March, core banks 
completed much larger than requested capital increases to the 
tune of EUR 8.3 billion, with issues being significantly 
  147  
oversubscribed. Two systemic banks have repaid state aid that 
has been in the form of preference shares. All four systemic 
banks are now under private management. 
These are the signs needed to restore confidence and lay the 
foundation for the healthy financing of the economy at a later 
stage. 
Mobilizing funds from capital markets 
Returning to the broader picture, it appears that bank credit will 
remain constrained at least until the European stress tests are 
completed and banks adjust to the results of the exercise. The 
burden of NPLs in economies that have gone through a deep 
recession––and Greece is a good example here––will be a major 
factor constraining the supply of bank credit in the medium term. 
Given the limited quantity of resources, it is important that banks 
use these limited resources in a way that improves allocative 
efficiency. In other words, they have to be channeled to the most 
productive uses. 
Nevertheless, despite the important role that banks will continue 
to play in the EU, particularly for SMEs, it has been clearly 
communicated by market participants that there is a pressing 
need to broaden the sources of long-term financing in Europe. 
Broadening the sources of financing of the economy toward 
capital markets should be viewed as one of the key priorities of 
economic policy. 
In this respect, the development of a deep, transparent, and 
robust European securitization market for corporate loans would 
improve risk sharing and increase banks’ lending capacity to 
corporates and, in particular, SMEs. 
And this solution will probably serve its purpose better this time 
than previously, since the lessons of the inadequate regulation of 
some securitization models in the past can be taken into account. 
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The ABS and the Covered Bond Purchase Programs will provide 
an initial boost, especially for the European ABS market, which 
has lain largely dormant since 2008. 
However, in my view, if we are to move farther towards the 
development of a market for corporate loans, a concerted effort 
is needed in several directions. A list of key priorities in order to 
revive credit markets should include the following: 
1) Further measures to revive the market for 
securitizations, in particular for SME bank loans. 
Securitization is an important instrument to promote 
bank credit. Allowing banks to securitize and 
redistribute SME loans to a broader investor base 
can provide banks with capital relief and allow them 
to lend to the real economy. This is not an easy task 
given the stigma attached to securitization following 
the global financial crisis, when the “originate-to-
distribute” model led to excessive leverage and 
financial fragility. Of course, lessons have been 
learned since then, and the regulatory framework has 
been adapted in a way that makes a repeat of past 
mistakes unlikely. For this securitization to work in 
a way that does not endanger the resilience of the 
financial system, we must ensure that only high-
quality assets that are simple and transparent are 
used in securitizations. In this respect, it is important 
to develop a set of rules that allow the definition of a 
pool of “high-quality securitizations” at the EU 
level. 
2) Changes to the prudential treatment of 
securitizations. It is essential, in my view, to adjust 
the regulatory framework for securitizations in a 
way that provides banks with incentives to engage in 
the market. Capital relief for banks’ holdings of 
ABS which are simple, transparent, and robust could 
provide an answer. The second aspect of regulation 
relates to potential investors, such as insurers, 
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pension funds, etc. The regulatory framework should 
allow for a fair treatment of high-quality ABS 
relative to ABS products with higher risk profiles, in 
order to provide long-term institutional investors 
with incentives to trade in the market. 
3) Policies to promote better access of SMEs to capital 
markets. As is well known, corporate bond markets 
work well for large corporations while they are not 
attractive to SMEs, which remain largely dependent 
on bank loans for financing. Efforts should be 
undertaken to reverse this trend and promote the 
access of SMEs to capital markets. The development 
of “mini bond” markets for SMEs in Italy and 
Germany could serve as examples to gain insights 
into best practices for the establishment of SME 
markets. The development of bond and equity 
markets for SMEs and mid-sized companies would 
also encourage more cross-border investment within 
the EU and from foreign investors. 
4) Measures to develop alternative financial 
intermediaries for young companies and SMEs. In 
this context, efforts should be intensified toward the 
creation of a risk capital market for non-listed 
companies such as a market for venture capital funds 
and markets for infrastructure financing. MiFID II is 
an important step towards improving the functioning 
of EU trading venues and setting the stage for the 
development of SME capital markets. However, 
further steps are necessary, in particular, to correct 
differences throughout the EU in the tax treatment of 
these products both at the issuer and investor level. 
5) Measures to improve investors’ access to business, 
credit, and financial information on SMEs. It is 
well-known that most SMEs are not rated by rating 
agencies. The lack of adequate and readily available 
information on the credit quality of SMEs is a 
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structural problem in the EU as a whole and in the 
CESEE region, in particular. This is one of the major 
reasons that SMEs in the EU have historically faced 
significant difficulties in accessing funding from 
capital markets. 
There is, thus, the need for a harmonized EU 
approach to credit scoring comparability of SME 
data. Improving the availability of financial 
information is paramount in allowing investors to 
gauge the riskiness of securitized products. In this 
respect, it is important to develop national credit 
registers for SMEs, allowing for higher 
transparency, standardization, and comparability of 
underlying assets. 
A final word of caution is in order: Most of the measures I have 
discussed above will likely have only medium- to long-term 
effects in reviving credit markets in the EU, because most of 
these measures constitute fundamental changes in the structure 
of the financial system. Such structures naturally change only 
gradually over time. In the short term, monetary policy will 
continue to play the major role in determining liquidity provision 
to banks and the cost of funding for the private sector. 
Nonstandard monetary policy measures and progress towards a 
Banking Union are, thus, of prime importance, in order to reduce 
market fragmentation and allow the normal transmission of 
monetary policy to the most vulnerable areas of the monetary 
union.  
Panelist 4: Fernando Restoy, Deputy Governor, Banco de 
España 
Introduction 
Thank you very much and good morning to everyone. It is a 
pleasure to be at this important conference, on this important 
matter. 
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Recent developments in the euro area show a diverging path 
between the evolution of the real economy and lending 
dynamics. While GDP is recovering, credit to nonfinancial 
corporations continues contracting, as Figure 1 shows. In this 
context, if credit does not recover, logical concerns about 
economic prospects arise. 
However, in my opinion, the analysis of credit developments and 
the implications for growth is not straightforward and before 
taking or recommending any policy action, a thorough 
examination of the factors explaining credit developments is 
required. 
With this in mind, my contribution to this debate lies in 
providing an overview of the factors explaining credit behavior 
(Section 1), and discussing possible policy actions based on the 
diagnosis that those factors suggest (Section 2). The analysis 
focuses on developments in the euro area, but this analysis is 
complemented in some particular aspects with evidence 
corresponding to the Spanish economy.  
Figure 1. GDP and Bank Lending to Nonfinancial Corporations: Euro 
Area Year-on-Year Growth in Real Terms 
 
Sources: Eurostat; and ECB. 
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What factors explain credit behavior? 
As mentioned before, in order to define the policy agenda, we 
need to first analyze the factors explaining credit behavior. This 
implies analyzing first the extent to which supply restrictions 
predominate or not over poor credit demand. If demand factors 
are relevant, then it has to be considered whether weak credit 
demand is associated to the necessary corrections of imbalances. 
It is subsequently important to pay attention to whether we can 
expect recovery of credit demand before recovery of output, and 
finally whether we can identify specific supply frictions that 
need to be addressed.  
Can we disentangle credit demand from credit supply changes? 
Starting then with the first question on whether supply 
restrictions predominate or not over poor credit demand, we have 
to acknowledge that disentangling credit demand from credit 
supply changes is far from easy.  
Having said that, and not wishing to go into a detailed 
description of supply and demand factors and its recent 
evolution,16 some insight can be provided by turning to the Bank 
Lending Survey17 that asks participating banks to provide their 
                                                 
16 A detailed description of the credit evolution in Spain can be found in Ayuso, J. (2013), “An 
Analysis of the Situation of Lending in Spain,” Economic Bulletin, October 2013, Banco de España. 
17 The Bank Lending Survey is an official quarterly survey that has been conducted in coordination 
with all the euro area national central banks and the ECB since January 2003. The survey asks a 
representative group of credit institutions about the changes in their lending policies and perceived 
demand, distinguishing between three market segments: nonfinancial corporations, households for 
house purchase, and households for consumption and other purposes. They are likewise asked 
about their forecasts for the following three months. 
Aggregate results for the euro area are regularly published on the ECB website: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html. The results for the 
participating Spanish institutions are published on the Banco de España’s website: 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/estadis/infoest/epb.html. 
(continued) 
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views on developments in credit demand and supply. Figure 2 
shows cumulative changes in demand and supply in the segment 
of lending to nonfinancial corporations in the euro area and 
Spain, extracted from the Survey, i.e., it shows the results over 
time of the cumulative changes in demand and supply that the 
survey provides for each quarter. 
Figure 2. Bank Lending Survey, Cumulative Changes in Demand and 
Supply, and Bank Lending to Nonfinancial Corporations 
 
  Sources: ECB; and Banco de España. 
 
These cumulative changes reveal that during the crisis the weak 
bank lending to nonfinancial corporations has been driven by 
                                                                                                 
Additionally, quarterly articles in the Economic Bulletin of the Banco de España summarize the 
results of the Survey corresponding to the participating Spanish institutions and compare them to 
the results corresponding to the euro area.  
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both demand and supply factors, in Spain as well as in the euro 
area. More recently, there have been some signs of a mild 
recovery in both demand and supply. But current levels are still 
significantly below the pre-crisis levels. 
Panelist 5: Bojan Marković, Lead Economist, EBRD 
Let me please lay down several points relevant for the revival of 
bank credit growth in the CESEE region. 
First, one should hardly expect a revival of economic and thus 
credit growth in the CESEE region to the pre-crisis level if 
structural reforms are not reinvigorated. The EBRD regularly 
produces the so-called transition indicators, measuring structural 
gaps between market practices in CESEE countries and best 
practices in developed countries. These indicators kept 
improving until the mid-2000s, but across all the transition 
regions, including CESEE, they stalled from 2005 onwards 
(Figure 1). This suggests that structural reforms stalled in the 
mid-2000s, i.e., before the crisis struck, and some of the CESEE 
countries have even witnessed reform reversals during the 
prolonged crisis period. The CESEE region seems to have 
become “stuck in transition,” implying that economic growth 
would have probably stalled even without the fall in bank credit. 
In its 2013 Transition Report, the EBRD found that—without 
structural reform—revival growth convergence between some of 
the CESEE countries and Western European countries may not 
continue, while in some countries it may continue but at much 
slower rates than otherwise (Figure 2). This has clear 
implications for the pace of bank credit growth, but also 
indicates that the revival of credit growth will not be sufficient to 
sustainably revive economic growth. 
The second point I’d like to make is that the credit growth 
revival may optimally be slower in CESEE countries where the 
credit-to-GDP ratio was a way too high before the crisis 
(Figure 3). In the decade before the crisis, many of the CESEE 
countries recorded consumption-driven growth financed by large  
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Figure 1. Structural Reforms Across Transition Regions Have Stalled 
Since Mid-2000s 
 
Figure 2. Without Structural Reform Revival Growth Convergence in 
Europe May Not Continue 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, 2013. 
 
capital inflows, often through banks, which resulted in large 
external imbalances, as reflected in unsustainable double-digit 
current account deficits. In such circumstances, some sectors—
e.g., nontradable services—overdeveloped, while some 
  156  
potentially prosperous sectors remained underdeveloped. 
Ensuing deleveraging and lower bank credit growth in some 
CESEE countries, therefore, may have been an optimal and 
necessary adjustment (Figure 4). 
The second point I’d like to make is that the credit growth 
revival may optimally be slower in CESEE countries where the 
credit-to-GDP ratio was a way too high before the crisis 
(Figure 3). In the decade before the crisis, many of the CESEE 
countries recorded consumption-driven growth financed by large 
capital inflows, often through banks, which resulted in large 
external imbalances, as reflected in unsustainable double-digit 
current account deficits. In such circumstances, some sectors—
e.g., nontradable services—overdeveloped, while some 
potentially prosperous sectors remained underdeveloped. 
Ensuing deleveraging and lower bank credit growth in some 
CESEE countries, therefore, may have been an optimal and 
necessary adjustment (Figure 4). 
That leads me to the third point to make. The ability of banks to 
revive credit growth in the CESEE region sustainably over the 
longer term will likely depend on who gets the new credit––
viable restructured corporates or nonviable corporates. In other 
words, it is the quality rather than quantity of credit growth that 
may matter, especially in countries that need to change sectoral 
drivers of growth in the future—such as those with previously 
large current account deficits. As mentioned, in those CESEE 
countries, corporates that flourished in a decade of consumption-
driven growth were usually those in the nontradable services 
sector. Business models of some of these corporates will not 
necessarily remain viable in the future and they may have to 
wind down. Some of them have already accumulated delayed 
debt, contributing to increasing NPLs across the CESEE region. 
Continued support to these weak nonviable corporates holds 
back loans to viable corporates, preventing the economic 
restructuring and sustainable economic and credit growth 
revival. 
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Figure 3. CESEE Credit-to-GDP Ratio Before the Crisis— 
Private Credit  
(In percent of GDP) 
 
 Source: IMF WEO, CEIC. 
 
Figure 4. Deleveraging During the Crisis—BIS Reporting Bankers’ 
Claims (FX-adjusted) as Share of 2012 Nominal GDP 
(In percent) 
  
 Source: BIS. 
Policy focus thus should be less on “more bank credit” and more 
on making the corporate sector stronger to be able to take on 
more long-term debt and redevelop securitization and capital 
market funding in general, not only bank-lending funding. 
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Indiscriminate lending support was partly the reason why some 
of the policy measures implemented over the past few years in 
some of the CESEE countries didn’t eventually yield sustainable 
credit growth. In Serbia, for example, the policy of subsidized 
loans, which was in place from 2009 to 2014, arguably kept alive 
many nonviable corporates, interfered with the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, and often just substituted credit—
which would anyways be extended through market mechanisms. 
Even more discriminate subsidies should be taken with caution, 
as governments throughout history were often less efficient than 
markets in picking up national champions amongst corporates. 
The fourth point I’d like to make is that the ability of central 
banks to revive credit growth—e.g., through TLTRO—will 
likely be particularly limited in countries with large NPLs, 
especially when these reflect underlying problems in the 
corporate sector, and these need to be resolved. Large NPLs, 
even when fully provisioned, discourage new lending, as they: 
(i) absorb managerial time, both in banks and corporates, thus 
suffocating managers’ focus on new lending and core business; 
(ii) lower the average return on the total stock of loans, thus 
pushing up on interest rates on performing loans; and (iii) lower 
expectations of future economic growth, thus further building-up 
interest margins and cost of funding for performing loans. 
But large NPLs in CESEE countries are mostly a reflection of 
problems in the corporate sector, and thus clearing-up bank 
balance sheets may not be sufficient to kick-start new lending. It 
should be accompanied by a comprehensive corporate-
restructuring action, which would: delineate upfront between 
viable and nonviable corporates; restructure the prior ones; and, 
in an orderly manner, wind down the latter ones. In CESEE 
countries, the restructuring will be particularly challenging due 
to the heterogeneous nature of NPLs in terms of sectors and in 
terms of the same corporate debt consisting of a series of 
bilateral lending contracts with multiple (sometimes dozens of) 
lenders. 
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Figure 5. Current Accounts Have Largely Rebalanced  
During the Crisis 
(In percent) 
 
Source: CEIC. 
 
 
Figure 6. NPLs Remain Persistently High Across the Region 
(In percent) 
Source: CEIC. 
 
In such circumstances, coordination between various 
stakeholders within and between countries may prove very 
important. The best-suited available framework to ensure such 
coordination may be the so-called Vienna Initiative framework, 
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which includes home and host-country banks, regulators, 
international financial institutions, and investors. The good news 
is that this framework has been recently intensifying efforts on 
coordinating its various stakeholders in CESEE countries with 
large NPLs in order to enable them to draw on each other’s ideas 
and experiences on their resolution, and yet formulate a tailor-
made solution, which would stimulate the orderly resolution of 
NPLs. 
The final point to make is that the ability of banks to extend 
credits in times of changing sectoral drivers of growth may be 
impeded due to the use of historically based credit-assessment 
models. When drivers of growth change, corporates that did well 
in the past may not do well in the future and vice versa. So 
historical data is worth less than otherwise, and credit assessment 
methodologies commonly used in banks may: (i) lead to 
continued forbearance of nonviable corporate clients; and, 
perhaps more importantly, (ii) prevent credit flowing towards 
corporates with good future prospects. The issue is particularly 
pertinent in the CESEE region with a large share of foreign-
owned banks and credit-assessment procedures unified and often 
centralized in so-called home countries. Many of these home 
countries have not experienced changing drivers of growth and 
historically based credit-assessment models work well there, so 
regional banks have little incentive to change the existing 
methodology. While it makes sense for the regional banking 
groups to have a unique risk-assessment methodology for the 
whole group, the unified methodologies may sometimes 
disadvantage subsidiaries in CESEE countries with changing 
drivers of growth. Developing alternative assessment 
methodologies, more aligned to the needs of particular CESEE 
markets, may thus be desirable to prevent piling-up liquidity in 
CESEE banks, and to help channel bank credit to prospectively 
viable corporates. Furthermore, this may prove particularly 
useful when these viable corporates are start-ups, or innovative 
firms with an often uncertain and volatile cash flow. In such 
cases, developing nonbank funding—such as venture capital, 
  161  
factoring, or securitization—may additionally help towards the 
sustainable revival of economic growth.  
 
C.   Discussions 
A number of issues were raised by participants from the floor 
following the presentations by the panelists. The issues were 
mainly related to the role of macroprudential instruments, 
nonstandard monetary policy measures, asymmetries of policy 
effects between stressed and nonstressed countries, and the size 
of the banking sector. 
 While agreeing about the importance of the 
securitization, one participant cautioned that small 
countries have a small volume problem, which could 
potentially translate into a price problem. He proposed 
supranational ABS as a potential solution that would 
provide sufficient volumes to be attractive for investors. 
 He also asked whether there is scope for 
macroprudential measures to boost credit growth, and he 
expressed scepticism that such instruments could work 
symmetrically. He related this issue to the optimal size 
of the banking sector and wondered whether it is 
sensible to promote credit growth to the extent that 
would return the economies to pre-crisis volumes. 
 Another participant raised the issue of whether the 
promise of the introduction of the ABS-purchase 
program by the euro system is having adverse effects on 
the incentives of banks to use other long-term 
refinancing operations provided by central banks. He 
noted that this could cause a delay in accessing existing 
schemes for liquidity provision while banks waited for 
the introduction of the new program. 
 A final question concerned the extent to which 
unconventional monetary policies introduced within the 
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euro area are having asymmetric effects on countries 
under stress and on those that are not stressed. 
Panelists’ responses to questions 
Securitization, macroprudential policies, and the ABS and 
TLTRO programs. Several panelists agreed with the problem of 
small volume with securitization. One pointed out that, in 
addition to increasing volume, cross-border securitization would 
exploit the opportunity for diversification of risks. The inclusion 
of other asset classes—mortgages, for example—was viewed as 
a potential solution to the small volume problem. While 
technically difficult, such securitization is feasible provided there 
is political will and potential involvement of supranational 
entities, such as the EIB, in the process of securitization. The 
panelist further argued that the ABS-purchase program would 
bring the benefits of lower long-term interest rates for SMEs and 
thus would foster economic activity.  
Regarding the asymmetric effects of macroprudential policies, 
one panelist noted that such policies may work both ways, 
provided that they are sufficiently tight during booms to form 
buffers that can be released during downturns. Another panelist 
agreed that asymmetries were induced by macroprudential 
measures and proposed greater financial integration as a 
solution. An integrated financial union would be able to 
redistribute liquidity from the areas where liquidity was plentiful 
to the areas that may need this liquidity. 
Most panelists agreed that the ABS-purchase program and 
TLTRO programs are complements, rather than substitutes. One 
panelist observed that some banks may be waiting for the details 
of both programs to become fully known before deciding on 
which instrument to use to obtain liquidity. 
Another panelist linked the issue of securitization and ABS 
purchases to the issue of asymmetric effects of unconventional 
monetary policy. He argued that stressed economies have 
problems with collateral for monetary policy operations due to 
low credit ratings. While it would be illogical to exclude some 
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countries' government bonds from refinancing operations on this 
account, the benefit of ABS is that they can function as collateral 
that is supplementary to government bonds.   
Banking-sector size. One panelist noted that there is little 
consensus on the issue of the optimal size of the banking sector. 
However, it is important for the various ratios to be balanced, 
such as the ratio between debt and equity, and the relationship 
between financing and GDP.  
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VII.   PANEL 4: RISKS OF A NEW FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
 
A.   Summary 
The panel discussed the risks of a new financial crisis affecting 
the CESEE region. The hoped-for revival of credit growth may 
be disrupted by renewed financial market turmoil and 
macroeconomic strains. Also, misdirected or mistimed efforts to 
stimulate the economy generally and in particular credit growth 
may themselves be procyclical and destabilizing. The panel 
therefore considered both the probability attached to various 
shocks, and the evolution of financial system resilience in the 
light of macroeconomic conditions and the policies pursued. 
There was acknowledgement of the difficulties attached to 
predicting the timing of renewed tensions and how they may 
play out. Over a long enough time horizon, a major (exogenous) 
negative shock is inevitable, but certain policies may be 
available to enhance resilience and reduce the chance of 
endogenous shocks.  
There was consensus that various market rigidities in Europe and 
inherited weaknesses are increasing the risk of prolonged low 
growth and intensified vulnerabilities. The market rigidities need 
not in themselves provoke a crisis; but may prevent financial and 
nonfinancial institutions from building-up resilience to an 
eventual exogenous shock, most obviously by condemning them 
to low profitability and low growth. 
Debt overhangs—whether in the corporate, household, bank, or 
government sectors—may persistently depress investment and 
consumption, and therefore growth. In these conditions, the debt 
overhang is difficult to work off, as are the substantial stocks of 
NPLs. Moreover, many financial institutions are not currently 
profitable enough to restore their buffers from internal resources. 
This uncertainty surrounding the European banking system may 
hamper recovery. 
  165  
Labor markets in much of Europe display hysteresis, affecting 
especially young workers, with all the attendant economic and 
social costs. Youth unemployment is a social problem, a political 
problem, and a generational problem. There is a need for more 
investment, especially private investment but also public 
investment. That investment will support both demand and also, 
if well chosen, potential growth; but it requires a reduction in 
uncertainty and a rekindling of optimism about economic 
prospects. 
Turning to possible exogenous shocks to the region, at present 
obvious geopolitical risks prevail. Certain sectors have already 
been affected significantly by the sanctions on Russia and that 
country’s economic difficulties. Also, the European recovery has 
been largely export-led; so a slowdown, especially in emerging-
market economies (for example, because of strains affecting 
highly leveraged multinationals), would have strong 
repercussions. Credit risk would then intensify further, most 
notably in export sectors—which have, so far, been rather 
insulated from recession. Even without a major global 
slowdown, Europe—including the CESEE region—cannot 
expect to see a further large strengthening of its current account 
balance. 
The current environment of very low interest rates and loose 
monetary policy has certainly eased tensions; but the eventual 
exit from this situation will require a delicate policy balance, 
especially if some countries exit earlier and faster than others. In 
this context, the prospective tightening of U.S. (and U.K.) 
monetary policy could be a catalyst for a change in sentiment. 
Certain financial markets, including those for European 
sovereign debt, now price in very little risk; a very dramatic 
repricing of assets and a return to higher risk premiums could be 
disruptive and reveal underlying weaknesses. Here, political risk 
in Europe, where reform fatigue and disenchantment with 
established parties is widespread, may spark a “blow out” in 
sovereign risk premia. Further down the road, certain trends 
suggest that nonbank intermediated financial markets may be 
becoming more susceptible to large, systemically driven 
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portfolio shifts. Funding connections in nonbank financial 
institutions (NBFIs) and between NBFIs and banks may be 
becoming more nontransparent and fragile.  
The short-term risk of a crisis endogenous to the CESEE was 
viewed as modest. In many ways, and in many CESEE countries, 
financial systems have been strengthened—for example, in terms 
of reduced reliance on parent or wholesale funding, and reduced 
dollarization. As a result, loan conditions are softening, albeit in 
the face of weak demand for new loans. There are few signs of 
excessive asset valuations or very rapid credit growth in most 
CESEE countries, albeit with some exceptions. Generalized 
deflation in CESEE was seen as unlikely.  
Regarding the debt overhang, the picture is mixed: government 
debt is high in some countries, and corporate debt is pronounced 
and rising in others; but aggregate household debt is mostly 
modest by European standards. Also, the distribution of debt 
matters: some countries have pockets of heavy indebtedness. Of 
more concern is the rising level of NPLs, especially in the 
enterprise sector, which weigh on that sector and the banks. 
Thus, incomplete fiscal consolidation and private-sector 
deleveraging may be key ingredients of new vulnerability in 
some countries of the region. 
Especially if the recovery takes firmer hold, then the policy 
challenge of how to sustain growth on a financially sound basis 
will become more urgent. During the current relatively calm 
time, the authorities can help reduce the risk of a renewed crisis 
by tackling the overhang of (impaired) debt. Action is needed at 
the level of banks but more importantly at the level of corporates 
and sovereigns. Buffers need to be built up, and that will require 
the promotion of the orderly elimination of excess capacity in the 
financial sector and the restoration of sustained bank 
profitability. Another element of the policy response is the 
development of macroprudential instruments, and the means to 
implement them in a timely fashion. But addressing underlying 
weaknesses—especially long-term youth unemployment and the 
low trend growth rate—will require structural measures; for 
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example: in labor markets; in better education for all sections of 
society; and in creating innovative European financing vehicles. 
B.   Presentations by Members of the Panel 
Lead: Erik Jones, The Johns Hopkins University 
There are signs of recovery in parts of the EU. The question is 
whether they are durable. Performance across EU member states 
is becoming more differentiated. Some countries are growing 
more quickly and experiencing lower levels of unemployment. 
Others remain mired in what can best be described as (very) 
slow growth equilibrium. Moreover, the European economy is 
being buffeted by shocks from the conflicts in the Ukraine, the 
Middle East, and in North Africa even as it experiences the usual 
volatility induced by political events such as the referendum in 
Scotland, the unofficial plebiscite in Catalonia, and the mid-term 
elections in the United States Also worrying is the prospect that 
any recovery will only result in the accumulation of imbalances 
that will lead to another round of financial fragility and 
instability. For every voice that warns of secular stagnation, 
there is another that cautions against the dangers of moral 
hazard; calls for quantitative easing or fiscal stimulus are met 
with concern for pent-up inflation and excessive indebtedness. 
The purpose of this contribution is to assess the risks that Europe 
will experience a new financial crisis—including the possibility 
that it never completely emerged from the last one. The implicit 
focus is on the countries of CESEE; given the nature of 
interdependence in the EU, however, Western European 
countries both inside and outside the euro area also garner 
consideration. 
The analysis is divided into four sections: The first examines the 
evidence that the CESEE countries have actually emerged from 
the crisis as part of a more general European recovery. The 
second looks at the negative impact of exogenous factors. The 
third explores the reemergence of endogenous risks through the 
accumulation of imbalances as a result of current performance 
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trends. The fourth concludes with the prospects for policy action 
both at the Europe and national levels. 
Rigidity and recovery 
Any recovery in European economic performance should be 
measured against those factors that best reflect the impact of the 
crisis. These factors are less causal than symptomatic. They 
matter more as obstacles to adjustment than as explanations for 
the deterioration in European performance during the period that 
ran from 2007 to 2013. This analysis focuses on five possible 
sources of rigidity that would prevent CESEE countries (and the 
rest of Europe) from recovering robustly. They are: 
 hysteresis in unemployment; 
 deflationary expectations; 
 a loss of confidence and an increase in risk aversion 
among banks and firms; 
 balance sheet dependence upon cheap and plentiful 
liquidity; and 
 excessive public indebtedness. 
The problems associated with these different sources of rigidity 
are well-known. Hysteresis in the labor market occurs when 
cyclical unemployment becomes structural as long-term 
unemployment accumulates and workers locked out of 
employment lose their ability to find work. Deflationary 
expectations emerge when the usual expectations about price 
inflation become unanchored, and economic actors begin to 
build in falling prices as part of their wage bargaining and 
investment planning. A loss of confidence in the banking sector 
results in fewer loans (offered at higher standards) to 
nonfinancial firms and households; a loss of confidence outside 
the banking sector results in a fall in demand for borrowing to 
finance new investment or large purchases. Excessive 
dependence on cheap and plentiful liquidity requires a balance-
sheet adjustment to change the gearing of debt to equity. 
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Meanwhile excessive public indebtedness leaves little margin for 
maneuver for fiscal stimulus. 
The evidence for these rigidities across the CESEE region is 
mixed. Looking at unemployment as a percentage of the labor 
force, for example, what is striking is not so much the high level 
of unemployment as the very slow and uneven pace of its 
alleviation—particularly when compared to the fast changes that 
took place during the period from 2002 to 2008. Meanwhile, 
evidence for deflationary expectations in the euro area continues 
to accumulate. Actual headline increases in consumer prices 
remain mired below 0.5 percent on an annualized basis. The 
average of forecasts for expected future price increases shows 
this figure rising to “below but close to 2 percent” only over a 
10-year time horizon. This estimate corresponds with the five-
year breakeven rate in the bond markets, which have fallen to 
1.7 percent in October 2014. 
The news is not entirely disappointing. Confidence within the 
financial sector has been improving and credit standards applied 
to new loans to nonfinancial firms and households have been 
loosening progressively. Moreover, these factors should continue 
to strengthen as European banks emerge from the ECB’s 
comprehensive assessment that was completed this October. The 
result will not be a flood of fresh liquidity, but it will be an 
improvement over the tight conditions that resulted from bank 
de-leveraging after the ECB’s AQR and in anticipation of its 
stress testing of bank balance sheets.  
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the softening 
conditions on the supply side of the banking industry will be met 
by aggressive demand for credit among nonfinancial firms and 
households. Moreover, consumer and business confidence 
indicators show continued signs of concern. At least part of this 
pessimism is due to their own balance sheet considerations. 
Nonfinancial firms also need equity and households worry about 
paying down their debts. Data from credit reform shows that the 
difficulties associated with repairing nonfinancial balance sheets 
are taking their toll in terms of corporate insolvencies. SMEs, in 
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particular, are struggling to meet their obligations and often 
coming up short. The burden of these insolvencies is not 
everywhere the same and yet the absolute volumes across 
Europe are high relative to recent history and so continue to 
weigh on any European recovery. 
Meanwhile, progressively higher public debt-to-GDP ratios limit 
the possibilities for fiscal stimulus. This is most evident in the 
euro area where there is a heated debate between the German 
government and governments in those countries most affected by 
the crisis about the need to strictly observe the terms of the EU’s 
fiscal compact. There is pressure on the governments of the 
CESEE countries as well. Even where these countries have 
relatively low public debt-to-GDP ratios, the European 
Commission has been quick to raise concerns about debt 
sustainability and reluctant to grant flexibility in providing fiscal 
stimulus. 
At the nexus of such constraints, it is small wonder that 
politicians express concern about the dangers of secular 
stagnation even as economists recommend ever more sweeping 
structural reforms. The challenge for policymakers is to identify 
which are the priorities in any given situation. The data show 
considerable variation from one country to the next, both in 
terms of the strength of the different sources of rigidity and in 
terms of their relative impact on economic performance. This 
dilemma is nothing new in European politics and policymaking. 
Indeed, it is much the same as that confronted by European 
policymakers during the period from 1997–2000 when the EU 
developed its Lisbon strategy for open cooperation in market 
structural reform; it is also much the same as that confronted by 
policymakers in 2004–05 when a mid-term review of the Lisbon 
strategy highlighted the many failures in making progress. The 
fact that the challenge is familiar does not make it less 
intractable. Overcoming market rigidities is a major obstacle to 
ensuring a durable recovery. 
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Exogenous shocks 
The challenge of engaging in market structural reform is 
complicated by the many powerful exogenous factors that are 
impacting upon European economic performance. The list of 
such factors is lengthy; the focus here is on just four categories. 
The big geostrategic worries associated with conflict and 
instability around Europe are at the top of the list. More 
mundane political events add to market volatility. The 
performance of key markets in Asia, North America, and 
elsewhere are a concern as well. So, too, is the movement in 
global currencies such as the euro, dollar, yen, and pound. 
The conflicts in the Ukraine, Syria, and Libya are important 
because they restrict access to key markets, jeopardize energy 
security, and add to immigration pressures. These are first-order 
concerns for the countries of the CESEE region, particularly in 
relation to Russia. The tightening of U.S. and European 
sanctions on Russia that has taken place in stages during the 
2014 spring, summer, and early autumn—coupled with Russian 
retaliation against European exporters—has slowed the pace of 
business between Russia and the CESEE region with the promise 
of even greater deceleration to come. At the same time, the 
Russian economy has suffered from the heightened sense of 
market uncertainty and resulting decline in business and 
consumer confidence above and beyond the threat of sanctions. 
This has depressed Russian economic performance and so 
further dented prospects for countries that export to Russian 
markets. 
The potential impact of Russian sanctions on energy supplies is 
important as well. Western sanctions target major energy 
producers and the banks that support them. So far this has not 
resulted in declines in Russian output. Moreover, the Russian 
government has shown little willingness to use energy resources 
as leverage––at least apart from the Ukraine, and from trying to 
prevent the re-export of Russian energy resources from other 
European countries back into the Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is 
unclear whether this attitude will change as the impact of 
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sanctions on Russian energy firms strengthens and should Russia 
succeed in negotiating access to alternative markets. The two 
recent agreements between Russia and China are cases in point. 
Europe will remain Russia’s primary energy export market and 
yet the margin for exercising leverage against smaller European 
countries that are excessively dependent upon Russian energy 
supplies will increase as alternative markets become more 
important. 
The conflicts in Syria and Libya are contributing factors in 
adding downward pressure on the CESEE region because they 
complicate the search for alternative energy supplies. These 
conflicts also add to immigration pressures through Turkey and 
across the Mediterranean; they subtract from business 
confidence across the European economy, more generally; and 
they distract European and American attention away from 
dealing with Russia. 
Meanwhile, an unusual congruence of political events has added 
to market volatility. The Scottish referendum is important as an 
illustration of this dynamic more than as a permanent influence. 
The surprising closeness of pre-referendum polling in late 
August 2014 fostered a spate of media speculation that the actual 
referendum put to rest. Firms and financial actors made 
contingency plans and, in some cases, deferred investments in 
response––but the whole episode was quickly forgotten once the 
results of the referendum became known. A similar pattern can 
be seen around the plebiscite in Catalonia and the mid-term 
elections in the United States, although uncertainties in both 
cases have lingered. This pattern will persist as the United 
Kingdom and Poland head to the polls in 2015, and as Italians 
wonder when Giorgio Napolitano will resign as President of the 
Republic and whether the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi 
will opt for early elections. The political situation in Greece is 
also problematic. There is nothing surprising about these 
influences; the point is only that they create a drag on economic 
performance. Should one or more of these events result in a full-
blown political crisis, the impact will be even greater. 
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The performance of key export markets is a further source of 
concern. The U.S. market is a major consumer of exports from 
Europe and has been moving more soundly into recovery. By 
contrast, the Chinese market is growing in importance and yet 
not performing as well. Exports to Russia are declining as a 
result of the geopolitical tensions mentioned earlier. Exports to 
Switzerland—which is a more important destination than Russia 
and only slightly less important than China—have also been 
falling off. The impact of these contractions in European exports 
shows up first in those countries like Germany that rely heavily 
on an export-led growth model and only subsequently in those 
countries—like much of the CESEE region—that supply goods 
and services for incorporation into German exports. That said, 
the lag between changes in German and CESEE performance is 
short. The impact of declining European export performance is 
also felt in countries like Italy and France, which are less export 
dependent (and are arguably suffering more for reasons related 
to the rigidities mentioned at the outset). As these larger 
European economies struggle, they bring down the prospects for 
economic performance in the CESEE countries as well. 
Exchange rates are a fourth exogenous factor. The relative 
movements in the euro, dollar, yen, and pound have had a 
powerful influence on European economic performance; both 
because of the impact of exchange rate levels on relative cost 
competitiveness, and because of the impact of exchange rate 
volatility on trade and investment patterns. This influence is 
likely to strengthen now that monetary policy is diverging across 
the Atlantic and as intra-European conflict increases over the 
limits on the use of unconventional monetary instruments like 
quantitative easing and over the relative usefulness of fiscal 
stimulus. 
Endogenous imbalances 
Turbulence in the world economy is a risk that the CESEE 
region will have to learn to accept. That makes the structural 
reform agenda to reduce the influence of market rigidities all the 
more important. However, there is an attendant possibility that 
  174  
the fruits of any recovery in the present will emerge as future 
unsustainable imbalances. This prospect is hardly unique to the 
CESEE region and could be applied to the world as a whole. 
Nevertheless, it is a major source of concern in Europe because 
of the financial interdependence that influenced the crisis as it 
unfolded. Here it is important to distinguish between symptoms 
and causes in a way that is different from the discussion of 
market rigidities in the first section of this analysis. Market 
rigidities are in many ways a symptom (or expression) of the 
crisis and an obstacle to recovery. By contrast, financial 
imbalances are a symptom (or expression) of recovery and a 
potential source of the next crisis. 
Four imbalances warrant particular attention. The first of these is 
closely tied to the political economy of extraordinarily loose 
monetary conditions and finds expression in the accumulation of 
indebtedness, even when there is little growth in credit. The 
second emerges in the form of price bubbles that affect both real 
and tradable assets. The third develops in the form of the 
progressively uncompetitive expansion of labor costs. The fourth 
takes the form of cross-border liabilities. 
The evidence for accumulation of household indebtedness during 
the crisis is mixed. Some CESEE countries like Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic have seen an increase in household indebtedness 
as a ratio of disposable income; others like Hungary and Poland 
have seen household indebtedness decrease by the same 
measure. The build-up of outstanding loans from commercial 
banks is more consistent, particularly when measured as a share 
of GDP. The farther east you travel in the CESEE region, the 
greater the burden of outstanding loans becomes and the more 
significant the increase as the crisis has moved into recovery. 
This accumulation of indebtedness corresponds with a growing 
burden of NPLs that will impinge on bank performance both in 
the present and looking ahead. The accumulation of indebtedness 
also constitutes a significant vulnerability. Should interest rates 
rise suddenly due to a change in market conditions or a policy 
shock coming from elsewhere (like the United States), the 
consequence would be a sudden build-up of debt servicing 
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requirements coupled with a greater risk of insolvency and 
nonperformance. 
An interest rate shock could also affect the prices of real and 
tradable assets. The evidence for a real estate bubble emerging 
during the recovery is not strong in the CESEE region, although 
there is some concern in countries like Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. A more prominent concern for CESEE countries (and 
for much of the southern European periphery) is the very low 
yield on (and therefore correspondingly high prices attached to) 
government debt securities. An interest rate shock that punctured 
a price bubble on sovereign debt instruments would quickly 
reassert the symbiotic relationship between bank balance sheets 
and sovereign finances by imposing losses on a significant 
volume of banking assets while at the same time redirecting an 
increasing share of government expenditures onto debt servicing 
requirements. This is probably the most significant threat to 
Europe’s recovery from accumulated imbalances. 
By contrast, the impact of the recovery on relative real unit labor 
costs is more varied across countries. Within the CESEE region, 
countries like Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia have experienced a relatively modest appreciation; 
others like Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania have seen 
their relative competitiveness increase. What is unclear in these 
movements is how much the effect will show up in terms of 
relative export volumes or manufacturing performance. What is 
clear is that none of the countries is currently running a 
significant currency-account deficit. 
Indeed, that uniformity in current-account performance may be 
symptomatic of a different kind of imbalance—not within 
Europe but between Europe and the outside world. Here it is 
useful to look beyond the CESEE region. Whereas before, the 
euro area was roughly in balance with the outside world—
meaning that any current account surpluses run by countries like 
Germany were offset by countries like Spain; snow, the euro 
area is running a consistent current account surplus as an entity. 
The CESEE countries are running surpluses as well. Hence, it is 
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worth considering which part of the world is running the 
offsetting deficits and how long those deficit positions will be 
sustainable. This is a more generalized expression of the concern 
for major export market performance insofar as it focuses not 
only on how Europe’s major markets are doing at the moment, 
but also on how they can be expected to perform in the 
foreseeable future. 
Policy response 
The analysis presented here suggests the need for an effective 
policy response both at the national and European levels. 
National policymakers will be the primary architects of any 
major market structural reforms. They will also be responsible 
for any fiscal stimulus. European policymakers will have a hand 
in overseeing market structural-reform efforts and in 
coordinating the use of fiscal policy. Policymakers at the ECB 
will work alongside these efforts by maintaining an 
accommodative monetary stance. And the whole of the 
policymaking community will be engaged in slowing or 
reversing any accumulated imbalances. 
The problem with this division of labor is well understood. 
National policymakers struggle to make market structural 
reforms in the face of significant domestic opposition to change. 
There is progress, but it is hard won––and all too often 
unrewarded either in terms of significant changes in economic 
performance (within a politically relevant time frame) or at the 
ballot box. The pace of reform can be accelerated under 
conditions of strict conditionality, as in exchange for emergency 
lending or conditional credit facilities. But such acceleration 
only defers the political consequences of any major market 
structural reform and risks building-up resentment toward the 
impingement on national sovereignty. Portugal’s early exit from 
its bailout program is a good illustration; Greece’s current efforts 
to emerge from Troika supervision are also relevant; and Viktor 
Orban’s campaign against the IMF in Hungary is a further case 
in point. 
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The challenge on the fiscal side is to take advantage of economic 
interdependence within the context of the EU’s “fiscal compact.” 
The countries that have sufficient flexibility should engage in 
stimulus measures so that the countries that are excessively 
indebted can maintain the pace of consolidation. However, such 
efforts are challenging to coordinate across diverse national 
electorates; they create conditions of moral hazard, and they 
depend upon market structural reforms to achieve lasting 
success. Hence, the trust required to organize something like this 
across diverse national governments is probably greater than 
what exists in Europe at the moment. 
As a result, monetary policy authorities both in the ECB and 
elsewhere are carrying an excessive share of the policy burden. 
They have exhausted most of their conventional instruments, and 
so have had to resort to unconventional measures that are openly 
distributive and so subject to controversy. It is a simple matter to 
calculate how much German savers “lose” from near-zero 
interest rates (and negative deposit rates at the ECB) and how 
much Italian tax payers ”gain” from relatively low sovereign 
debt yields. As the ECB moves into the purchase of covered 
bonds and ABS, its actions will give rise to a different kind of 
distributive calculus. Those instruments are more likely to 
circulate in some countries than in others and so the benefits of 
this light form of quantitative easing will provoke a new round 
of distributive controversies. A full-blown quantitative easing 
using corporate paper or sovereign debt instruments will only 
fuel the controversy further. 
Finally, it is worth considering whether the intellectual 
framework for regarding accumulated imbalances is appropriate. 
The whole of the European policy apparatus treats current-
account surpluses and deficits asymmetrically, regarding 
surpluses as an indicator of competitiveness and deficits as the 
reverse. This normative framing makes it difficult to bring 
European economic performance into balance with the outside 
world. That is a vulnerability insofar as the rest of the world 
cannot operate as Europe’s consumers of last resort, particularly 
when the rest of the world includes export powerhouses like 
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China and the other countries of East and Southeast Asia. Hence, 
there is a significant risk that Europe’s policy response will be 
inadequate. If that risk is borne out, then Europe will face 
another crisis—albeit perhaps only in the distant future. 
Panelist 1: Cristian Popa, Deputy Governor, National Bank 
of Romania 
Like other speakers, let me add my thanks to Banka Slovenia and 
Boštjan for having invited me.  
That said, I need to qualify the agreeable character of the 
invitation by recalling the early literature on proxies for central 
bank independence (notably Rogoff (1986)), which spoke about 
the best choice of governor being a person whose aversion to 
inflation is higher than the social average. I would say that my 
risk awareness regarding the financial system, if taken by similar 
metrics, has seen an increase in the relatively recent period. So, 
with that comment as a background to my subsequent messages, 
what I want to do here in the brief time span allocated is to ask 
questions more than provide answers.  
My first point is that we should be rather humble about how 
much we actually know and are able to quantify regarding 
financial sector risks. Rather than imagining clear and detailed 
scenarios about how things could go wrong, what I think is much 
more productive is an investigation of the vulnerabilities 
currently affecting the financial system, with some assessment of 
their attached probabilities of realization. This would provide us 
with an image about the way the window will crack, which 
points are the weakest and what can be done about them, rather 
than exactly what the broken window will end up looking like.   
The second point is, given my qualification, what do we know? 
The idea from previous crises is that these tend to be localized in 
time and quite cathartic in the way we shape the economy and in 
the way that the real sector and possibly even the financial one 
undergo a restructuring that transforms them. But this idea may 
no longer be valid in the same manner as in past episodes. 
Depending on whether you believe that the secular stagnation 
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concept is valid, or just think that this is a temporary 
phenomenon, we are living through the hangover of the previous 
crisis. And, again conditional upon the time horizon we have in 
mind, this may influence things going wrong the next time 
around.  
The first risk I see is the fact that, again from the perspective of 
how you look into financial system risks, at the present juncture 
it is very difficult to distinguish between two things: (i) what has 
been valid in the short run that we think is sustainable (or 
persistent) in the longer run; and (ii) what really are positive, 
factual developments compared to the normative aspects we tend 
to associate with the current state or we would like to think 
should undergo a correction.  
One example is Daniel saying that we would like to have more 
new lending taking place without more indebtedness; in the 
current state, even with some considerable mileage being 
registered from deleveraging in regard to both corporates and 
households, debt burdens (and relative undercapitalization, 
especially for the former) are still important. So are NPLs, which 
are frequently invoked by banks as one of the principal reasons 
for lending remaining sluggish so far. Therefore, an additional 
jump in the stock of NPLs is not a scenario that helps at the 
present juncture. We are barely able to deal with the existing 
stock across many economies, and the attendant workout has 
proven to be more difficult and time-consuming than initially 
thought.  
But let me say that central banks have had to take on a more 
prominent role by acting like fire fighters. In the initial stages of 
the crisis, they fought the risk of a really disorderly repricing of 
assets because the alternative was really off the charts in terms of 
welfare costs. This got us into history. How do we get out of 
history is a more important question, even if tinged with irony. Is 
financial repression, even if we have the backdrop of difficulties 
(barely sustainable debt levels across many developed 
economies) really a feasible long-term solution? That is the first 
question, and one to which I believe the answer is negative. 
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Secondly, the fact that we seem to be seeing increasingly 
divergent business and financial cycles in different economies 
and regions, is that something that is going to last or is it a 
temporary phenomenon? Because in the former case, the 
persistent aspects of lax monetary policy may be further 
complicated. But we need to be aware of what impairments to 
transmission from monetary policy may be generated in terms of 
distortions in the financial sector over time. We also need to look 
at how accurately markets are pricing in risks right now with this 
kind of low rate backdrop being taken as more persistent than it 
may actually be, with divergence looming ahead in terms of G-4 
central-bank stances.  
Other risks relate to the financial sector reform agenda and 
macroprudential policy.  
Financial sector reform agenda 
Compared to its initially hoped-for configuration, the 
implementation of the financial sector regulation reform agenda 
has been rather inconsistently delivered. And I speak here not 
only of the European perspective but more of G20. This needs to 
be broader than just the EU in order to avoid delocalization and 
regulatory arbitrage, both of which would impair the ability of 
regulators and supervisors to obtain accurate information and act 
to prevent risks from accumulating and/or being manifested. It 
would also affect the cost of new capital in a manner that would 
be more significant in the presence of over-indebtedness and 
continued deleveraging.  
At the same time, we are rightly concerned about shadow 
banking, which partly is a result of things moving from the 
formal sector into the informal sector and of the concentration 
we have; I believe we do not even have good data on that besides 
the superficial stuff. Yet we are being sanguine in the wrong way 
about how liquidity dependence, common funding sources and 
the complexity that evolves over time between the formal and 
informal sectors in finance are shaping things. I think that co-
movements may be stronger than they were in the past. Indeed, I 
think roll-over risk, not just rising yields that may translate into 
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higher cost of capital, is a problem. And these may be significant 
in a second round way for emerging markets, given the close 
integration between developed and emerging market financial 
sectors.  
Let me now concentrate on things that have something of a 
political economy nature. We are in a very difficult world here 
because I do not think central banks were prepared for the kind 
of actions they have had to take. But at the same time, trying to 
fight a fight that ultimately concerns structural reforms and 
productivity enhancing policies by macroeconomic demand 
management and giving a growth mandate more or less 
explicitly to central banks may not be the best way to go 
forward. I am still a very orthodox believer in price and financial 
stability being the best things that central banks are active in, and 
that should stay with us and not be mixed with the economy-
wide real sector mandates that I just mentioned. Also, some 
countries have run into a different problem: the central bank is 
seen as institutionally and reputationally so powerful, but may 
actually be lacking the necessary tools when it is supposed to 
compensate for or remedy actions that are time-inconsistent in 
other components of the macro policy. Or the remedy to reform 
that was there as a program item but was not completely 
delivered upon. I think we should be concerned about that.  
Macroprudential policy 
The second thing is the new field offered by macroprudential 
policy. Whenever we discover a new tool and its name has been 
there for a while, we tend to overuse it or overpromise regarding 
what it can actually deliver in isolation. I think here there are a 
lot of things that need to be done, but macroprudential policy 
needs to work in tandem with monetary policy as part of the 
macroeconomic policy mix. We also need to look at the financial 
sector inter-linkages between countries, because typically we are 
talking about partial equilibrium and country specific notions, 
because that brings more clarity and is an impetus for action. But 
really things are much more cross-border in nature. And we need 
to be prudent about how effective these measures are, if they 
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have side effects—some of them do—how porous can they 
become, whether cross-border cooperation by macroprudential 
authorities and others blend into the mix, are they as good as 
they can be or can they be enhanced. We actually need to 
collectively deliver on these measures very well and avoid 
overpromising. Because then, when crunch time comes, we need 
to show what was on paper has actually taken place in reality and 
the best safeguards have not only been thought of but are 
operational, without believing that these can ever be a panacea 
by themselves. Thank you. 
Panelist 2: Dubravko Mihaljek, Head of Macroeconomics 
Analysis, BIS 
Introduction 
Erik Jones’ introduction provided a stimulating framework for an 
analysis of the risks of a new financial crisis in CESEE. I shall 
discuss the three scenarios he outlined—recovery never really 
gains momentum, Europe gets pushed back into crisis, the 
recovery leads to a new crisis—and examine how likely these 
scenarios are in South-Eastern Europe (SEE). For the purpose of 
this note, I shall include in this region Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey. This is a 
heterogeneous group of countries, whose economic performance 
and policies elude easy generalizations. But they display a 
similar pattern of macroeconomic developments before and—
with the exception of Turkey—after the global financial crisis.  
In particular, after a strong expansion accompanied by high 
inflation, low unemployment, low savings, high investment 
rates, and very high external deficits in 2003–08, the period since 
2010 has been one of very low or negative growth, much lower 
inflation, much higher unemployment, and the disappearance of 
external deficits (Figure 1). The impact of the crisis was smallest 
in the case of Turkey, where the economy has evolved since 
2010 similarly to Asian and Latin American emerging markets. 
But looking ahead, Turkey faces some of the same challenges as 
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other economies in this region, and can therefore be analyzed 
within the same group framework.   
My main argument will be that incomplete fiscal consolidation 
and private sector deleveraging, as well as the stalling of 
structural reforms are key ingredients of a potential new crisis in 
this region. These vulnerabilities could threaten financial 
stability and lead to a standstill or reversal of the convergence 
process. In other words, without fiscal consolidation, 
deleveraging, and structural reforms, SEE not only puts financial 
stability at risk but could also remain stuck on the periphery of 
developed Europe.  
The remainder of this note is divided into four sections. 
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the global economy at the 
current juncture. Section 3 evaluates domestic risks for the 
recovery. Section 4 evaluates some exogenous shocks that might 
push SEE back into crisis. Section 5 concludes by examining 
whether the recovery could lead to a new crisis through 
repetition of past mistakes made in the private and public 
sectors. 
Global economy is approaching a turning point 
The past year has seen macroeconomic conditions diverging 
across major advanced economies: growth has taken hold in the 
United States and the United Kingdom; remained weak in the 
euro area; and become very volatile in Japan. In the emerging 
market economies (EMEs), the slowdown in growth that started 
in late 2012 has stabilized and output is expected to pick up over 
the next few years, though at a slower pace than in 2010–12.   
Despite a somewhat better global growth outlook, there has been 
a broad-based decline in inflation, reflecting remaining slack in 
labor markets (e.g., in the United States), weak domestic demand 
(e.g., in the euro area), and falling commodity prices. One 
concern for inflation targeting central banks has been that several 
forward-looking measures suggest that inflation might remain 
low or fall further over the medium term. 
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Figure 1. Macroeconomic Developments in SEE Countries:  
Pre-and Post-Crisis1 
Real GDP Growth 
(In annual percentage change) 
Inflation 
(In annual percentage change) 
  
Unemployment Rate 
(In percent of labor force) 
Gross National Saving 
(In percent of GDP) 
  
Total Investment 
(In percent of GDP) 
Current-Account Balance 
(In percent of GDP) 
  
Sources: IMF, WEO, October 2014; author’s calculations. 
   1 Period averages 
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Diverging macroeconomic conditions have been reflected in 
diverging monetary policies. The U.S. Federal Reserve ended 
large-scale asset purchases in 2014 and started preparing for the 
lift-off of policy rates. The Bank of England has maintained a 
very accommodative monetary policy stance through late 2014, 
while the ECB and in particular the Bank of Japan have further 
eased their stance.  
The shifts in the macroeconomic outlook and monetary policy 
have been associated with significant movements in exchange 
rates. The dollar has appreciated sharply against major 
currencies over the past year. Conversely, the yen has fallen 
sharply against both major advanced and EME currencies.  
In global financial markets, periods of unusual calm have been 
interspersed with episodes of heightened volatility over the past 
year. Different market segments were affected each time: 
emerging market assets in January; high-yield corporate bonds in 
August; and advanced economy government bonds and equities 
in October.  
Observers, rightly or wrongly, related these bouts of volatility 
mainly to changes in market expectations about major central 
banks’ monetary policies. One issue is that monetary policy 
guidance may have increased market sensitivity to 
macroeconomic surprises. More fundamentally, there are 
concerns that after a long period of monetary accommodation, 
central bank policies have become a key determinant of global 
financial market conditions, possibly overshadowing underlying 
macroeconomic conditions.  
Given the expectations about U.S. monetary policy and the 
dominant role of the dollar as the funding currency for 
international investors, this implies that global financing 
conditions will likely tighten over the next year or so. This 
would affect not only the EMEs in Latin America and Asia, but 
also those in Europe. Despite its close economic and financial 
ties to the euro area, where monetary conditions will remain 
easy, governments and firms in south-eastern Europe that rely on 
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external funding will thus face higher borrowing costs in the 
period ahead.  
Domestic risks for the recovery 
Against the backdrop of global macroeconomic and financial 
market conditions in late-2014, one key risk for the recovery in 
SEE stems in my view from high public and private-sector debt 
and doubts about their sustainability as global financial 
conditions start normalizing.  
Several governments in the region––notably Croatia, Hungary, 
and Slovenia––have debt levels close to or exceeding 80 percent 
of GDP (Table 1). They depend heavily on cheap and plentiful 
external funding to sustain such levels of debt. As global interest 
rates start to rise, some of these governments could run into 
funding problems. In its 2014 Autumn Economic Forecast, 
European Commission estimates interest expenditure of the 
general government in Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia in the 
range from 3.3 percent to 4.1 percent of GDP. This is fairly high 
compared with the euro area average of 2.7 percent of GDP on 
average debt of 108 percent of GDP in 2014.  
Several countries also have very high levels of private debt. In 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia, for instance, 
nonfinancial corporate-sector debt ranges from 80 percent to 
over 120 percent of GDP in 2014; the average for other SEE 
countries shown in Table 1 was well over 50 percent of GDP.  
Household debt is generally about 30 percent of GDP, which is 
significantly below most advanced economies (except Italy), but 
higher than in most EMEs. Moreover, several SEE countries 
have seen a large increase in private sector debt––for instance, 
Croatia by 14 percent of GDP and Turkey by 28 percent since 
end-2008. Since much of this debt is external or, if domestic, 
held by foreign investors (e.g., in Turkey), countries in question 
are vulnerable not only to higher global interest rates, but also to 
domestic currency depreciation against the dollar. 
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Table 1. Debt of the Nonfinancial Sector 
 (As a percentage of GDP) 
 Level in 2014 /1 Change since end-2008 /2 
 House-hold 
Corpo-
rate 
Govern-
ment /3 Total 
House-
hold 
Corpo-
rate 
Govern-
ment /3 Total 
Advanced 
economies /4, /5 75 87 118 280 –6 –4 35 24 
  United States 77 68 106 252 –17 –5 34 12 
  Euro area 64 103 108 274 0 –2 30 28 
  France 57 124 115 296 7 12 36 54 
  Germany 56 56 84 196 –5 –5 14 4 
  Italy 44 80 147 272 4 –1 28 31 
  Spain 75 111 108 295 –9 –21 60 31 
  United Kingdom 93 79 102 274 –8 –23 44 13 
  Japan 65 103 230 398 0 –3 58 55 
Major EMEs /4,/6 27 79 44 150 8 21 3 32 
South-Eastern 
Europe         
  Bulgaria 24 126 25 175 –2 –5 10 3 
  Croatia 41 90 82 213 2 12 53 67 
  Hungary 28 92 79 200 –9 7 6 4 
  Romania 19 48 40 107 –2 –45 26 –22 
  Slovenia 29 82 82 188 3 –7 61 57 
  Turkey 21 50 34 104 8 20 –6 21 
    
  Sources: ECB; European Commission; IMF; OECD; national data; author’s calculations.    
  /1 Refers to Q1, Q2, or Q3 2014; for Bulgaria, 2013.  
  /2 In percentage points of GDP. 
  /3 OECD and IMF estimates of gross financial liabilities. 
  /4 Weighted averages of the economies listed based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange rates. 
  /5 Economies shown. 
  /6 Argentina, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, 
Poland, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey. 
 
But there are also countries in the region in which private-sector 
debt has been significantly reduced: Bulgaria and Romania have 
seen deleveraging in both household and nonfinancial corporate 
sectors; Hungary in the household; and Slovenia in the corporate 
sector––though some of this reduction is offset by the rise in 
public debt related to bank restructuring.  
Private-sector lending conditions in the region are relatively tight 
at present, and many households and nonfinancial firms are still 
deleveraging, notably in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and 
Slovenia. As a result, credit demand currently is very weak. 
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Higher global interest rates should thus initially affect mainly 
debt-servicing costs. But for borrowers who are not indebted, 
tighter global financing conditions will make a difference. As a 
result, it will be harder for the recovery to gain traction. 
How important are other “market rigidities” that Erik identified 
as weighing on the recovery: labor market hysteresis, de-
anchoring of inflation expectations, and insufficient credit supply 
due to ongoing repair of banks’ balance sheets, but also weak 
confidence of lenders in the general economic outlook?  
Unemployment is already mostly structural, so the relevance of 
any labor market hysteresis effects arising from the latest crisis is 
probably marginal. But extremely high youth unemployment is a 
major concern. However, it is not clear how far current proposals 
for reducing labor-market rigidities could help reduce youth 
unemployment. The real impediments to job creation are, in my 
view, a poor business climate and inadequate education systems, 
rather than existing labor legislation.  
Similarly, it is hard to think that expectations of deflation could 
form in SEE and trigger a further drop in aggregate demand. 
Perceived inflation is rather high, not low. Many households in 
this region spend their entire budget on food and utilities, 
displaying a rising medium-term price trend due to structural 
changes in food and energy production and distribution, and, in 
the case of utilities, a gradual removal of remaining price 
controls.  
With the exception of Turkey, credit growth in SEE is very 
weak, as both banks and their customers are in the process of 
repairing their balance sheets. This kind of adjustment after the 
bursting of credit and asset price bubbles is normal and in my 
view does not reflect rigidities in financial intermediation. 
Households and firms have to reduce their debt to more 
sustainable levels before they get in a position in which they can 
start borrowing again. And banks have to strengthen their capital 
and start cleaning up their balance sheets from nonperforming 
assets before they can resume lending. The faster this adjustment 
takes place, the sooner banks will begin to lend again.  
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Long delays in payments to suppliers––for instance, government 
institutions’ payments to SMEs for goods and services 
delivered––are arguably a bigger corporate liquidity issue in 
some SEE countries than firms’ access to bank credit. Rather 
than devising schemes to encourage banks to lend, governments 
could issue debt to repay promptly what they owe to the private 
sector. This would leave the public-debt level largely unchanged 
but would prevent many SMEs in SEE from going under, thus 
stimulating private sector activity and growth of the tax base––
all this without increasing private sector debt. 
External risks 
The risk that SEE gets pushed back into crisis as a result of 
exogenous shocks is in my view relatively small. Political 
conflict and instability, notably in relations between Russia and 
the Ukraine, is clearly weighing on the outlook. But we lack 
empirical benchmarks to assess the potential economic impact of 
such idiosyncratic shocks, whose effects depend crucially on the 
nature and duration of the conflict.  
Regarding political risks, the impact of any particular national 
election on market volatility is likely to be temporary. More 
generally, the impact of political developments in individual 
countries on trend investment is likely to be small, as investment 
rates have already been on a declining trend for some time for 
reasons not well understood. And political gridlock in some SEE 
countries reflects perhaps more the inability of institutions to 
adapt to changing circumstances than any particular election 
outcome.  
Weaker economic performance in Europe clearly does not help 
the already slow recovery in SEE. But a number of European 
markets are expanding: the United Kingdom is currently the 
fastest growing advanced economy; Nordic economies and 
Switzerland are also performing well; and Germany’s growth 
foundations remain sound despite some slowdown in mid-2014. 
Unless the slowdown in Europe is widespread and prolonged––
which doesn’t seem to be the case based on current consensus 
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forecasts and vulnerability assessments––it is not likely to lead 
to another crisis in SEE. 
Weaker economic performance outside Europe is a significant 
external risk. But based on the current outlook, the U.S. and 
Chinese economies are unlikely to be hit by macroeconomic or 
financial market shocks large enough to tip Europe into a new 
recession or a financial crisis.  
SEE countries could be more affected by contagion from a 
possible wider emerging-market turmoil. One source of 
contagion could be loss of confidence in EME local currency 
debt, which has become an important segment of global financial 
markets over the past few years. In particular, many 
multinational corporations from EMEs have reportedly become 
quasi-financial institutions: their overseas operations issue bonds 
in international markets, typically in U.S. dollars, and buy 
financial products in their own countries’ market instead of 
expanding their business. Low volatility, cheap funding costs, 
and strong demand for emerging market corporate bonds by 
global investors have supported such carry-trade type strategies.  
However, once U.S. interest rates start to rise, some EMEs could 
experience large capital outflows. Investor sentiment towards 
SEE assets could also deteriorate by association with emerging 
market debt. This effect is likely to be temporary; however, 
global investors have demonstrated on several occasions over the 
past few years that they quickly start to discriminate among 
emerging market debtors in periods of turmoil. For instance, 
SEE assets were generally not affected by the financial market 
“taper tantrum” of May–August 2013, unlike assets from Asian 
and Latin American EMEs.    
Another potential external shock in the period ahead relates to 
greater exchange-rate volatility. As monetary policies in the 
United States and the United Kingdom get normalized while the 
ECB and the Bank of Japan maintain their highly 
accommodative policies, exchange-rate volatility among major 
currencies is likely to increase. But with current monetary policy 
settings––and other things equal––the euro would tend to 
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weaken against the dollar in the near term, which would help 
euro area and SEE countries with exports and low inflation. But, 
depending on the composition of external assets and liabilities, it 
could also lead to valuation losses on SEE countries’ external 
balance sheets. 
Risk of repeating past mistakes 
In addition to domestic and external risks discussed above, there 
is also a risk of repeating past mistakes once growth in the region 
finally gains traction. In the private sector, this risk would arise 
if households, firms, and financial institutions resumed the 
borrowing, lending, investment, employment, and consumption 
decisions that resulted in misallocation of resources before the 
crisis. In the public sector, the main policy mistakes that could 
lead to a new crisis would be to abandon fiscal consolidation and 
structural reforms.  
With firms and households in most SEE countries still 
deleveraging and banks continuing to restructure their balance 
sheets, we are probably several years away from the start of a 
new credit cycle. The possibility that the economic recovery in 
SEE could lead to a new crisis via another credit and asset price 
boom, a surge in cross-border lending, and loss of 
competitiveness through wage inflation and real exchange-rate 
appreciation seems remote at the moment. The strengthening of 
global bank regulation and the experience that the authorities in 
SEE have gained with the use of macroprudential policies also 
provide reassurance that the most egregious consequences of a 
new credit boom could be avoided.  
The main concern would rather seem to be the public sector. One 
issue is that governments of highly indebted economies in the 
euro area and SEE are generally not doing enough to reduce 
public debt. Availability of cheap funding, since the sovereign 
debt crisis in the euro area was contained in August 2013, has 
reduced incentives for fiscal adjustment. Once global financing 
conditions start to tighten with the rise in dollar funding costs, 
concerns about debt sustainability will likely reemerge and make 
access to market funding much more difficult and expensive. 
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This could easily threaten the incipient recovery in the private 
sector. 
Another concern is that structural reforms remain incomplete and 
get postponed for some “better times.” This is particularly the 
case with health care and education reforms. These areas account 
for a significant share of public expenditure and are complicated 
to reform because they involve a large number of stakeholders 
with different interests, operating in environments often 
characterized by market failure. Most SEE countries also need to 
strengthen significantly their legal systems and judiciary, which 
are essential for improving the business climate.    
From the perspective of long-term economic growth, reforms of 
education—from primary and secondary school systems through 
universities—are crucial. Former socialist countries started their 
transition to a market economy with relatively solid human 
capital stock in industries such as energy, mining, manufacturing 
and construction, or in services such as health care. But after 
becoming successful low-cost manufacturing and outsourcing 
destinations for western European firms, these economies have 
so far largely failed to develop successful domestic industries 
based on homegrown entrepreneurship and innovation. To make 
this transition, it is essential to reform the often antiquated 
school and university curricula, especially in public 
administration, finance, economics, and business management. 
Due to bottlenecks in these areas, new EU member countries 
consistently fail even to spend all the EU funds that are allocated 
to them––unlike, in the past, the southern European countries 
such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain, which otherwise face 
similar structural challenges. At the same time, widespread 
corruption and lack of competition are raising the costs of 
projects that are being undertaken, for instance, in transportation 
infrastructure. Not least because of these deficiencies, the 
convergence process in SEE has stalled since 2008 (Figure 2).  
To respond to these challenges, it would be important for 
governments in SEE not to repeat the mistakes of their 
counterparts in southern Europe, who avoided the hard reforms 
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Figure 2. GDP per Capita at Current Prices, in U.S. Dollars 
(South-Eastern Europe as a percent of EU-10) 
 
   Sources: IMF, WEO, October 2014; author’s calculations. 
   Note: 
     SEE: simple average of Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey. 
     EU-10: simple average of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,  
   the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
 
of public administration and legal and educational systems after 
joining the EU. Otherwise, SEE countries risk remaining on the 
periphery of European economic development, where they have 
been for much of their recent history––except for the brief catch-
up phase from the mid-1990s to 2008.  
It is interesting to note in this context that central banks in SEE 
have generally managed the transition to best practices far better 
than their counterparts in government. But monetary policy is 
clearly not the answer to structural problems. Only prudent 
macroeconomic and financial stability policies and consistent 
implementation of structural reforms on the part of both 
government institutions and the private sector will make a 
difference.  
Panelist 3: Daniel Hardy, Advisor, Monetary and Capital 
Markets Department, IMF 
Especially the central bankers in this room appreciate the 
importance of choosing your words carefully: we would all like 
to revive growth and credit, but we do not want to revive growth 
in indebtedness. Adopting one expression rather than the other 
and using synonyms can convey very different impressions. 
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Indeed, growth in indebtedness is the single most reliable 
indicator of susceptibility to a financial crisis. Hence, it is quite 
meet and proper to discuss not only how to revive credit growth, 
but also whether to be concerned that these efforts may, in fact, 
increase vulnerabilities over time.  
In addition, right from the start, it is useful to be clear on time 
frame that we are talking about, and on the nature of a (financial) 
crisis. First, the probability of a crisis occurring in 2015 may 
differ greatly from the probabilities of crisis in 2016, 2017, etc. 
Second, the occurrence of a crisis requires both a trigger and a 
relevant vulnerability; one system may suffer a particular shock 
but survive it much better than another system with different 
characteristics. Here we are going to discuss both aspects, but 
policy can and should work more on increasing resilience than 
on reducing the probability of exogenous shocks that, inevitably, 
come as surprises. Eventually, some shock will occur, so we 
should be prepared. As the footballers say, after the game is 
before the game. Once we have gotten past one crisis, we need to 
start training and revise our tactics for the next crisis, and 
hopefully we can score 7:1 next time. 
Turning to near-term vulnerabilities, in some ways the situation 
of the financial system in Europe—and the CESEE countries, in 
particular—is less crisis-prone than it was in the mid-part of the 
past decade before the global crisis. There is a greater reliance on 
local financing, dollarization or euroization is less pronounced, 
many asset markets including real-estate markets are rather 
subdued, and many banks have built up substantial liquidity 
cushions. Part of this improvement reflects policy actions 
including the implementation of prudential measures in the 
financial sector and also central bank action. It is also 
noteworthy that the macro imbalances are less, and especially 
that current-account deficits are smaller; vulnerability to a 
combined external and financial crisis is reduced. There is also a 
greater confidence that the policymakers are willing to do 
whatever it takes to prevent an out-and-out collapse. That has 
been demonstrated quite forcefully. 
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As to the risk factors, some have already been mentioned. 
Obviously, political risk affects the CESEE region. This risk 
might be realized through a hike in energy prices and even a 
curtailment of supply. Another factor is the possibility of a 
slowdown in emerging markets. One of the more successful 
areas of the European economy in recent years has been the 
export sector, particularly towards the emerging markets. Even if 
countries like Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic do not 
export much directly to these markets, they are integrated into 
the export sector of, say, Germany, and thus are linked indirectly 
to demand conditions in emerging markets.  
While concern about high valuations in asset markets is absent in 
most of Europe, there are some exceptions. Policy actions have 
been taken and may have been successful in taking the edge off 
asset prices, such as in certain real estate markets. But what is 
more exceptional now is the extraordinary low spreads on some 
sovereign bonds, including those for Spain and Slovenia, which 
are perhaps a reflection of the great abundance of liquidity in the 
market and the lack of alternative investments, rather than an 
assessment of medium-term credit risks. This situation is 
unlikely to persist and could adjust back sharply; a reversal at 
least over the medium term is highly likely and could revive 
pressures on sovereigns and corporate borrowers.  
Mention has already been made of the danger that a prolonged 
period of low growth and even deflation, combined perhaps with 
future attempts to stimulate the economy with ever greater 
amount of liquidity, could in fact increase vulnerability to 
exogenous shocks. First, some signs can be detected of “search 
for yield” on a global scale, whereby assets move towards 
investments outside Europe that may look fine during times of 
ample liquidity and low interest rates but which could be 
revealed as much more risky when conditions revert to normal. 
Second, very low interest rates make high indebtedness 
sustainable even in a slow growth environment, but it is difficult 
to reduce those stocks. When, in due course, rates and risk 
premia revert back to normal levels, credit risk will re-intensify. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as mentioned yesterday, 
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profitability is so low for many European financial institutions—
not just in banking but also in some other sectors, such as life 
insurance—that it is very hard to build up the stocks of capital 
that are needed to achieve true, sustained resilience. Adequate 
profitability is a prerequisite to being able to recover from a 
series shocks, and not just from a one-off hit. This low 
profitability is partly a matter of the inherited stock of poorly 
performing loans, that is, of having to make hefty provisions, but 
reflects also low spreads, a very flat term structure, and low fee 
income.  
Let us consider now some relevant developments and potential 
risk factors outside Europe. Several significant trends can be 
identified. One is that, although markets individually do not look 
far out of balance, the synchronicity of unusual phenomenon is 
unsettling. Thus, we see exceptionally low volatility in many 
financial markets at the moment (and it is worth bearing in mind 
that emerging market debt is particularly susceptible to 
fluctuations in volatility); at the same time we see very high 
equity valuations in the United States compared to projected 
covered earnings; and also corporate bond yields are very low, 
such that the spreads do not currently compensate for typical 
through the cycle loss rates. Again, no one phenomenon 
represents a massive anomaly, but many parts are coming 
together.  
More structurally, the years since the crisis have witnessed 
strong growth in the assets managed by mutual funds, and the 
increasing concentration of mutual funds, often with rather 
similar portfolios. The top 10 largest family asset managers 
control, it is estimated, about US$19 trillion of assets, which is a 
fair amount of money even by world standards. Many of these 
funds are very “benchmark sensitive,” as in the case of 
exchange-rated funds. Many may also incur more liquidity risk 
than is commonly appreciated; especially should overall market 
conditions tighten. The exposure arises because it is easy for an 
investor to withdraw savings, but if many of these funds have to 
redeem a lot in a hurry, markets would be affected and prices 
would start falling. The markets for the securities held by these 
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funds may be liquid on the margin, but may be disrupted by 
large coincident portfolio shifts. 
Asset holdings by the public sector, namely central banks and 
sovereign wealth funds, show comparable similarities. 
Concentrated holdings in a few asset classes and homogenous 
behavior are often warning signs in financial markets. When 
people start behaving in the same way, they may also change 
behavior in the same way and provoke a sudden shift. And if you 
are anticipating that the others will change their behavior, you 
may want to front-run that change and accelerate the shift.  
In these circumstances, policymakers face a policy balancing act: 
if they undertake too little stimulus, the result may be low 
growth, heavy indebtedness, low profitability, and no (real 
sector) risk-taking by financial institutions. Vulnerability is 
increased because of what might be termed market rigidities. 
However, if the authorities undertake too much stimulus, then 
one may see imprudent search for yield, too much leveraging of 
balance sheets, and too much financial risk-taking. Vulnerability 
to an eventual sudden rebalance is increased.  
To sum up, exogenous shocks may well occur, though there is 
not much that policymakers in this region can do about them. In 
the short term, it seems that endogenous risks in this region are 
low. However, resilience is now not as good as we would like, 
and resilience may not be being built up as quickly as we would 
like. 
So we come back to some rather familiar themes in policy advice 
aimed at reducing vulnerability to a new crisis. Number one is 
the urgent necessity of tackling the inherited stock of poor-
quality corporate debt. The second is the development of 
macroprudential instruments for both boom and bust conditions 
that are truly usable. Many efforts are going into that but the 
usability of some instruments is still an open question. And the 
third theme relates to the need to eliminate excess capacities in 
the banking system in an orderly manner, so that banks can 
restore their profitability and therefore contribute to both 
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sustained financial sector resilience and reliable intermediation. 
Thank you. 
C. Discussions 
Following the presentations, participants from the floor raised 
important issues for discussion by the members of the panel.  
 There was broad consensus among participants that the 
CESEE financial sector remains vulnerable because of 
(i) generally weak macroeconomic conditions in the 
region and in Europe more widely, and (ii) incomplete 
recovery from the global crisis. The persistence of 
sluggish growth was seen to be at the heart of this 
vulnerability. 
 A major endogenous shock arising within the region was 
viewed as unlikely to occur in the near term, with only a 
slight risk of a boom-and-bust cycle. Rather, participants 
believed that shocks were more likely to come from 
outside, in the form of: (i) geopolitical developments 
leading to a disruption in trade; (ii) a revival in concerns 
over sovereign risk; or (iii) a rapid increase in (U.S.) 
interest rates. 
 One participant wondered whether EMEs have now 
reached a size where they can play a major stabilizing 
role in the world economy.   
 Returning to Europe, views were exchanged on the 
connection between structural reforms, investment, and 
fiscal policy. There was agreement on the need for 
structural reforms in Europe in order to raise the trend 
growth rate and address structural unemployment. It was 
noted that the United States still has a big advantage in 
the availability of venture capital, flexibility in labor 
markets, and the dynamism of the high-tech sector. 
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 Several participants remarked that sovereign bond 
spreads, and bond spreads generally, were very low, 
with markets seeming to attach almost zero probability 
to the chance of a euro area break-up or sovereign credit 
event. They were concerned that this attitude was 
excessively sanguine and could be reversed abruptly. 
Panelists’ responses to questions and comments 
Vulnerabilities. One panelist observed that the major 
vulnerability was the overhang of government debt in many 
countries and, in some cases, the corporate or household debt 
overhang. The overhangs also put a drag on growth and limit the 
scope for fiscal policy activism. A negative feedback loop exists: 
high indebtedness discourages investment and growth; but. In 
their absence, it is difficult to reduce indebtedness. The situation 
is currently sustainable in an environment of very low interest 
rates, ample central bank liquidity, and limited demand for new 
credit. The absolute level of rates is low by historical standards, 
and recently spreads have been compressed. For now, borrowers 
can roll over debt cheaply, and the pressure for adjustment is 
lessened. Hence, the situation could deteriorate rapidly if all 
rates and, in particular, risk spreads rise rapidly. 
A factor contributing to vulnerabilities is that low interest rates 
increase the attractiveness of debt financing, rather than the use 
of equity. Certain sectors are clearly overleveraged, although it is 
difficult to establish empirically what would be an optimal level 
of leverage for households, corporates, and the public sector in 
the various CESEE countries. The lower prospects for growth 
and inflation in much of the region, and, arguably, greater long-
term uncertainties suggest that the optimum has shifted towards 
greater reliance on equity. 
Role of EMEs. Panelists responded to the question on the role 
EMEs can play in stabilizing the world economy. In the past, the 
EMEs were very prone to contagion from adverse developments 
in advanced economies and especially U.S. monetary policy. 
Massive capital inflows would overheat their economies, which 
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would then be plunged back into crisis when U.S. policy 
tightened and the capital flows stopped or even reversed. The 
biggest EMEs now have large domestic economies, and many 
are less dependent on capital inflows and have built up large 
buffers. Thus, as seen to some extent already in 2008, a truly 
global recession is less likely than in the past because the EMEs 
are more robust to the developments in advanced economies.  
Structural reforms, investment, and fiscal policy. One panelist 
suggested that structural reforms, which impose extra costs on 
certain sections of the population at least in the short term, 
should be accompanied by a fiscal stimulus and, at a minimum, a 
strengthened social safety net. Another argued that there was 
currently no “fiscal room” for such measures in most CESEE 
countries. Indeed, current account spending in the small open 
economies of the region has a multiplier close to zero, and past 
experience suggests that structural deficits were consistently 
underestimated because they were masked by unsustainable 
cyclical effects. Hence, what could help is an expansion in public 
sector investment, and possibly the promotion of private sector 
investment, even while overall fiscal consolidation is pursued.  
The situation in Europe. The discussion ended on a positive 
note, based on the view that the EBA/ECB-led stress testing 
exercise and AQR were being conducted to high standards. The 
publication of results (at the time forthcoming) would reassure 
markets and the public at large that the European banks are 
generally robust and that the authorities have in place measures 
to deal with remaining weaknesses. The Single Supervisory 
Mechanism should, over time, enhance the resilience and 
efficiency of the banking system in the euro area and Europe 
more generally. 
 
  201  
 
VIII.   KEYNOTE SPEAKERS 
 
A.   European Perspective 
Benoit Coeuré, Member of the Executive Board, ECB 
What is needed is to revive the euro area economy 
recapitalization and also to repair private-sector balance sheets. 
The banking sector is undergoing a necessary process of 
structural reforms. With the conclusion of the comprehensive 
assessment, there is potential to ensure that credit supply 
constraints diminish and the cycle turns. 
For a stronger rebound in investment, the private nonfinancial 
sector needs to raise equity. One instrument especially for SMEs 
is to allow EU investment funds to be distributed in the form of 
equity and not only in the form of debt, as the EBRD and the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) already do in many 
countries. Also, the fragmentation in venture capital markets 
should be reduced. 
For smaller firms with the need to deleverage, debt-for-equity 
swaps—possibly fostered by tax incentives—could facilitate 
private-debt workouts. 
What is also needed is to raise productivity. An “upward shock” 
to total factor productivity is needed but only possible in highly 
competitive markets. 
Introduction 
Across Europe credit growth is weak. In most central and eastern 
European countries, credit is either stagnant or growing at low 
rates. In many countries of the euro area, credit to the private 
sector is even in negative territory. The reasons for this are 
several; but at the heart is a vicious circle of low growth, low 
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investment and low credit. And the challenge facing 
policymakers today is how to break it.  
The current policy debate is largely focused on the credit 
dimension. And indeed, there is evidence that creditless 
recoveries, while not as rare as sometimes contemplated, are 
much less common in high income, financially developed 
economies than in low income countries. As European 
economies heavily depend on bank loans, it stands to reason that 
the recent weak credit performance of Europe is contributing low 
economic growth rates.  
It is, nevertheless, important that reinvigorating credit growth is 
not seen as an end in itself. Research based on international 
evidence suggests that a fast-growing banking sector can be 
detrimental to aggregate productivity growth. And we have seen 
in the euro area that credit growth that leads to the wrong type of 
investment creates financial imbalances eventually leading to 
crises, while doing little to support long-term economic 
performance.  
Indeed, the 1999–2007 period saw a positive correlation between 
the initial level of GDP per capita and average total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth rates. The highest TFP growth rates 
were found in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland, 
while in the “catching-up” economies (Spain, Greece, Portugal, 
and Ireland) TFP actually declined. An important explanation for 
this is that capital in the latter economies flowed 
disproportionately into the nontradable/services sector, which in 
general has lower productivity growth. Investment was highest 
in the construction and real-estate sectors, closely followed by 
retail, transport, and leisure. 
This experience shows us that the quality of credit matters as 
much as the quantity and it implies that policymakers should 
focus on a broader question than just reviving credit––namely, 
“how can we channel savings towards productive investment?” 
This focus on investment is warranted because, in the short run, 
it is key to boosting demand and creating a self-sustaining 
recovery. And over the longer run, ensuring that investment is 
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efficiently allocated helps create a virtuous circle between 
productivity and credit, thus avoiding mistakes of the past.  
Achieving this requires a policy agenda that encompasses both 
credit supply and demand factors. It requires that we unclog and 
diversify the channels of financial intermediation in the euro 
area; that we recapitalize the economy through both reducing 
debt and raising equity; and that we have a policy mix that 
makes borrowing to invest worthwhile.  
In other words, it requires a comprehensive approach. And what 
I would like to do this afternoon is to sketch out for you what 
such a comprehensive approach could look like, drawing on the 
lessons learned from the crisis and the post-crisis adjustment.  
Fixing the credit channel 
The starting point is logically the financial sector, and here we 
are confronting a changing landscape: the European banking 
sector is undergoing a necessary and largely unavoidable process 
of structural change. Banks are adopting less-risky business 
models, moving to more deposit-based funding strategies, and 
strengthening their equity capital. As a result, there is a clear 
trend towards an overall smaller and less-leveraged banking 
industry.  
While there are several benefits to this process, it also presents 
an important question, which is how we can have more credit for 
productive firms, but less leveraged banks.  
The medium-term solution is for both banks and capital markets 
to adapt to the new environment. For banks, this means 
refocusing their business models and taking advantage of IT 
developments to improve risk management and lower operating 
costs. We will always need strong banks in the euro area, as they 
play an essential role in situations where information cannot be 
standardized or where state verification is costly, for example, in 
lending to SMEs.  
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The main challenge in capital markets is to expand market access 
for firms across the euro area. This is to some extent already 
happening organically, as firms that can issue diversify their 
funding sources, but it is uneven: bond issuance is strongly 
concentrated in countries and among firms where bank lending 
constraints are lowest. As the ECB has argued on several 
occasions, this is one reason why we need to urgently focus on 
creating the legal and regulatory framework for a genuine single 
market in capital in Europe.  
Essentially, what we are aiming for is a more balanced financing 
mix in which firms have a greater ability to substitute bank and 
market finance, and hence intermediation becomes more 
contestable and resilient. I would, however, emphasize that 
balance is key; we should not view market finance as a cure-all. 
Indeed, there is some research to suggest that too much 
substitution towards market finance may lead to less total 
borrowing, as firms that replace bank loans with bond issuance 
internalize the fact that this type of borrowing will be harder to 
restructure in bad times. Besides, Europe does not have a set of 
institutions consistent with a fully market-based allocation of 
savings, such as funded pension schemes.  
In any event, a more diversified financing mix is realistically a 
project for tomorrow. We are now seeing signs that credit 
demand is picking up, making it imperative that nascent demand 
is not choked off by credit supply constraints. Our focus today 
therefore has to be on bank finance, namely ensuring that it can 
continue to fund the real economy even as banks downsize and 
restructure. And this is where two current policy initiatives come 
in.  
The first is the comprehensive assessment of bank balance 
sheets, which has the potential to ensure that supply constraints 
diminish as the cycle turns this year. One purpose of the 
assessment is to steer the deleveraging process towards a “good” 
form––i.e., banks quickly carving out nonperforming assets and 
raising equity—which international experience suggests leads to 
a faster rebound in credit to viable firms. Indeed, empirical 
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research suggests that the oft-heard view that higher bank capital 
leads to lower loan supply is not accurate. Long-run evidence for 
Germany, for example, finds that higher bank capital tends to be 
associated with higher business loan volume, with no evidence 
of a negative effect.  
While the exercise will only conclude next month, we can 
already see signs that it has affected both the speed and quality 
of deleveraging. Whereas from 2011 to 2012 asset deleveraging 
accounted for only 0.1 percentage point of a 1.3 percent increase 
in banks’ Core Tier 1 ratios, from 2012 to 2013 (i.e., after the 
assessment was launched) it accounted for 1.0 percentage point 
of the overall increase of 1.2 percent. Capital increases 
accounted for about half the increase over the two years. This 
acceleration of the process suggests that, once the final results 
are known and residual uncertainty is removed, banks will be in 
a stronger position to resume new lending.  
The second ongoing initiative is the full roll-out of the ECB’s 
credit easing package, which aims to encourage banks to use 
their new balance sheet space for lending to the real economy.  
The TLTROs have a built-in incentive mechanism to encourage 
loans to firms and households, and we expect a stronger take-up 
from banks in the December 2014 operation and in the six 
subsequent installments until June 2016. And our programs to 
purchase outright high-quality ABS and covered bonds 
complement this by providing market incentives for banks to 
originate more saleable securities, and thus more loans to 
collateralize them.  
In short, the combination of these two initiatives results in a 
confluence of factors––improved incentives and higher capital––
that should allow loan supply to expand elastically to meet loan 
demand. And to the extent that credit supply and demand are 
endogenous—for instance, through the effect of supply 
constraints on macroeconomic risk—we could see the 
beginnings of a self-sustaining credit recovery.  
  206  
I would, nonetheless, question whether a credit recovery is 
enough to achieve an investment recovery, and hence a sustained 
recovery for the economy. If we look at the breakdown of credit 
demand components in the survey data, fixed investment is only 
having a mildly positive effect on demand after 11 quarters of 
negative effects. And this demand may well be “backward-
looking”––that is, delayed projects coming back online. From a 
“forward-looking” perspective, there are reasons to be cautious 
about the degree of pent-up investment demand.  
Principal among these is that, while banks might have 
deleveraged, not all of their customers have. In several euro area 
countries firms still face a debt overhang that affects the 
economics of taking on new credit.  
Real interest rates in the euro area are expected to decrease, as 
nominal interest rates will remain low for a long period while 
inflation is expected to gradually rise back towards 2 percent. 
But the issue for over-indebted firms is that long-term real 
interest rates probably cannot go low enough to make new 
investment attractive: any profits generated will be absorbed by 
servicing existing debt. Indeed, we see a clear negative 
correlation––with a coefficient of 0.48 between corporate debt-
to-GDP levels in different countries at the beginning of the crisis 
and the evolution of nonresidential investment since.  
Repairing private-sector balance sheets 
If we want to see a stronger rebound in investment across the 
euro area, the next step therefore has to be repairing nonfinancial 
private-sector balance sheets. And as this process will take place 
against the backdrop of low inflation and, in the most affected 
countries, limited fiscal space, it will have to involve reductions 
in nominal debt.  
The rebooting of the financial sector that has already taken place 
puts us in a better position to achieve this. When the 
comprehensive assessment concludes, banks will acknowledge 
losses and raise provisions and capital. After the disclosure of 
the results, capital shortfalls are expected to be covered within 
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six months for the AQR or the baseline stress test scenario, and 
within nine months for the adverse stress test scenario. Thus, 
from the bank side, restructuring loans to distressed borrowers 
should become more feasible.  
What we need going forward is more efficient debt restructuring 
and insolvency regimes for firms, which at present vary widely 
between euro area countries. The effectiveness of the 
restructuring regimes is often hampered by sluggish creditor 
coordination, a lack of new financing for viable companies 
undergoing restructuring and an overburdened judicial system. 
For example, according to the World Bank, to resolve insolvency 
in Italy takes 1.8 years compared with just 0.4 years in Ireland.  
A number of stressed countries have already begun to take 
initiatives to improve restructuring and insolvency proceedings. 
In Greece, for example, facilitating debt workouts for viable 
companies is being made simpler by two new out-of-court debt 
restructuring tools: one for larger enterprises that includes a 
multi-creditor coordination mechanism inspired by international 
standards; and one for SMEs that employs standardized 
templates.  
In Spain, the substantial amendment to the Insolvency Law 
earlier this year, among other things, makes facilitating out-of-
court settlements easier while also making in-court settlements 
more effective. Court approved refinancing agreements now 
have lower majority requirements and permit the extension of 
maturities on bank loans, negotiating haircuts and arranging 
debt-for-equity swaps. Ireland and Portugal have also introduced 
various measures targeted at enterprises, SMEs, and households.  
In most cases, however, restructuring and insolvency regimes 
could be made more efficient still by adopting best practice more 
broadly. This would include, inter alia, strengthening measures 
to facilitate out-of-court settlements for viable firms; introducing 
centralized guidelines for voluntary debt workouts coupled with 
independent intermediation for larger companies; and 
establishing standardized voluntary workouts for SMEs.  
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The deleveraging of European firms is, however, not only about 
reducing debt; it is first and foremost about raising equity. We 
have in fact already seen a significant decline in debt-to-equity 
ratios for larger euro area corporates since end-2009 due to 
valuation gains in equity markets, supported by low interest 
rates. To the extent that our new monetary policy measures 
affect the relative supply of financial assets and initiate further 
portfolio rebalancing, we may see further spillovers to equity 
markets that continue this trend.  
For smaller firms, however, these channels are less powerful, as 
equity markets are largely underdeveloped. Raising equity 
therefore has to be a more proactive process.  
One way to achieve this is to use debt-for-equity swaps (fostered 
possibly through tax incentives) to facilitate private debt 
workouts. Another is for EU investment funds to be distributed 
in the form of equity as well as debt, as the EBRD and IFC 
already do in many countries, and as I called for in a recent 
article. A third, more medium-term aim is reducing 
fragmentation in European venture capital markets to increase 
the depth of private equity markets.  
This last point is another example of where advancing towards a 
single market in capital would be beneficial for the euro area; it 
would not only help strengthen capital markets relative to banks, 
but also help strengthen equity funding relative to debt. This 
would also have positive structural effects for the euro area: 
cross-country integration through equity improves risk-sharing 
and, as it is harder for investors to “cut and run,” would most 
likely provide more resilience in a crisis than integration through 
interbank lending and fixed income investment. New research 
shows that the vulnerability of the euro area to a “sudden stop” 
worsened the crisis by further constraining the fiscal reaction of 
governments during the downturn.  
While such options to increase equity funding are being 
developed, a strategy that can improve debt dynamics for all 
firms is to raise “implied equity”––the outlook for future income. 
If firms expect higher income, it improves their debt-to-income 
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ratios and debt service capacity, which in turn creates space for 
new investment. In this sense, raising both the level and trend of 
potential growth is an integral part of recapitalizing European 
firms, and indeed of the economy as whole.  
We face, however, a circular problem in the euro area. We need 
higher potential growth to work through the debt overhang so 
that firms can begin investing again; but that investment is itself 
necessary to raise potential growth. And this circle is potentially 
vicious; if low potential growth leads to lower investment, then it 
further lowers potential growth.  
A policy mix to lift investment demand 
This is where the next part of a comprehensive approach comes 
in––getting the policy mix right on the supply side of the 
economy to lift investment demand.  
In a basic Solow growth model, investment grows at the growth 
rate of productivity plus the growth rate of hours worked along 
the steady state path of the economy. As we can only expect 
limited labor participation gains in an ageing society, to raise 
investment demand, we therefore have to raise productivity. 
Indeed, achieving an upward shock to TFP seems to me essential 
to trigger, in a sustainable way, a positive accelerator effect 
between productivity, investment and credit.  
But it requires an environment characterized by two things—
competition and certainty.  
Competitive markets are necessary to ensure that investment and 
productivity are indeed mutually enhancing, which as I said 
earlier is not a given: high investment in several euro area 
countries in the pre-crisis period did not lead to a convergence in 
TFP. Certainly, an important reason for this was that too much 
capital flowed into real estate. But misallocation also resulted 
from low levels of competition in the non-tradable/services 
sector more generally, which distorted price signals. As some 
firms could capture excess rents, a falling marginal product of 
capital was counterbalanced by rising profit margins, meaning 
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that total compensation from investing in these sectors remained 
high.  
So the flipside of productive investment is more competitive 
markets that produce more accurate price signals, thus drawing 
resources to where they are most efficiently employed. 
Achieving this requires not only product and labor market 
reforms that accelerate the “churn” process within and across 
sectors, but also reducing unnecessary regulations that hinder the 
allocation and reallocation of resources.  
The World Bank’s “Doing Business” report gives examples such 
obstacles.18 If an entrepreneur wants to start a new business in 
Spain, she has to go through 10 separate procedures, while doing 
so in Slovenia requires only 2. If a firm wants to launch a green-
field investment, it would have to wait 200 calendar days in 
Ireland before a new warehouse gets electricity; in Germany, it 
would have to wait only 17 days.  
There are reasons to be optimistic about the effects of a reform 
process in the euro area. Recent micro-level research from the 
euro system’s Competitiveness Network, for instance, shows that 
there is a large and skewed distribution between the most and 
least productive firms in individual euro area countries. Far from 
being normally distributed, there are a few highly productive 
firms and many which have low productivity. This implies that a 
faster and more efficient reallocation across firms and sectors 
could be quite powerful.  
Where certainty complements this process is by fixing 
expectations: the more that firms trust that structural reforms will 
be followed through vigorously, the more they will be inclined to 
                                                 
18 World Bank (2013), Doing Business 2014: Understanding Regulations for Small- and Medium-
Sized Enterprises. 
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invest on that basis. Put differently, certainty allows the positive 
medium-term effects of structural reforms to be brought forward 
into the present. The fact that euro area corporates are currently 
holding record amounts of cash, rather than investing, suggests 
that plans for structural reforms are not yet credible enough to 
reap this “certainty dividend.”  
Certainty also extends to tax policy. Remember that what matters 
for firms when deciding whether to invest is the after-tax return 
on investment. Thus, if firms expect the burden of future taxation 
to rise, the internal rate of return on a given project is lowered, 
effectively canceling out the stimulating effect of lower interest 
rates on investment. And by contrast, a lower expected tax 
burden increases the effectiveness of any monetary policy 
measures.  
But certainty means also that we stick to our commitments. 
Indeed, sticking to our own commitments has to become the 
hallmark of the euro area. The ECB will continue to provide a 
nominal anchor to the euro area recovery by delivering its 
primary mandate to bring inflation back to a growth rate of 
below but close to 2 percent. It is essential that, in parallel, all 
countries follow the rules outlined in the Stability and Growth 
Pact and in the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure and that 
these rules are not stretched to the point where they would lose 
credibility.  
Conclusion 
My main message today is simple: we need to focus on the 
quality of credit, not only the quantity.  
To create an environment where credit flows to productive 
investment requires a coherent and comprehensive approach. It 
requires managing the bank deleveraging process while the euro 
area transitions to a more-balanced financing mix. It requires 
finding workable solutions to reduce the debt overhang involving 
both reducing debt and raising equity. And it requires acting on 
the basic determinants of investment demand, namely 
productivity.  
  212  
Fortunately, all the pieces of the jigsaw are now in place to 
achieve such an approach. Banks are approaching the end of 
their deleveraging. This is creating a better-capitalized sector 
that can facilitate restructuring. And we have an emerging 
consensus on the importance of supply-side policies to boost 
growth potential. We now simply need to put those pieces 
together. 
B.   Outside Perspective/Lessons from Other Parts of 
the World 
Guillermo Ortiz, Former Central Bank Governor and 
Minister of Finance of Mexico 
Introduction 
Good evening. I would like to thank the Bank of Slovenia, in 
particular Governor Jazbec, as well as the International 
Monetary Fund for the invitation to participate in this seminar on 
Reinvigorating Credit Growth in Central, Eastern, and Southern 
European Economies. It is a pleasure for me to share with you 
the challenges we had to face in Mexico, during and after the 
financial crisis known as the Tequila Crisis. I hope the lessons 
we learned in Mexico can be useful for your own reflections. 
Although the structures of our real economies are indeed very 
different, I think our financial systems share to some extent, for 
good and for bad, the costs and benefits of being directly 
integrated with much larger neighboring ones: the United States 
in our case, and the core EU in yours. And those similarities may 
induce common challenges for policy making. 
 
The Tequila Crisis: the Short-Run Response 
In my view, the “Mexican Tequila Crisis” of 1994 to 1995, 
which as you know had nothing to do with Tequila, began with 
Mexico’s “Original Sin.” Of course, “Original Sin” is not meant 
here in a biblical sense, but in the way Eichengreen and 
Haussman defined it 15 years ago, as the inability of emerging 
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economies to fund themselves in their own currency.19 That sin 
eventually led to high external-debt ratios, engendered currency 
mismatches and eventually ended up in a financial crisis. 
A financial crisis involves macroeconomic stock disequilibria 
and national balance-sheet imbalances. This is essentially 
different from standard balance-of-payment crises, which 
involve just flow disequilibria and normally require only 
exchange-rate adjustments and supportive macro policies. As a 
consequence, a financial crisis typically involves: strong 
movements in credit volumes and asset prices; severe disruptions 
in financial intermediation leading to liquidity deterioration; 
forced asset sales at fire-sale discounts; large-scale balance sheet 
problems of firms, households, intermediaries and/or the 
sovereign; and large-scale public liquidity support and 
recapitalization.20 
Unfortunately, as Reinhart and Rogoff21 as well as others have 
argued, it takes a long time for output to return to pre-crisis 
levels in the wake of a financial crisis. Therefore, the economy is 
expected to have a slow-paced recovery. This was the case in 
Mexico in the mid-1990s and in Europe in the post-Lehman 
crisis.  
The Tequila crisis was a classic case of a sudden stop. In Mexico 
at the beginning of the 1990s, a fixed exchange rate and a very 
positive economic outlook fostered by NAFTA, together with a 
set of market-friendly reforms, led to an abundance of capital 
flows, allowing Mexican banks to tap international markets in 
large amounts. The combination of abundant liquidity, 
macroeconomic stability, financial deregulation, lack of proper 
                                                 
19 See Eichengreen and Hausmann (2002). 
20 See Ortiz (2014). 
21 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
  214  
supervision, and eager-but-inexperienced private-sector bankers 
proved to be fatal. Banks extended large numbers of loans 
without sufficient credit analysis and with both currency and 
maturity mismatches. 
In 1994, the financial framework was weakening and the country 
suffered two major shocks: (i) on the domestic front, the leading 
candidate in the presidential election was assassinated; and 
(ii) on the foreign front, the Federal Funds rate increased from 3 
to 6 percent. Both events triggered large capital outflows. 
As a result, the fixed exchange rate regime prevailing at that time 
did not provide the government with much room to maneuver. 
The peso-dollar exchange rate depreciated 92 percent by mid-
March 1995. Borrowers stopped servicing their debts and 
depositors withdrew resources from the financial system on a 
large scale, although annual interest rates spiked at 80 percent. 
The result was the collapse of the banking system and a very 
deep recession. 
The severity of the crisis forced the authorities to act quickly to 
stabilize the exchange rate and to reduce the risk of bank runs. In 
this context, I want to highlight six actions: 
1) The Mexican government sought international 
support, and achieved an unprecedented 
US$50 billion rescue package, consisting of 
US$20 billion from the U.S. government, 
US$17.5 billion from the IMF, and the rest from 
other international organizations. 
2) As the central bank had run out of reserves, we had 
to adopt a flexible exchange rate regime—80 percent 
of government liabilities were foreign. 
3) A very restrictive fiscal austerity package was put in 
place to close the balance-of-payment deficit and 
regain investors’ confidence. 
4) A U.S. dollar liquidity window was created to help 
banks service their obligations. 
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5) A temporary capitalization program was introduced 
to allow several banks to improve their capital-asset 
ratio, as well as capitalization and loan purchase 
mechanisms; several banks were intervened. 
6) Finally, support programs for debtors were put in 
place to help borrowers reschedule their debts, and 
to avoid the costly consequences of the proliferation 
of a so-called “nonpayment culture.” 
The last three actions were explicitly directed to support the 
banking system. 
In sum, the short-run program adopted by Mexico during the 
Tequila Crisis was characterized by an overshooting both in 
adjustment and finance. The main features of the program 
eventually became a model by the IMF for dealing with 
subsequent financial crisis. 
The aftermath of the Tequila Crisis: strengthening the 
institutional framework 
Once the worst part of the crisis was over, the government 
embarked on a series of deep modifications to achieve the 
recovery on the basis of three basic pillars: (i) a sustainable fiscal 
policy; (ii) credible monetary and exchange rate policies; and 
(iii) a stronger financial sector. 
Pillar One: a sustainable fiscal policy 
On the fiscal side, the Mexican government achieved quite low 
fiscal deficits, going from more than 5 percent of GDP in the late 
1990s to a balanced budget by the mid-2000s. In addition, in 
recent years fiscal responsibility laws have been passed aimed at 
achieving fiscal balance over the economic cycle. 
Pillar Two: credible monetary and exchange rate policies 
At the beginning, some controversy took place within the 
Mexican government as to whether a truly free-floating 
exchange rate regime was feasible at all, since no other EM 
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country had adopted such a regime at the time, and there were 
widespread fears that the deep financial integration with the 
United States could be a special source of instability. Once the 
‘yes’ side came through, we were able to develop a monetary 
policy and exchange-rate framework that included: (i) an 
independent central bank whose main objective was to reduce 
inflation and gain credibility; (ii) the establishment of an 
inflation-target framework; and (iii) a mostly hands-off approach 
to achieve a fully flexible exchange rate regime. This allowed 
the country to experience single-digit inflation in the year 2000, 
and it then became a stationary process in 2001.22 
Moreover, the Foreign Exchange Commission––formed by the 
central bank and the Ministry of Finance––in charge of FX 
policy, adopted an almost hands-free approach towards the 
exchange rate. I say “almost” because, in stormy times of higher 
global volatility, the authority implemented preannounced and 
predictable interventions to restore U.S. dollar/Mexican peso 
market liquidity, but not to set a level for the exchange rate. On 
top of that, the central bank accumulated foreign reserves, which 
surged from less than US$10 billion by year-end 1995, to nearly 
US$200 billion in August 2014.23 
Probably, the most unexpected consequence of the free-floating 
regime was the extraordinary depth and liquidity that the FX 
market acquired in the course of just a few years. For instance, 
the daily global turnover in the Mexican peso market increased 
from below US$5 billion in 1994 to US$135 billion in 2013, 
making the Mexican peso the eighth most-traded currency 
according to BIS statistics.24 
                                                 
22 See Chiquiar, Noriega, and Ramos Francia (2007). 
23 Source: Banco de México. 
24 See BIS (2014). 
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Pillar three: a stronger financial sector  
Healthy public finances and responsible monetary policy 
allowed for the development of a liquid local-currency-
denominated bond market––ending up with the Original Sin. The 
government strategy to develop this market started with the 
issuance of a three-year fixed-rate, peso-denominated bond back 
in year 2000––the birth of “Mbonos.” At the same time, 
“Formadores de Mercado” or primary dealers were created in 
order to provide liquidity in the secondary market. With a very 
well-defined coupon payment and issuance calendar structure, 
and a gradual approach towards increasing the maturities 
according to market conditions, the government was able to 
increase the average maturity of local debt from 200 days in 
1994, to almost 8 years currently. This is above the U.S. debt 
maturity profile. 
In this context, the ratio of external debt to Mexican GDP went 
from the aforementioned 80 percent, to its current ratio of 
30 percent. Mexico experienced a “baptism of fire” and 
redemption from the “Original Sin” in October 2006, when a 30-
year Mbono was successfully issued. There is now a well-
defined yield curve that spans up to 30-year maturities. The span 
of the curve and the total convertibility of the peso are almost 
unique features among large EMEs and a strong source of 
demand from global asset managers. Their long position on 
Mbonos has induced a vibrant market for peso-denominated 
interest rate swaps; for instance, although trades in peso 
instruments are not yet required by Dodd-Frank legislation to be 
centrally cleared, the CME opened such a clearing facility at the 
end of last year and the open interest in peso IRS has already 
reached US$14 billion. Another interesting feature that attracted 
more foreign investors in their global search for yield was that 
Mbonos are now euro-clearable.  
The government reformed the pension fund system, from a pay-
as-you-go, to an individual account fully-funded system in 1993. 
Later on, the investment regime of these funds, called Afores, 
has been changed several times to allow the managers to 
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diversify the pensioners’ portfolios, from only investing in 
government bonds to a more diversified financial instruments 
portfolio. Today the Afores have 12.5 percent of GDP of assets 
under management and are the most important institutional 
component of the local buy side of the financial markets. 
Financial regulation and supervision also played a very 
important role in maintaining a complete macrostability 
framework. In this context, having restrictive but effective 
regulation and supervision schemes, it was relatively easy to 
implement Basel II and, later on, Basel III capital requirements.  
Another important feature was foreign bank participation. 
Financial restrictions to acquire large Mexican financial 
institutions were lifted in 1998. In this context, the foreign bank 
participation rate in Mexico increased from 2 percent in 1995, to 
82 percent by 2002. For some policymakers, it made sense to 
leave the Mexican financial system in the hands of foreigners, 
particularly because of what had happened during the 1994–95 
painful episode. In addition, they also considered other potential 
benefits in terms of innovation, better risk management and 
access to capital. Nevertheless, several formal studies have found 
evidence that––even though some benefits have been achieved––
it has been at the expense of leaving several population groups 
out of the banking sector reach.25 
In summary, achieving a healthy fiscal stance, with responsible 
monetary policy in a full-fledged flexible exchange rate regime, 
with a strong financial regulation scheme, along the same lines 
as the creation of a liquid peso-denominated debt market, are in 
my view responsible for the rock-solid macroeconomic 
framework Mexico currently enjoys. 
                                                 
25 See Stiglitz (2005), and Beck and Martínez Peria (2008). 
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In fact, the aforementioned new institutional framework was 
recently put to the test by the 2008–09 global financial crisis. 
Even though Mexico’s GDP fell 4.7 percent in 2009, no banks 
filed for bankruptcy. In addition, the peso depreciated around 
50 percent at some point, and inflation did not surpass 
6.3 percent; because, for the first time in our economic history, 
inflation expectations remained well anchored in the face of a 
sharp devaluation. Consequently, the economy recovered quite 
quickly. This was probably the most effective test of the 
resilience of our new exchange rate regime and financial 
institutions.  
The negative legacy of the Tequila Crisis: creditless low growth 
In the aftermath of the Tequila Crisis, Mexico experienced a 
creditless recovery, which has proved to be a lasting legacy and 
has contributed to a growth rate below potential. Commercial 
bank credit to the (nonfinancial) private sector, as a percentage 
of GDP, fell from nearly 30 percent in 1994 on the brink of the 
crisis to a level below 7 percent by 2002. Later on, Mexico has 
observed a slow process of gradual credit penetration increase. 
Today, Mexico’s commercial bank credit to the nonfinancial 
private sector is currently about 15 percent of GDP.26 This is not 
only considerably below developed economies’ standards; but it 
is also well below emerging markets’ credit ratios, even in Latin 
America (for instance, 72 percent in Chile, 46 percent in Brazil, 
or 41 percent in Colombia.)27 
I believe low credit penetration levels stem from two features of 
the Mexican economy: (i) the large number of individuals and 
firms working in the informal sector; and (ii) the difficulties 
faced by banks to recover collateral. As a result, commercial 
                                                 
26 Source: Banco de México. 
27 Source: World Bank. 
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banks are not able to lend to a plethora of sectors, particularly 
SMEs and low-income families that either operate in the 
informal sector, or that are high-risk potential clients, whose 
assets (if any), are not easy to repossess. Therefore, alternative 
sources of financing arise. 
Low credit penetration is clearly related to a low productivity 
vicious cycle. Consumers usually borrow money from “loan 
sharks” and resort to small-appliance-related credits, in a small 
weekly-payment program with astronomical annual interest rates 
of 150 percent or more. Firms, SMEs, and even large companies 
mainly use supplier credit. According to the latest Banco de 
México survey, nearly 83 percent of the surveyed firms said that 
they use supplier credit as their main source of financing, while 
only 40 percent responded that they used some sort of 
commercial bank credit.28 
The high interest rates that SMEs and individuals—usually 
working in the informal sector—have to face and the hassle to 
obtain loans from informal sources subtract from productivity. 
SMEs’ and individuals’ low productivity keeps them from going 
formal, so their access to commercial bank credit continues to be 
limited, leading them to continue using alternative sources of 
funding, forming an unfortunate vicious cycle. 
Fortunately, the government has recently achieved approval for a 
bank-lending reform. This reform is based upon a two-axis 
structure: (i) a full improvement of the collateral-recovery 
processes, creating specialized courts and fostering the 
development of specialized judges, as well as easing the 
guarantee-execution procedures; and (ii) the allowance for 
government-owned development banks to significantly increase 
                                                 
28 See Banxico (2014). 
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the amount and number of guarantees for commercial banks to 
lend to SMEs. 
In this context, using quite conservative assumptions 
for Mexico––such as GDP annual growth rates of 2.5 percent to 
3 percent––credit-to-GDP ratios could easily reach 20 percent in 
five years and are projected to increase up to 40 percent by 
2025.29 
CESEE parallelisms with the Mexican experience 
The CESEE countries face important challenges in their banking 
system. After having a buoyant period before the global crisis, 
with the entry of foreign banks and foreign investment, the 
situation has changed dramatically. After the crisis, European 
authorities decided to implement a stricter regulatory framework 
that forced European banks to increase their capitalization ratios. 
This created a process of strong deleveraging that has left 
CESEE countries with high levels of NPLs and, in some cases, 
has constrained private-sector balance sheets. 
These factors are holding back domestic demand and credit. 
According to IMF data, credit growth to nonfinancial firms (in 
nominal exchange-rate-adjusted terms), has been negative in the 
Baltic States, CEE, and SEE through end-2013, though there are 
some signs of a relaxation in credit standards. Furthermore, in 
SEE countries, private-sector balance-sheet weakness, high 
NPLs, and fiscal and structural challenges continue to constrain 
the recovery in domestic demand.  
The recent situation has become riskier for the region as it 
reflects a possible protracted period of weak growth in the 
eurozone, surges in financial market volatility along the path 
                                                 
29 Source: Banorte-Ixe. 
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towards higher interest rates globally, an escalation of 
geopolitical tensions in the region, as well as delayed resolution 
of crisis legacies. 
At first glance, the current situation of the CESEE region looks 
familiar to me. The possibility of a sudden stop in capital flows, 
the financial fragility experienced in the last few years, and a 
tighter regulation for capitalization in Europe create certain 
parallelisms with the Mexican experience. That is why I would 
like to share with you the most important policy components, 
which in my view have helped Mexico to achieve a more stable 
and resilient financial system, as well as the challenges we are 
still facing. 
1) Act quickly. In the case of a financial crisis, it is 
necessary for the authorities to respond 
expeditiously with short-term measures intended to 
contain liquidity and capitalization problems. 
2) Achieve monetary and fiscal stability. Rebuilding 
fiscal policy space not only restores investors’ 
confidence, but allows any country to respond in 
case of external shocks. 
3) Develop a domestic securities market. To reduce 
reliance on foreign funding, which I understand is an 
important concern for many of the CESEE countries, 
it is necessary to adopt several measures to increase 
the liquidity and depth of domestic markets. In the 
case of Mexico, the development of institutional 
investors and the secondary market’s liquidity 
enhancements have been key to achieving it. On the 
fiscal side, by reducing the vulnerability of public 
finances to adverse interest and exchange rate 
movements, the government has been able to 
actively manage its debt and improve its 
amortization schedule. On the other hand, deeper 
and more-developed financial markets have allowed 
agents to pool and diversify risk in a more efficient 
fashion, and have facilitated the allocation of savings 
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to more productive uses, thereby making the 
economy less vulnerable to adverse shocks. 
4) Create a more resilient banking system. A stricter 
regulation can help to align the incentives of debtors, 
bank creditors, and shareholders. For instance, in the 
case of foreign banks, it is essential to encourage 
cooperation among supervisors, central banks, and 
finance ministries from the countries involved in 
extensive cross-border banking. For example, the 
subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions in 
Mexico have rigorous limits on credit to related 
parties, which restrict the possibility of domestic 
banks being asked to provide liquidity support to 
their parent banks. Also, the Mexican banking 
system is well-capitalized, with adequate leverage 
ratios. 
5) Adopt a free-floating exchange rate and 
accumulate reserves to serve as a shock absorber. 
This was very important for Mexico. I understand 
several CESEE economies are either part of the 
EMU or thinking seriously about joining. A 
monetary union has a number of political, monetary, 
and banking advantages. However, we have seen the 
difficulties experienced by the eurozone countries in 
the absence of a political, fiscal, and Banking Union. 
In Mexico’s case, the free-floating exchange rate has 
served a very useful purpose as a shock absorber and 
also as a key element to achieve a complete and 
strong macro structure. 
Finally, it is fundamental for Mexico and other EMEs to 
implement the necessary structural reforms for creating a more 
inclusive and efficient financial system. Those reforms will be 
able to create a more competitive and productive economy, and 
increase economic growth. 
Thank you very much for your time.  
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IX.   CASE STUDIES 
 
A.   The Case of Slovenia 
Daria Zakharova, European Department, IMF  
Slovenia experienced a deep and protracted recession following 
the crisis. Output dropped by 11¼ percent from its peak in 
2008:Q2 to its trough in 2012:Q4. This was the largest output 
loss among euro area members after Greece. Real GDP still 
remains some 10 percent below its pre-crisis peak. 
The economy is now recovering, but credit continues to contract. 
Quarterly GDP growth turned positive in 2013:Q2, helped by 
recovering euro area demand. Meanwhile, credit is still 
contracting.  
Should we be worried about a creditless recovery? Recent 
studies find that creditless recoveries tend to be weaker than 
those supported by stronger lending. And many such recoveries 
are more likely to be followed by mediocre growth, reflecting 
the long-term adverse effects of lower investment and weaker 
productivity. The figures below show the evolution of output and 
credit in creditless and normal recoveries in advanced 
economies. Following Everaert and Tereanu (2014), a creditless 
recovery is defined as one where the average year-on-year 
growth rate of real credit—defined as the stock of nominal credit 
in national currency deflated by the GDP deflator—is negative. 
Economic growth is about 20 percent lower in a creditless 
recovery compared with a normal recovery—arguably a poor 
prospect for Slovenia.  
What holds credit back? In this presentation, I will argue that in 
Slovenia both supply and demand factors are important in 
explaining the contraction in credit. Reforms would therefore 
need to tackle both supply- and demand-side constraints in order 
to revive credit. 
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 Figure 1. Slovenia: Real Output and Real Credit Developments 
Source: Haver Analytics. 
Source: Eurostat/Haver Analytics. 
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Supply-side issues 
On the supply side, banks are burdened with NPLs. Following 
the crisis, NPLs increased rapidly from under 3 percent of total 
assets at the end of 2007, to over 18 percent in November 2013. 
Even after the transfer of a portion of NPLs to the bank asset 
management company in December 2013, NPLs have remained 
high, standing at over 15 percent of total assets in June. NPLs are 
particularly high in domestic banks. And the worst affected 
sectors are construction, food and accommodation services, and 
financial holding companies.  
High NPLs are a problem, because they keep lending rates high. 
The text figure shows a strong correlation between the level of 
NPLs and lending rates across different types of banks. This 
should not come as a surprise. High NPLs divert bank resources 
from core activities to NPL workouts, weigh on banks’ 
profitability, hinder extension of credit, and push up interest 
rates on new loans.  
Demand-side issues 
On the demand side, corporates are overextended with leverage. 
Slovenia has one of the highest debt-to-equity ratios in the EU. 
This is largely a result of scarce equity, rather than high debt. In 
part, the relative scarcity of equity reflects low foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which is a key source of potential equity in a 
small open economy. FDI into Slovenia has averaged 1½ percent 
of GDP per year since euro adoption, compared to an average for 
the euro area of 29½ percent of GDP. 
Corporate leverage weighs on credit growth, investment, and 
economic recovery. The next figure illustrates the positive 
correlation between corporate leverage and the decline in the 
investment-to-GDP ratio in the post-crisis period. Companies use 
any available resources to repay debt, rather than invest. As a 
result, investment continues to decline, undermining economic 
recovery. This is evident in Slovenia’s own experience. 
Slovenia’s investment-to-GDP ratio declined to 18 percent in 
2013—the lowest recorded in the country’s history. 
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 Figure 2. Output and Credit Growth in Normal and Creditless 
Recoveries 
Sources: 2014 IMF Baltic Cluster Report.  
High corporate leverage in the context of a prolonged recession 
also translated into high corporate NPLs. The share of NPLs in 
loans to nonfinancial companies peaked at 28 percent in 
November 2013. Corporate NPLs are also highly concentrated. 
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for some 43 percent of all banking sector arrears in 
November 2013. This share shrank only moderately to 
36 percent post-bank asset management company (BAMC) 
transfer.  
Figure 3. Slovenia: NPLs and Arrears in Banks 
 
   NPL ratio (Nov 2013) 
Source: Bank of Slovenia. 
 
 
Source: IMF FSI. 
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Figure 3 (Concluded). Slovenia: NPLs and Arrears in Banks 
 
Source: Figure 6.13, 2014 Financial Stability Report, Bank of Slovenia. 
Financial stress is widespread. Firms that cannot cover their 
interest bill through their earnings account for 16 percent of total 
employment in Slovenia. In addition to large companies, the 
ratio of financial debt to earnings is particularly high in micro 
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modal distribution of debt distress could hold some clues as to 
what restructuring frameworks are best suited for Slovenia. 
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 Figure 4. Corporate Leverage and FDI in a Cross-Country 
Perspective 
Sources: ECB, Eurostat, and OECD. 
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To facilitate corporate restructuring, the bankruptcy law was 
amended in line with international best standards to introduce a 
simplified pre-insolvency regime and an enhanced compulsory 
settlement procedure. 
But more is needed to complete the restructuring of banks and 
corporates and unlock credit flows. 
Strengthening the demand side 
On the demand side, the focus should be on accelerating 
corporate restructuring. 
Let’s look at the supply side first. As I mentioned earlier, NPLs 
remain high, even post-BAMC transfer. This is not conducive to 
a revival of credit supply. Thus, additional transfers of problem 
loans to BAMC are in order. This is necessary both to further 
cleanse banks’ balance sheets from legacy problem loans and to 
strengthen BAMC’s capacity to act as a catalyst for the much-
needed corporate restructuring. The ongoing comprehensive risk 
assessment by the ECB offers an opportunity to determine the 
value of the assets for the transfer and to quantify the size of the 
existing capital buffers in the two largest domestic banks. 
Going forward, there is a need to strengthen bank governance 
and supervision to prevent the reemergence of the same 
vulnerabilities that led to the crisis. Governance can be improved 
through privatization. The government currently owns 62 percent 
of the banking system capital. Privatizing the intervened banks 
would ensure that their management responds solely to 
commercial motives. It would also weaken the link between the 
creditworthiness of the government and the banks—a key source 
of vulnerability.  
Finally, further bank consolidation may be needed to exploit 
economies of scale, reduce administrative costs, and shore up 
banks’ profitability. 
First, the apparent concentration of problems in large Slovenian 
corporates implies that a large reduction of leverage can be  
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 Figure 5. Corporate Leverage and Investment 
 
Sources: ECB and Eurostat. 
 
achieved by involving only a few parties in restructuring 
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Figure 6. Leverage and Debt Repayment Capacity by Corporate Size 
Source: Figures 4.14 and 4.15, 2014 Financial Stability Report, Bank of Slovenia. 
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restructurings (used in Iceland (2011) and Turkey (2001)) can 
help simplify negotiations by providing simple tests for viability 
and a set of harmonized restructuring terms. 
And finally, to the extent that banks are the factor that constrains 
credit to domestic firms, it could be useful to explore the scope 
for nonbank financing. For larger corporates, direct access to 
capital markets may be a good alternative. Smaller companies 
could take advantage of minibonds (as was done in Italy) or debt 
securitization.  
B.   Austrian Banks in CESEE 
Thomas Reininger and Doris Ritzberger-Grünwald, OeNB30 
Travelers to CESEE countries, but also investors and 
entrepreneurs doing business in the CESEE region, quickly 
notice the strong presence of Austrian banks in the CESEE 
region. How did this come about? The comparatively low 
interest margin in Austria pushed Austrian banks to expand their 
business abroad. Looking for alternatives––preferably nearby––
they seized the historic opportunities to focus on the CESEE 
region, given the geographical proximity and cultural ties. 
Interestingly, the difference between the Austrian and the euro 
area interest rate margin has remained broadly constant between 
2004 and 2014 (Figure 1). This is mainly ascribable to the 
competitive pressure resulting from the high number of Austrian 
banks (end-2013: 790 registered banks), given the prominent 
role of decentralized bank groups (in particular, the Raiffeisen 
sector). To adjust the cost structure, banks have responded to the 
                                                 
30 Thomas Reininger is Senior Expert in the OeNB’s Foreign Research Division and Doris 
Ritzberger-Grünwald is Chief Economist and Director of the OeNB’s Economics Department. The 
presenters want to thank Andreas Greiner and Alexandra Schober-Rhomberg, Head of Unit in the 
OeNB’s Financial Stability Department, for valuable support. 
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relatively low domestic net interest income with ongoing 
restructuring and redimensioning, and the number of banks has 
been on a continuous decline. Over the past two years, the 
interest margin on new lending has risen, but on the basis of 
relatively small volumes, so that the margin on the outstanding 
stock did not increase substantially. Moreover, this hardly 
changed the relative position of Austrian banks, given the 
parallel rise in the euro area. 
Domestic Interest Margin and Consolidated Profitability of 
the Austrian Banking Sector 
Figure 1. Interest Margin, New Lending to Nonbanks 
(In percentage points) 
Source OeNB. 
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2007, the year before the crisis, it still came to 0.8 percent 
(Figure 2). Clearly, these results were driven by the net profits of 
Austrian bank subsidiaries in CESEE, which posted ROA ratios 
between 1.2 percent and 1.7 percent from 2003 to 2008 
(Figure 5). However, it would be too rosy a picture if we did not 
mention that, during this period, banks to some extent also 
pursued ill-considered business strategies—such as lending 
based on insufficiently strict lending standards coupled with 
overreliance on funding from parent banks abroad, even though 
the supervisory authorities of several host countries issued some 
explicit warnings. 
Figure 2. Earning Power of the Austrian Banking System—Return 
on Asset (RoA), Consolidated 
Source: OeNB. 
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growth and the low interest rate environment––to two major one-
off effects, namely the losses of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank 
International AG and the write-downs of goodwill linked to the 
CESEE subsidiaries of one major bank. In absolute terms, the net 
loss amounted to EUR 1 billion. Without these one-off effects, 
the RoA would have amounted to about 0.2 percent. 
Exposure to CESEE 
Against the background of relatively low interest margins at 
home, Austrian banks were among the first to take advantage of 
the opportunities in CESEE and to become major players in the 
region. Banks expanded their activities in parallel with 
nonfinancial companies entering the CESEE markets after the 
Iron Curtain had come down, partly following them and partly 
paving the way for them. In 2014, majority domestically owned 
Austrian banks held a share of 20 percent in the total exposure of 
EU-15banks to CESEE (Figure 3). If we also included Bank 
Austria, which is majority owned by the Italian UniCredit 
Banking Group, in this category, this share would increase to 
about 30 percent (and the share of Italy would decline 
correspondingly). 
Since the crisis of 2008/09, Austrian banks’ exposure to the 
aggregate CESEE region and their share in total EU-15 banks’ 
CESEE exposure has remained remarkably stable. Still, the crisis 
has impacted––not immediately, but definitely step by step––the 
structure of Austrian banks’ CESEE exposure. At the peak of the 
crisis, banks avoided falling into the trap of the rush to the exit 
and prevented the loan supply from collapsing not only on 
aggregate in the region, but also in almost all individual host 
countries. In this context, the private-public Vienna Initiative 
played a rather important role. Later on, the exposure developed 
in a more heterogeneous way, with country-specific differences 
emerging, depending on factors like real growth, credit demand, 
the size of legacy problems, and the economic policy approach. 
A country-by-country analysis shows that the exposure remained 
quite stable, for instance, in the Czech Republic (after some 
further increase) and in Romania. By contrast, the exposure 
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shrank significantly in particular in Hungary and the Ukraine, 
mostly due to unfavorable political conditions. In Turkey and 
Russia, the exposure grew strongly until the fourth quarter of 
2013. However, during 2014, the exposure to Russia contracted 
markedly (Figure 4). Indeed, the increases in some countries, 
e.g., the Czech Republic, Turkey, Russia and––via acquisition––
in Poland, helped maintain the exposure to the total CESEE 
region stable after the crisis of 2008/09. Interestingly, there is 
also evidence that Austrian banks do not stay under all 
circumstances, as Bank Austria left Kazakhstan.  
Since the crisis of 2008/09, Austrian banks’ exposure to the 
aggregate CESEE region and their share in total EU-15 banks’ 
CESEE exposure has remained remarkably stable. Still, the crisis 
has impacted––not immediately, but definitely step by step––the 
structure of Austrian banks’ CESEE exposure. At the peak of the 
crisis, banks avoided falling into the trap of the rush to the exit 
and prevented the loan supply from collapsing not only on 
aggregate in the region, but also in almost all individual host 
countries. In this context, the private-public Vienna Initiative 
played a rather important role. Later on, the exposure developed 
in a more heterogeneous way, with country-specific differences 
emerging, depending on factors like real growth, credit demand, 
the size of legacy problems, and the economic policy approach. 
A country-by-country analysis shows that the exposure remained 
quite stable, for instance, in the Czech Republic (after some 
further increase) and in Romania. By contrast, the exposure 
shrank significantly in particular in Hungary and the Ukraine, 
mostly due to unfavorable political conditions. In Turkey and 
Russia, the exposure grew strongly until the fourth quarter of 
2013. However, during 2014, the exposure to Russia contracted 
markedly (Figure 4). Indeed, the increases in some countries, 
e.g., the Czech Republic, Turkey, Russia and––via acquisition––
in Poland, helped maintain the exposure to the total CESEE 
region stable after the crisis of 2008/09. Interestingly, there is 
also evidence that Austrian banks do not stay under all 
circumstances, as Bank Austria left Kazakhstan.  
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Figure 3. Home Countries’ Shares in Total EU-15 Banks’ Exposure to 
CESEE 
Source: BIS. 
 
Figure 4. Development of Austrian Banks’ Exposure to CESEE 
 
Source: OeNB. 
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Profitability of Austrian bank subsidiaries 
A closer look at the profitability of Austrian bank subsidiaries in 
the CESEE region reveals why Austrian banks stayed in the 
region, although economic conditions were less favorable than 
before the crisis of 2008–09. In the post-crisis period, the ROA 
of CESEE subsidiaries was only half the pre-crisis level, coming 
in at 0.8 percent in 2013 (Figure 5). This ROA ratio, however, 
still exceeds the ROA recorded by Austrian banks in their 
domestic market. Moreover, this profitability level has remained 
remarkably stable throughout the post-crisis period.  
Earning Power of Austrian Subsidiaries in CESEE 
Figure 5. Return on Assets (ROA) 
Source: OeNB. 
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activities in Hungary and Slovenia even resulted in small losses 
(Figure 6).31 As a matter of fact, the increased concentration of 
profit sources implies a higher risk for the Austrian banking 
sector. 
Figure 6. Profit/Loss After Taxes 
(In billions of euros) 
 
Source: OeNB. 
A key factor for lower CESEE profitability in the post-crisis 
period was the rise of NPLs and the resulting substantial credit 
risk provisioning––basically a legacy problem of boom-related 
exuberance. In the domestic market, the NPL ratio of Austrian 
banks (i.e., the unconsolidated NPL ratio) increased from a low 
level to about 4 percent in the first quarter of 2009, but has since 
then remained stable. By contrast, the loan quality in CESEE 
continued to weigh down group figures. For CESEE subsidiaries, 
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in Turkey had not been covered separately by the Austrian supervisory reporting framework up to 
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the NPL ratio climbed from 7 percent (early in the crisis) up to 
15 percent in mid-2014. As a result, the NPL ratio of the 
consolidated Austrian banking sector increased to 8.6 percent. 
Whereas the unconsolidated loan loss provision (LLP) ratio was 
3.6 percent in mid-2014, the consolidated ratio (taking CESEE 
subsidiaries into account) stood at 4.8 percent. Overall, the LLP 
ratio kept pace with the NPL ratio, preventing the coverage ratio 
from deteriorating. Moreover, the good news is, that after the 
steep rise of the NPL ratio in CESEE from 2009 to 2012, it 
leveled off and even declined slightly (Figures 7 and 8). 
To what extent has credit growth recovered? 
CESEE aggregate credit growth recovered from the crisis, with a 
smaller role for foreign currency lending. Indeed, net new 
foreign currency lending to households virtually disappeared. 
Figure 9 shows this development in detail in terms of credit 
growth by economic sector and currency relative to annual GDP. 
Before the crisis, the CESEE economies on aggregate recorded 
very high credit growth of more than 14 percentage points of 
annual GDP. In this situation, foreign currency loans played a 
significant role for both households and nonfinancial companies. 
Cross-border credit to the corporate sector, denominated almost 
entirely in foreign currency, was used intensively to meet the 
demand for credit, as investment activities were high and their 
financing was not always fully met by (foreign-owned) domestic 
banks. Instead, parent banks stepped in and financed, in 
particular, bigger projects. 
In 2009, domestic and cross-border credit growth came to a 
standstill, with very small increases in national currency loans 
canceled out by decreases in foreign currency loans to 
nonfinancial companies. Thereafter, domestic credit growth 
revived to a moderate level. However, within domestic credit, 
foreign currency lending to households did not reemerge on an 
aggregate level, as it was restricted in various ways by banks’ 
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 Credit Quality of the Austrian Banking System 
Figure 7. LLP Ratio 
Source: OeNB. 
 
Figure 8. NPL Ratio 
 
Source: OeNB. 
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Figure 9. CESEE: Changes in Outstanding Stocks of Domestic Credit 
and Cross-Border Credit to Private Nonbanks by Sector and Currency 
 
Sources: ECB, Eurostat, national central banks, national statistical offices, OeNB. 
Note: Domestic credit comprises loans to households and to nonfinancial companies (NFCs), except for 
Russia where it includes also loans to other financial institutions (OFIs). Domestic foreign currency loans 
include also exchange rate-linked loans denominated in national currency. Cross-border credit to the 
corporate sector comprises cross-border credit to 'other sectors' (including OFIs), including portfolio debt 
securities held abroad by nonbanks, but excluding trade credit and intra-company loans. CESEE: EU-MS in 
CESEE, plus Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, Russia and Turkey. 
 
Ukraine, the supervisory authorities have prohibited new foreign 
currency lending. In other words, both banks and supervisory 
bodies have learned their lesson and started to limit this risky 
business. 
In the pre-crisis period, CESEE aggregate credit growth was 
fueled by most countries across the region. However, it is 
important to highlight that foreign currency lending to 
households was not a phenomenon shared by all CESEE 
countries. In the post-crisis period, the moderate positive growth 
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of CESEE aggregate credit stemmed mainly from a few, but 
relatively large countries—notably Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Russia and Turkey—while several other 
countries suffered from negative credit growth. 
Strategy of diversification 
Traditionally, Austrian banks in CESEE pursued a risk-reducing 
strategy by diversifying their business across many countries of 
the region. At the same time, this strategy allowed them to 
realize economies of scope by providing added value for 
customers operating throughout the region. Up to now, this 
strategy has helped Austrian banks weather adverse economic 
developments in the region. To some extent, this seems to apply 
also to the years 2014 and 2015: GDP growth forecasts for the 
CESEE EU member states have been rather stable for these two 
years; no major downward revisions have been made so far 
(Figure 10).  
 
However, if one adds Ukraine, Russia and Turkey to the sample, 
the picture changes completely and a constant downward 
revision of growth prospects becomes obvious (Figure 11). 
While in recent years, growth in Russia (and Turkey) 
compensated for recent years, growth in Russia (and Turkey) 
compensated for weak economic growth in the CESEE EU 
member states, the latter provide more stability now, dampening 
the effect of adverse developments in the former.  
 
Capitalization 
Despite lower profitability resulting mainly from higher credit 
risk provisioning, Austrian banks responded to increased capital 
requirements by both market participants and regulatory bodies 
by improving their capitalization. As a result, major Austrian 
banks operating in CESEE now have above-average leverage 
ratios (defined as Tier 1 capital to total assets). However, given 
their business model and the risks inherent in their assets, these  
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Figure 10. CESEE EU Member States: Growth Projections for 2014 
and 2015 
 
Figure 11. CESEE (CESEE EU-MS plus UA, RU, TR): Growth 
Projections for 2014 and 2015 
Source: Consensus Economics, WEO for PPP weights. 
Notes: The CESEE aggregate comprises, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine.  Average of GDP at PPP 
over the period from 2007 to 2013 to aggregate the single countries. 
 
large Austrian banks record below-average capital ratios 
(relative to risk-weighted assets) compared to their peers, with 
the total Austrian banking sector having posted a Tier 1 ratio of 
11.9 percent at the end of 2013. This may be regarded as a signal 
for the need to further buildup high-quality capital. Moreover, 
banks have to face several challenges in the coming years: a low 
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interest margin, further restructuring, weak economic growth, 
and higher political uncertainties. Therefore, additional risk 
buffers are required. From another perspective, it is important to 
highlight that the capitalization of Austrian subsidiaries in 
CESEE is generally well above the respective country minimum 
requirements, but in some countries “ring fencing” complicates 
reallocation and thus an optimal use of bank group capital.  
 
Recommendations 
Against this background, the recommendations by the OeNB to 
the Austrian banking sector are:  
 Banks should continue strengthening their capital levels. 
 Banks should strive to address structural issues and 
improve their cost efficiency. 
 Banks should strive for sustainable loan-to-local stable 
funding ratios at the subsidiary level and for the risk-
adequate pricing of liquidity transfers. 
 Banks should further pursue risk-adequate provisioning 
and coverage policies to deal with loan-quality issues. 
 Banks should ensure high standards of risk management 
so that risks are properly addressed and effectively 
controlled. 
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X.   CONTRIBUTORS 
Boštjan Jazbec, Governor, Bank of Slovenia 
He graduated from the Faculty of Economics, University 
of Ljubljana, and continued his studies at the Central 
European University in Budapest and Prague. After 
completing his Ph.D. studies in Economics at the Institute 
for Advanced Studies in Vienna he defended his doctoral 
thesis on real exchange rate determination in transition 
economies at the Faculty of Economics, University of 
Ljubljana. His research interests focused on the 
macroeconomic topics including the impact of structural 
reforms on the exchange rate determination and the 
convergence of the transition countries to the European 
Union (EU). He has worked as a short-term consultant for 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and the World Bank in Washington, DC. In July 
2003, he was appointed to the Board of the Bank of 
Slovenia and continued his post until 2008. After 2008, 
he worked as a consultant to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) at the Central Bank of Kosovo and the 
Central Bank of Suriname. In July 2013, he was 
appointed Governor of the Bank of Slovenia. 
Christopher Towe, Monetary and Capital Markets 
Department, IMF 
Christopher Towe is presently Deputy Director in IMF’s 
Monetary and Capital Markets Department. His 
responsibilities include coordinating the IMF’s FSAP 
program and financial sector technical assistance work 
across the Fund’s membership. In recent years he has 
taken a leadership role in FSAP assessments of the 
United States, Turkey, and Japan. Prior to his assignment 
to the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, he was 
mission chief to a wide range of countries, including the 
U.S., Canada, Japan, India, and Hong Kong. His research 
has covered areas including fiscal sustainability, 
monetary policy implementation, tax policy, and 
exchange rate bubbles, and before joining the IMF, he 
worked for three years at the Bank of Canada, covering 
money markets. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the 
University of Western Ontario and earned his B.A. from 
Queen’s University. 
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Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board, ECB 
Benoît Cœuré is a member of the Executive Board of the 
European Central Bank and the Chairman of the Bank for 
International Settlements’ Committee on Payments and 
Market Infrastructures. Prior to joining the ECB, he 
served in various policy positions at the French Treasury. 
He was the CEO of the French debt management office, 
Agence France Trésor, then France’s Assistant Secretary 
for Multilateral Affairs, Trade and Development, co-
president of the Paris Club and G8 and G20 finance sous-
sherpa for France, and finally Deputy-Director General 
and Chief Economist of the French Treasury. Mr. Cœuré 
is a graduate of École polytechnique in Paris. He holds an 
advanced degree in statistics and economic policy and a 
B.A. in Japanese. He has taught international economics 
and economic policy at École polytechnique and at 
Sciences Po in Paris, and authored articles and books on 
economic policy, the international monetary system and 
the economics of European integration, including most 
recently: “Economic Policy: Theory and Practice” 
(Oxford University Press, 2010). 
Marco Piñón, Monetary and Capital Markets 
Department, IMF 
Marco Piñón is currently an Advisor at the Monetary and 
Capital Markets Department (MCM) of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), concentrating on European issues 
and Financial Sector Assessment programs (FSAP). He is 
currently leading the FSAP for Norway. Since 1990, he 
has also served the IMF in several capacities in the 
Western Hemisphere and Strategy and Policy Review 
departments, including as division and mission chief for 
several program countries. Prior to joining the IMF, he 
was an econometrician and international consultant at 
Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates in 
Philadelphia. He completed his education in economics at 
the Monterrey Institute of Technology (Mexico) and the 
George Washington University. His recent research 
interests focus on macro-financial linkages and 
macroprudential policies. Recent Publications include 
books (main author) such as “Central America, Panamá 
and the Dominican Republic: Challenges following the 
2008–09 Global Crisis;” and “Macroeconomic 
Implications of Financial Dollarization: The Case of 
Uruguay.” 
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Jan Švejnar, Professor, Columbia University 
Jan Svejnar is the James T. Shotwell Professor of Global 
Political Economy and Founding Director of the Center 
on Global Economic Governance at Columbia 
University’s School of International and Public Affairs. 
His research focuses on the effects of foreign investment 
and government policies on firms and workers; corporate, 
national and global governance and performance; and 
entrepreneurship. He has published widely in academic, 
policy and practitioner-oriented journals in advanced and 
emerging economies. Prior to joining Columbia, Svejnar 
taught at the University of Michigan, University of 
Pittsburgh, and Cornell. He received his BS from Cornell 
University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations and 
his MA and PhD in Economics from Princeton 
University. In 2012, Professor Svejnar was honored with 
a Neuron Prize for lifelong achievement from the Karel 
Janeček Endowment for Research and Science. In 2008, 
Professor Svejnar was one of two candidates for the 
Presidency of the Czech Republic. 
Josef Bonnici, Governor, Central Bank of Malta 
Josef Bonnici was appointed as Governor of the Central 
Bank of Malta for five years with effect from 1 July 2011 
after serving as Director on the Board of the Bank. He 
graduated B.A. (Hons) in Economics from the University 
of Malta, and read for his Masters and PhD from Simon 
Fraser University, Canada specialising in the areas of 
Monetary Economics, Macroeconomics and 
Econometrics. He was awarded a Doctor of Humanities, 
Honoris Causa from Rikkyo University in Japan. Josef 
Bonnici has published books and many articles in 
professional Economics journals, and lectured at Deakin 
University in Australia, and Simon Fraser University in 
Canada. He was advisor to the Prime Minister of Malta, 
Parliamentary Secretary in Finance and Minister for 
Economic Services in two legislatures, with a wide 
portfolio, including that of economic development policy. 
He was Observer member of the European Parliament, 
and Member of the European Court of Auditors, with 
responsibility for the institution’s Statement of Assurance 
(DAS). Prior to his appointment as Governor Josef 
Bonnici held the post of Professor of Economics at the 
University of Malta, focusing primarily on Monetary 
Economics, Macroeconomics and Econometrics. 
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Boris Vujčić, Governor, Croatian National Bank 
Boris Vujčić (born 1964) holds a BA, an MA and a PhD 
in Economics from the University of Zagreb. He joined 
the Croatian National Bank in 1997, and was Director of 
the Research Department for three years before becoming 
Deputy Governor in 2000, a position to which he was re-
appointed in 2006. In July 2012, Mr Vujcic became 
Governor of the Croatian National Bank for a six-year 
term of office. Mr Vujčić became an associate professor 
in 2003 at the Faculty of Economics, University of 
Zagreb. He also teaches at the Diplomatic Academy of 
the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
University of Zagreb, Department of Mathematics. Mr 
Vujčić’s fields of expertise are macroeconomics, 
international finance and labor economics. 
José Joaquim Berberan e Santos Ramalho, Vice 
Governor, Banco de Portugal 
He graduated in Economics from Institute Superior de 
Economia (School of Economics of the Technical 
University of Lisbon) in 1981. He performed functions as 
economist in the Central Planning Department of the 
Ministry of Finance (1981–83), Banco de Portugal 
(1983–88) and BIS (1989–90). At Banco de Portugal, he 
was Deputy Head of the Statistics and Economic 
Research Department (1990–93), Head of the Foreign 
Department (1993–99) and of the Markets and Reserve 
Management Department (1999–2000). He was a 
member of the Board of Directors of Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos (CGD) (2000–07) and, in that capacity, a 
member of management boards across the group’s 
companies, namely Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of Caixa Gestão de Activos. As a member of the Board of 
Directors of CGD, he was the Deputy Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto 
(the Portuguese stock exchange) (2000-2002). Within the 
CGD group, he was also a member of the Board of 
Directors of the insurance companies Fidelidade-Mundial 
and lmpério-Bonança (2008–10), Deputy Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of Caixa Banco de lnvestimento 
(2008–11) and General Manager of CGD branches in 
France and Luxembourg (2010–11). He was appointed 
Vice-Governor of Banco de Portugal in September 2011. 
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Stanislava Zadravec Caprirolo, Vice Governor, Bank of 
Slovenia 
Stanislava Zadravec Caprirolo is holding current position 
since April 2010. She is also a Member of ECB 
Supervisory Board, Member of Board of Supervisors of 
EBA and non-voting national representative for banking 
supervision to the ESRB. She was Director General of 
Treasury of the Ministry of Finance (2005–2009), 
responsible for the field of central government debt 
management, general government liquidity management, 
payment systems and state consolidated balance sheet and 
State Undersecretary at the Ministry of Finance (1998–
2005). From 2003 to 2009 she was a member of EFC T-
Bills and Bonds Working Group. Working experience 
includes also international financial organizations, 
bilateral relationships and financial succession issues 
after disintegration of former Yugoslavia. She started her 
career in 1989 in the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Slovenia. She also worked as public finance expert in the 
region (including for Regional Center for Excellence in 
Finance and IMF). She was a member (and President) of 
the Supervisory Board of SID bank and of NLB. She 
holds a master degree in International Affairs (Economic 
Policy Management), Columbia University, New York 
and bachelor degree in Law, University of Ljubljana. 
Ewald Nowotny, Governor, Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank 
Before taking on his current position in September 2008, 
Ewald Nowotny held a number of high-level positions in 
financial institutions. He was CEO of the Austrian 
BAWAG P.S.K. banking group from 2006–07, served as 
Vice-President and Member of the Management 
Committee of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 
Luxembourg from 1999–2003, and, between 1971 and 
1979, was first a Member and then President of the 
Governing Board of Österreichische Postsparkasse 
(P.S.K.). Moreover, from 1992–2008, Mr. Nowotny 
served on the supervisory boards of several banks and 
corporations and was a member of the OeNB’s General 
Council from 2007–08. Mr. Nowotny was born in 
Vienna, Austria, in 1944. He studied law and political 
science at the University of Vienna and economics at the 
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) in Vienna. In 1967, 
he received his doctorate in law from the University of 
Vienna. He served as a professor at the University of Linz 
and at the Vienna University of Economics and Business, 
where he was also Vice-Rector for Financial Affairs. 
Mr. Nowotny was Vice President of the Austrian 
  253  
Economic Association and is a Member of the University 
Board of the Vienna University of Economics and 
Business. 
Ján Tóth, Deputy Governor, Národná banka Slovenska 
Mr Jan Toth received his master’s degree from the 
Faculty of Management at Comenius University in 
Bratislava. He completed an extensive part of his studies 
in the United States, where he was awarded first a BBA, 
magna cum laude, from the W. Barton School of 
Business at Wichita State University and then MA in 
economics from The Ohio State University passing field 
exams in monetary economics, macroeconomics and 
international economics. In 1998 Mr Toth returned to 
Slovakia to join Tatra banka (a member of Austrian 
Raiffeisen group) as a research economist and strategist, 
shortly becoming the bank’s Chief Economist and 
Strategist. In 1999 he was hired by ING Bank (former 
ING Barings), where he spent ten years as Chief 
Economist for Slovakia. For another two years, he took 
up the same post at Slovak UniCredit Bank before being 
recruited to the Ministry of Finance to head its research 
arm as the Ministry’s Chief Economist in late 2010. In 
late 2012, the President of the Slovak Republic appointed 
Mr Toth as Deputy Governor of the Slovak central bank, 
NBS. 
László Baranyay, Vice President, European Investment 
Bank 
In September 2013, László Baranyay became Vice 
President of the EIB, responsible for financing operations 
in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Belarus and 
Ukraine, Ex post evaluation of operations, Information 
technologies and data governance, Strategy for the 
Danube region. He is Alternate Governor of the EBRD. 
He most recently (2010-August 2013) held the positions 
of CEO and Chairman of Board of Directors of MFB 
(Hungarian Development Bank). From 2002 to 2010, 
Mr. Baranyay was both Member of the Supervisory 
Board of the Hungarian National Bank and Advisor to the 
Chairman of OTP Garancia Insurance Company (from 
2007 Groupama Insurance). During the 1980s and early 
90s, he worked as a civil servant first by teaching 
Macroeconomics in Budapest; then at the Central Office 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, where he 
managed research and the finances of several 
socioeconomic research institutes of Academy. László 
Baranyay graduated in economics from the Budapest 
University. 
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Andrzej Raczko, Member of the Management Board, 
National Bank of Poland 
Andrzej Raczko is a member of the Management Board 
of Narodowy Bank Polski. He started his political career 
as Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Finance. His 
responsibilities covered public debt management, 
financial negotiations with the European Union and co-
operation with international financial institutions. In 
2003-2004, during the final stage of the Polish accession 
to the European Union, he was Minister of Finance. 
Before he began his public responsibilities, he had 
worked as CEO in the Polish banking sector for over 
10 years. He served as Alternate Executive Director in the 
International Monetary Fund for four years. Mr. Raczko 
graduated from the University of Lodz (M.A. in 
economics). In 1985, he obtained his Ph.D. from the same 
university and then worked as an assistant professor. 
Biswajit Banerjee, Chief Economist, Bank of Slovenia 
Biswajit Banerjee is Chief Economist of the Bank of 
Slovenia. He is a former senior staff member of the 
International Monetary Fund, where he led surveillance 
and program missions to several countries in central and 
southeastern Europe. He also previously taught at 
Haverford College, the Wharton School of the University 
of Pennsylvania, and University of Oxford. He has served 
as an external advisor to the Minister of Finance of the 
Slovak Republic, and has conducted training courses in 
financial programming for senior government officials of 
Bangladesh. Dr. Banerjee received his doctorate in 
economics from the University of Oxford, which he 
attended as a Rhodes Scholar. He has numerous 
publications in leading academic journals. 
Daria Zakharova, Advisor, European Department, IMF 
Ms. Zakharova heads the Poland-Baltics Unit in the 
European Department at the International Monetary Fund 
and is a mission chief for Poland. She previously led 
missions to Slovenia, Iceland, and Slovakia. Her research 
interests span a broad range of issues, including economic 
growth, fiscal and monetary policy and institutions, and 
capital flow management. Ms. Zakharova holds a Ph.D. 
in Economics from the University of Minnesota and a 
B.A. in Economics from the University of Michigan. 
Prior to joining the IMF in 2000, she worked as an 
associate analyst at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis and a teaching associate at the University of 
Minnesota. 
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Doris Ritzberger-Grünwald, Director, Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank 
Doris Ritzberger-Grünwald (Director of the OeNB’s 
Economic Analysis and Research Department) studied 
social and economic sciences at the University of Vienna 
and completed a postgraduate program in economics at 
the Vienna Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS). She 
started her career as a research assistant at the IAS before 
joining the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) in 
1988 as an economist. In 2000 she moved into a 
management position as Deputy Head of the OeNB’s 
Foreign Research Division, which she managed as Head 
of Division from 2002 to 2013. In 2013 she was 
promoted to the position of chief economist. Her fields of 
policy- oriented research include monetary policy, 
economic growth, convergence issues, inflation as well as 
EU and euro area enlargement, with a special focus on 
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European Countries. 
She is a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of 
the European Central Bank and an Executive Board 
Member of the Joint Vienna Institute. 
Vedran Šošić, Vice Governor, Croatian National Bank 
Vedran Šošić (born 1974) is Vice Governor at the 
Croatian National Bank. He has responsibility for the 
Research and Statistics Area, which besides the Research 
and Statistics Departments also includes the Financial 
Stability Department and the Econometric Modeling 
Department. He started his career in the Research 
Department of the Croatian National Bank in 1997 and 
worked in the Real Sector and Budget Analysis Division 
until 2006, when he moved to the Mission of the 
Republic of Croatia to the European Union in Brussels, to 
work as a second secretary responsible for economic and 
monetary issues, free movement of capital and financial 
services. From 2008 to his appointment as Vice 
Governor, he was heading the CNB Financial Stability 
Department where he worked on the development of 
stress-testing framework, early-warning systems and 
preparation of the Financial Stability Report. Mr Šošić 
received his BA and MA in Economics from the Faculty of 
Economics in Zagreb. 
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Guillermo Ortiz, Former Central Bank Governor and 
Minister of Finance, Mexico 
Guillermo Ortiz is currently Chairman of the Board of 
Grupo Financiero Banorte-Ixe. Dr. Ortiz is also a member 
of the Group of Thirty, of the Advisory Board of the 
Center for Financial Stability, of the Advisory Council of 
the SWIFT Institute and of the Advisory Board of the 
Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. He is Chairman of the 
Per Jacobsson Foundation. Additionally, he currently 
serves as member of the International Advisory Council 
of Zurich Insurance Group Ltd., on the advisory Board of 
Bombardier Inc., and he is a board member of 
Weatherford International Ltd. He also serves on the 
board of several Mexican companies. He was Governor 
of the Bank of Mexico from 1998 to 2009. From 1994 to 
1997, Dr. Ortiz served as Secretary of Finance and Public 
Credit in the Mexican Federal Government. In 2006 he 
was appointed to the Board of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) and was elected Chairman of the Board 
in 2009. Dr. Ortiz earned a B.A. degree in Economics 
from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and 
an M.A. and Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford 
University. 
Erdem Başçı, Governor, Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
Born in Ankara in 1966, Dr. Erdem Başçı graduated from 
the Electrical and Electronics Engineering Department of 
Middle East Technical University in 1987 with high 
honors. He completed the M.B.A. program at Bilkent 
University in 1989, ranking first in his class. Having 
obtained his M.A. in Economics from Bilkent University 
in 1990, Dr. Başçı received his second M.A. degree in 
Economics from Johns Hopkins University in 1993. He 
obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from Bilkent University 
in 1995. Between 1995 and 2003, he worked as an 
Assistant Professor at Bilkent University’s Economics 
Department. In 1999, Dr. Başçı was promoted to the rank 
of Associate Professor and lectured at the University of 
York, U.K. as an honorary visiting fellow. Erdem Başçı’s 
research field includes monetary economics, financial 
economics, macroeconomic theory and mathematical 
economics and has many articles published in national 
and international journals. Having served as Deputy 
Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
since 9 October 2003, Dr. Başçı was appointed Governor 
on 19 April 2011. 
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György Matolcsy, Governor, Central Bank of Hungary 
György Matolcsy obtained his degree in economics at the 
University of Economics in 1977. Between 1978 and 
1985, he worked as a chief rapporteur and was a 
contributor to economic reform at the Department of 
Industry of the Ministry of Finance. After spending a few 
years at the Financial Research Plc, Matolcsy was 
appointed to the position of Political State Secretary and 
Personal Economic Adviser to Prime Minister József 
Antall in 1990. In this capacity, he was also head of the 
Economic Policy Secretariat of the Economic Cabinet. 
Between 1991 and 1994, he served on the Board of 
Governors of the EBRD. He was founder of the 
Hungarian Economic Development Institute in 2007, 
which he headed until 2010. Matolcsy served two terms 
as Minister for National Economy (2000–2002; 2010–
2013). He took office as Governor of the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank in March 2013. He is the author of several 
books, articles, studies and other publications. 
Yannis Stournaras, Governor, Bank of Greece 
Graduated from the Department of Economics, 
University of Athens and obtained his post-graduate 
degrees (M.Phil., D.Phil.) from Oxford University, where 
he also worked as a Research Fellow and Lecturer at St. 
Catherine’s College and as Research Fellow at the Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies. He worked as a Special 
Advisor to the Ministry of Economy and Finance (1986-
1989) on Public Enterprises and Incomes Policy issues, 
and to the Bank of Greece (1989-1994) on Monetary 
Policy issues. As Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisors at the Ministry of Finance (1994-July 2000), he 
participated in the negotiations for the entry of Greece in 
the Economic and Monetary Union. He was Vice 
Chairman of the Public Gas Corporation (1994-1997), 
member of the Board of Directors of the Public Debt 
Management Office (1998-July 2000), Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer of Emporiki Bank and Vice 
Chairman of the Association of Greek Banks (2000-
2004), and managing director of Kappa Securities (2005-
August 2008). He served as Director General of the 
Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research 
(September 2009-June 2012), as Minister of 
Development of the Interim Government (May–June 
2012) and as Minister of Finance (July 2012–June 2014). 
Since June 2014, he is Governor of the Bank of Greece. 
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Fernando Restoy, Deputy Governor, Banco de España 
He is a graduate in Economics and Business Studies from 
the Madrid Complutense University, a M.Sc. in 
Econometrics and Mathematical Economics from the 
LSE, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard 
University. He was appointed Deputy-Governor of the 
Banco de España in 2012. He is also a member of the 
Supervisory Board of the ECB, Chairman of the FROB 
(the Spanish Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the 
Banking Sector) and a member of the CNMV (Spanish 
National Securities Market Commission) Board. His 
entire career has been pursued in the realm of public 
institutions. He was Vice-Chairman of the CNMV Board. 
He was also a member of the Board of Directors of 
ESMA, Deputy-Chairman of the IOSCO Technical 
Committee and member of the Supervisory Board of the 
IFRS Foundation. He joined the Banco de España in 
1991, where he held several positions at the Monetary 
and Financial Studies Department. 
Bojan Markovic, Lead Economist, EBRD 
Bojan Markovic is Lead Economist at the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. He holds Ph.D. and 
M.Sc. in Economics from the University of Birmingham 
(UK), and B.Sc. from the Belgrade Faculty of Economics. 
Mr Markovic began his central banking career in 2000 at 
the Bank of England (London), working on monetary 
analysis and financial stability. He was in charge of the 
official model for forecasting U.K. inflation. In 2008, he 
moved to Goldman Sachs, where he was an executive 
director in private wealth management, focusing on 
investment strategies for exchange rates, short- and long-
run interest rates, and equities, mainly in G10 countries. 
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